Webinar or Talk
Understanding Lebanon in Crisis with Jonathan Spyer
Watch on YouTube
Description
Perversely, Hezbollah gains from the collapse of Lebanon’s economy and from the rocket attacks against Israel, even though they threaten full-scale war. Can the West take steps to reduce Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon? What can Israel do to protect its interests?
Transcript Automatic captions
Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved November 6, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.
0:00 good afternoon and welcome to the middle east forum speaker webinar series and podcast i'm stacy roman and i will be moderating this discussion today we're pleased to have jonathan spire a columnist for the jerusalem post and a fellow writing fellow here at the middle east forum join us to discuss understanding lebanon in crisis dr spire will speak for 15 minutes and open it up for questions should you wish to ask a question please use the q a box located at the bottom of your screen to type your question and with that i will turn the discussion over to dr jonathan spyer thank you very much stacy i hope everyone can uh can hear me okay if not then uh indicate right 15 minutes not a long time to talk about a quite complex and very uh subject instead of affairs in lebanon there are three things i want to quickly get through firstly the current situation the current very very dire social and economic situation in lebanon secondly very briefly the reasons why lebanon has reached that state and lastly the security implications or
1:03 potential security implications uh for first of all let's just acquaint ourselves a little bit with some of the statistics with regard to level on you lebanon is currently subject to chronic shortages of imported fuel beirut is currently getting about two hours of electricity per day the shortages of fuel are forcing hospitals businesses bakeries to scale back or shut down the lebanese pound has lost 90 percent of its value next to the dollar over the last 18 months of crisis it's not clear right now how much money there actually is in the lebanese central banks reserve nominally there's uh 17 billion dollars it's not clear how much of that is really there according to un figures 77 of lebanese households are unable to purchase sufficient food at the present time citizens are being prevented from er withdrawing uh dollars or in in considerable amounts from their bank
2:06 accounts are getting about a hundred dollars a day allowed to withdraw it's about as bad as it could could possibly be there has been a collapse of lebanese infrastructure in terms of fuel in terms of food provision in terms of electricity provision obviously at the height of summer still in the height of summer months so life for the average lebanese citizen is extremely extremely challenging at the present time many families as we said not even having enough food to eat now that's a whistle stop tour of course the interesting question then is how on earth did lebanon get to that point famously almost clichedly lebanon in the 50s and 60s in its early days of independence was regarded as the paris of the middle east obviously that was then torn apart by the arrival of the palestinians in the late sixties palestinian refugees and fighting organizations from jordan uh to lebanon the outbreak of civil civil war in 1975 for 15 bitter years of civil war but there was then
3:08 uh just about 15 years ago a great new hope after the expulsion of the syrian occupation the march 14th movement people remember of uh well well of of afsaat hariri son of the murdered prime minister rafika and now here we are 15 years on in what is i think it can be fairly said the first truly collapsed and failed states uh of the uh of the levant we could perhaps include syria as well but there is at least a nominal regime uh operating there in lebanon all is chaos there isn't even a government and hasn't been one for for ten months how did we get to this point well look there are a number as lebanon experts will tell you there are a number of explanatory lebanon was required to borrow enormous sums of money for reconstruction following the civil war and the result of that is a very very large national debt encompassing around i think 69 billion dollars around that is 150 percent of lebanese corruption is and has long been endemic
4:14 to the lebanese political system and to the lebanese financial system but it is my contention at least and not only mine that the reason for the collapse that we're currently seeing is not only or primarily because of those factors but it is rather because you must if looking at lebanon add to those uh genuine structural problems the presence in lebanon now for nearly uh 30 years of a sort of hostile takeover bid launched at the country by the islamic republic of iran via its franchise hezbollah group a franchise of the islamic revolutionary guards corps and i would argue that if we think of the la the last decade and a half as one of the slow advance of hezbollah and therefore iran towards full domination of uh of lebanon we can also see sort of marching alongside that the gradual withdrawal of many of those parties and many of
5:16 those factors which kind of propped up lebanese social and economic life and made it possible despite the presence of the distorting hezbollah and iranian element hizballah of course launches the war against israel in 2006 with its kidnapping and murder of a number of idf soldiers on the border doesn't seek permission from the government to do that in 2008 it openly challenges the government on the streets of beirut and defeats it from 2018 onwards hezbollah is at the center of the largest parliamentary faction more and more and more moving towards a kind of open iranian control and ownership of the lebanese state now from hezbollah and iran's point of view what's supposed to happen is that the official state and the official economy and the official political system kind of keep on formally existing and they act as a kind of cara pass a kind of cover for the true iranian and hezbollah domination of the country
6:18 who wish to use lebanon as su as uh springboard as uh as a soil for the prosecution of the iranian long war against israel intended to eventually in israel's destruction now what's gone wrong with that plan is that as other factors have really realized the role that they're intended to play they've simply pulled their money out most importantly the gulf countries kingdom of saudi arabia and united arab emirates have pulled money out of the army saudi the saudis pulled four billion dollars committed to the lebanese armed forces uh in 2016 but they've also removed their holdings in the lebanese central bank uh tourism from the gulf which used to account for something like 7.5 percent of lebanese gdp has ground to a halt so you know the gulfies have moved out and this has had a massive effect on lebanese economic and social life firstly secondly u.s sanctions against hezbollah and also against elements of the lebanese leadership have
7:20 hit hard at the economy too now put that together then with the arrival of around 1.8 million syrian refugees to lebanon in the course of the syrian civil war put that together with the emergence of cavite 19 which has hit lebanon very hard and then of course the explosion of ammonium nitrate in the port in beirut to kind of cool the grass in august 4th 2020 and you can see that these blows hitting an already very distorted and fragile body have kind of brought lebanon to its current state now since of uh last year uh lebanon for the first time defaulted on its national debt on a euro bond it just couldn't pay which meant then that the imf moved in with a proposed package of measures for a bailout of the lebanese economy but distorted as the economy is the lebanese political class was simply not willing to take the kind of reforms necessary to get that money so the money is not forthcoming right now now the government resigned after the explosion at the port
8:23 so for 10 months now there hasn't been a government a government in lebanon najeeb mccarthy a former prime minister is now having his turn on the kind of musical chairs of trying to form a government in lebanon and you know they hope very much there will be a government formed at some stage in the coming days mccarthy is saying he's close to it well we'll see but the point is it really couldn't have got any worse uh than it currently is in lebanon politically socially and economically many uh i think most observers of lebanon would say it's at a low point you know it's not been at this point since its independence since it gained its independence in the 1940s so this is a very very dire situation indeed now of course for many of the people listening uh here and for myself as well sitting here in jerusalem the main question is what security impact might all this have on israel the common wisdom which i've tended to to share also has been well these conditions mean that lebanese hezbollah
9:28 and iran don't really have the bandwidth or the time right now for provoking israel they're so busy with trying to hold up a collapsed system that the last thing they can really afford is uh heating up of the border and then clashing with obviously the very very powerful and strong israel defense forces this common commonly held wisdom was challenged of course uh in the uh first days of the present month with the incident that took place and we need to perhaps just go through what happened and remind ourselves before i'll then conclude by giving at least what my sense is of what it may mean um on august 4th three rockets were launched at uh israel from the tyre area in uh in lebanon this is one of many such rocket launchers there was a previous one in july 20th there have been about 20 such launches since 2006 since the war of 2006. usually they happen when israel is a war in
10:30 an operation against hamas in gaza they're kind of supposedly act of solidarity and usually they are they usually aren't claims of responsibility but they're attributed to uh palestinian organizations or fighters of one kind or another on this israel chose to take tough action and an airstrike was carried out the first airstrike for i think uh seven years since uh 2014 was carried against targets close to tyre where the fight with the shooting came from a day later on august 6th uh hizballah then launched uh 20 rockets at the whole dove area most of them were brought down by iron dome some others a few landed in empty areas and hassan nasrallah as well as leader then gave a you know that hezbollah took responsibility for carrying out this and that his bola deliberately aimed open areas because as he claimed israel had aimed open areas also during the air
11:32 strikes uh the previous day israel responded with how it's a fire artillery fire and at that point the uh incident uh was brought to a close now what does all this mean and should how worried should we be by first of all i don't think that this was an attempt by hezbollah to push towards war i don't think hezbollah can afford war or it wants war right now i think in a way conversely what it was was in an attempt by israel in the air strikes on the fifth to try to refuse an emergent situation an emergent status quo in which israel is expected to kind of put up with periodic rocket attacks on israeli targets or in israeli communities which are then attributed to nobody or then palestinian organizations are meant to have independently carried them out and the reason why israel is not going to be prepared and i think rightly not going to be prepared to accept that situation is because it's because it is entirely unrealistic to claim that anybody is launching rockets from south of the
12:35 litany without the knowledge of and permission of lebanese hezbollah and its irgc iranian masters and the reason for that i can tell you from some personal experience i'm one of the few journalists and certainly one of the very few israeli journalists and who spent some time snooping around south of the litany river on a couple of occasions and i can tell you from my own experiences and from from you know much study nothing moves south of the litany without the permission of lebanese hezbollah and the iitc they know everything that's going on down there they have that area very tightly under control which means that if somebody's launching rockets there anonymously it's they're doing so with the permission and very probably the instruction of his bola and the iigc israel therefore doesn't want to accept that equation and israel it looks like he's going to try and change that equation by taking very tough action including apparently when these rocket firings occur now what that means on this i'll conclude is that while i don't think either side is
13:37 looking for war and while i think that the deterrence that israel achieved against hezbollah in 2006 you know largely still holds we know from the experience of 2006 that a spark can launch a conflict even if neither side particularly at that point is looking for it and is looking to go to war so while i don't think that either hezbollah or of course also israel are looking to uh to move towards conflict it does look like hizballah is trying to impose a new status quo on the situation with regard to this rocket fire the events of august the fifth indicate that the government of israel does not intend to simply sit back and accept that change of the status quo and as a result there has been a notable rising of tensions on the border and as we know a spark can sometimes set off a very fire indeed so no desire for war hezbollah because of its catastrophic economic and social situation that it's facing can't really
14:40 afford a major conflict but we should note that the incident of early august does i think take us into a somewhat heightened state of tension and alert along the northern border and we should be i think and we will be i think watching that very carefully uh in the weeks and months ahead we'll also be watching of course whether lebanon if lebanon does in fact manage to form a government of one kind or another or if this quite a catastrophic situation continues and in that regard we should note finally that nasrallah reiterated yesterday his determination to start to bring uh iranian oil uh into into lebanon for the purposes of dealing with fuel shortages which would bring that country i'd say that'll be the next stage in this con this emergent uh process in which iran and its local servant are kind of swallowing up lebanon there's a big debate here in israel as to whether that's necessarily good or bad from an israeli point of view and i'll be very happy to get that into that in questions if people would
15:42 like me to i think that's my 15 minutes up so i'll be happy now to move on to trying to answer your questions and i hope you found this informative thank you so much for that uh we have quite a few questions coming in the first one is from jay lewis does this collapse present any opportunities for israel to aid the lebanese people and therefore undermine the power and influence of hezbollah and iran that's a fascinating question um as you probably know you're probably aware as the questioner is probably aware and others too israel has offered to uh assist the lebanese people with donations of fuel and foodstuffs and it's been conclusively unsurprisingly now of course that doesn't end the conversation necessarily we know that during the syrian civil war israel did carry out a limited but notable and successful uh project called operation provide comfort which was uh which ended up uh providing foodstuffs and vital goods and
16:46 medicines and medical treatment for syrians from the rebel-controlled areas of the southwest and in return israel managed to build up a quite successful relationship with some of those rebels which lasted a while now it's over but it lasted a while for long as it lasted it did a lot of good um we have seen in lebanon in recent days most famously in the village of shwaya on august 5th the day of the rocket launches there are indications that there are lebanese especially from the non-shia communities who are pretty much you know tired of this situation of hezbollah domination and who have had it up to here and who are willing to now start openly defying and resisting this organization that has you know brought their country to ruin so i think it should be a discussion in in you know defense circles here in israel as to the extent to which and the ways in which israel can perhaps potentially begin to exploit that to make contact with some of those people to help some of those communities and to to gain influence uh through that assistance there is a certain taboo as the question is probably aware in israel about all this because of the
17:49 perceived and i think it was you know a failed the failed uh alliance with the lebanese christian phalange in the late 70s and early 80s and that's kind of put a damper on on any notion in much of the israeli system of this kind of activity having said all that you know this is not the 1980s anymore we're in 2021 i think there are opportunities and i think you know i'm sure there are discussions about this and i can personally say at least from from my hope you know i do hope that israel will be let's say creative and imaginative and proactive in some of the activities it could be pursuing north of the border right now thank you and in regards to your last point barry werner asked how could it be good to have iran take over lebanon right well this is a big discussion which is uh taking place the point is not that it's good of course what would be very good would be if the iranian regime fell and was replaced by a you know pro-israel friendly to israel and pro-western regime or government that would be excellent given that that does not appear to be imminent and given that the current situation in lebanon and indeed a situation which has
18:51 pertained for about 50 at least 15 years now is one in which de facto the iranians and hezbollah do control lebanon lebanon is already basically controlled by the iranians and the and their local franchise local uh proxies but the problem is there is a nominal government ruling over lebanon there is a nominal state still in existence but it can't actually control the iranians or hezbollah and to greatest then it's controlled by them from this point of view from an israeli point of view it might well be preferable to have unambiguity to remove the cloak from the de facto situation of iranian domination now why does that matter well i think people can understand it matters quite a lot if you can imagine a war situation between israel and iran slash hezbollah in lebanon it might well be preferable for israel to be able to say look we're at war with a state here we're a war actually with a state which has been swallowed up by iran so we're at war with iran via lebanon rather than saying we're just at war with an organization called hezbollah and then facing the
19:53 situation which we faced in 2006 you know where the norman the nominal very nice very ineffectual prime minister of lebanon then mr signora you know can go go to the un general assembly and burst into tears at the fact that the nasty israelis are bombing his infrastructure and israel then suffers you know a great deal of diplomatic pressure from the americans who backed food senora from of course the europeans to desist in its war effort we don't want that we want unambiguity so that's that's the argument in that regard i'm not saying it's a closed argument there are those who would counter that and say no actually you know there are still components of the lebanese state that do have agency the lebanese armed forces arguably you know can perhaps form a counterweight to to his bowler and around you can probably tell from the uh i guess the way i framed the argument that i tend to be sympathetic to the view that lebanon is already an owned uh colony effectively of the iranian iranian regional empire and it'd be better if that were to be openly known but it's a discussion that's ongoing
20:55 even here in israel and certainly in the united states uh it's a very very engaged discussion and in the united states the people who still think the lebanese state exists and is worthy of support uh are still very much in the thank you so much that was a fascinating point uh along those lines carrie hillebrand asks what are the chances that the lebanese militia and the lebanese and or the lebanese army will take on hezbollah do they have the will and capacity the short answer is no neither the will nor the capacity with regard to the lebanese armed forces itself uh you know the army is the army contains a very large percentage of shia soldiers and they don't do uh tests by sectarian affiliation in the lebanese armed forces so you can't give an accurate figure on it but you know the shia are well represented within both the lebanese armed forces and within the lebanese armed forces officer corps and within the lebanese armed forces military intelligence
21:58 which means that you know you can't really think of it in terms of his baller over here and the army over there on the contrary they work very much together at least on a a local and tactical level which means that while there aren't undoubtedly elements within the army who are pro-western who are or anti-hezbollah in the event that uh any any lebanese prime minister or whoever were to attempt to give an order to the lebanese armed forces to act against his bolt it's almost unimaginable if we just imagine that for a moment the result would be the army splitting in two or possibly in three it wouldn't be that the you know notionally 70 000 strong lebanese armed forces would take on hezbollah that's unimaginable the army would split at that point and much of the army would go over to hezbollah probably with the hardware uh which that army has much of which by the way was given by the french and the united states and others who want to keep the lebanese state intact you see what i mean so that's the situation with regard to the army now with regard to the militias the other the situation is also not not great after 1990 when the syrians came in and
23:01 effectively ended the civil war they disarmed all the militias except for hizballah at that time his bottle was fighting israel in the south people remember prior to 2000 um which means that hizballah since 1990 of course has grown exponentially into something that arguably is in many ways a stronger army anyway that the liberty's armed forces it's not really a militia anymore it is an army in israel they like the people the chief of staff calls it the terror army you know so you know it's an army today these militias the druze the lebanese forces of christians and so on they do exist and they have weaponry still and they could certainly make trouble for hizballah in a straight conventional fight they wouldn't have a chance but having said that hezbollah doesn't dominate the entirety of lebanon in the northern bicar in towns like tripoli you know where there's a sunni majority hezbollah can't his fighters can't just go there and wander around those people are armed they are very much anti-hezbollah and once they couldn't sort of take on his baller in a straight fight and defeat it it's certainly
24:03 imaginable you know a kind of perhaps syrian style you know sunni insurgency keeping his bowler and its allies very very busy indeed that i think is imaginable in a lebanese context and could well happen i draw people's attention to a very interesting incident that took place i think was august the this month in a place called halde which is just south of of beirut where a senior hizballah local officer called ali shibli was shot dead at a wedding he was attending and then at his funeral was fired upon using rpgs and small arms and three additional hizballah supporters were killed now this area of halde is sunni area it's a very strong tribal area and there was apparently a tribal dispute going on between shibli and i think it was called the the hosting family a sunni family attached to one of the powerful tribal structures so there's lots of stuff bubbling on beneath the surface and this kind of stuff you know harassing of his bolo fighters local resistance local insurgency i think it's very much within the bounds of possibility but a kind of
25:06 open war you know in which hezbollah would be defeated by a rival paramilitary group i'm afraid currently is not on the cards because they're just so much stronger than all the others but they can be you know they're not invulnerable by any means thank you uh actually leads me into the next question terry rosen asks can hezbollah be destroyed is international aid needed will is the lebanon government forming possibly at the start well with regard to can hezbollah be destroyed the point is hizballah cannot be destroyed i think by any financial or political acts of the so-called international community and the answer the question as to why that is is because his bond has its own economy anyway hezbollah doesn't suffer from you know the decline in the economy that i was sort of briefly uh outlining a few minutes ago because his bowler has its own economy his bowl has its own ways of gaining income it smuggles iranian oil into syria and sells it to the syrian government it
26:08 smuggles cannabis through the gulf and to europe it smuggles captain tablets in very very large numbers to both the gulf and to europe and thus through all these measures it its economy and the people around it are doing very well indeed so even if there were international sanctions against lebanon because this is an aspect element of lebanon or against hezbollah leaders themselves and structures they have their own underground economy which of course vastly distorts the real economy but keeps them pretty much safe so whether or not a government is formed whether or not there are sanctions whether or not there's an imf aid package eventually or not and therefore whether or not the lebanese state survives the hezbollah state is not dependent on any of that has its own sources of income its own after all large grants are worth you know tens of millions of dollars from iran itself so it's not in danger of running out of funds can it be destroyed i think in the long term it uh it can be destroyed um but i suspect frankly that
27:13 the way in which it will eventually be destroyed is when the islamic republic of iran itself falls which i don't think is imminent necessarily but i think probably you know will happen in the end the the usual fate of brutal dictatorships is to fall and and when iran falls hezbollah will fall you know because his bowler is a it's a is nothing more or less than a franchise of the iotc it has no potential for independent existence except maybe as a small political party with a few guns you know without the support of islamic republic of iran thank you see so you brought up the explosion in the bay report last year uh there seemed to be a lot of confusion about it at the time david levine asked do we now know what really caused the and whether the chemicals were actually part of a hezbollah cache we don't know conclusively with regard to that but it certainly it certainly is the case that hezbollah had the run and has the run of the port itself it's the case that the portal
28:16 thought the official port authorities you would not be surprised to hear were corrupt and incompetent so for the re for those two reasons you know this massive uh stash of ammonium nitrate was able to build to be built up and we know that ammonium nitrate is uh one of the preferred uh explosives of explosive materials of iran irgc and hezbollah and that you know large consignments have been found in iitc hands uh elsewhere in the world in london for example people remember a few years ago a large consignment was discovered in a number of private houses as part of a uh igc uh effort on british soil so put all that together and you've got i would suggest you know some pretty good circumstantial evidence to suggest this very well may have been part of hizballah's activities but you know of course we don't have a smoking gun and the answer that we won't have one either and the reason for that is obvious and it goes back to what we've been discussing and it is that the lebanese state today including
29:18 its law enforcement authorities that basically work for his bollard certainly can't work against them so there isn't really any mechanism that can actually do a real investigation into this and we've been through all this of course before people will remember the special tribunal on lebanon which was supposed to be looking into the murder of rafiq al-khariri back in 2005 and it reached fairly clear conclusions that a number of hizballah men were the people uh who were responsible for the killing but of course you know it had no teeth no ability to apprehend anybody no ability to even order those men to come and testify and they never did so uh you know so that's that's the situation also with regard to this issue wonderful so one last question jack berkowitz asked forgive me but when is the hard-line islamic terrorist world ever considered finances and economic well-being before initiating violence and hostilities yeah no i don't think well it's not that they're considering economic well-being out of a sense of altruism i think that they are deterred by israelis israel's superior weaponry
30:21 and they are frightened of the destruction that the israeli armed forces can bring down on uh on lebanon they're busy trying to keep a lid on the situation in lebanon right now not because they care about people but because they care about their own power and their own governance and if they end up because of their economic mismanagement you know provoking something like an arab spring type reaction i you know thousands and thousands of people in the street in lebanon which by the way was happening just prior to covert 19 there were very large demonstrations taking place they don't want that they don't need that they don't have superpowers they can't just easily control demonstrations of thousands of people any more than anybody else can so it means that they do have to take all that stuff into account but let me be clear of course the main thing which is deterring them is not social or economic considerations it is israel's superior weaponry and their own desire to keep their own equipment intact and maybe above and beyond that of course the desire of the islamic republic of iran who are their masters to keep their 150 000 rockets and missiles facing israel for use in the event i i think of israeli potential
31:25 israeli action against the iranian nuclear program that's what that stuff's there for so all these considerations are in there but i am you know i wouldn't uh i would say it's important not to be simplistic i mean the notion that sort of terrorists are just kind of lunatics frothing at the mouth who aren't capable of thinking about economic sense and uh politics is not serious these are our enemies and we need to assess them correctly coolly and accurately and they're not stupid and they are doing governance and they understand if you're doing governance you know you do have to factor in issues of economics issues of popular control issues of popular legitimacy and i think lebanese says bola has to do that and i think that it does do it thank you so much for that point uh before we leave can you just tell our audience where we can find some more of your work sure so i have uh my own website which is called jonathanspire.com and most of the articles that i write from all various publications i put them up at that place as well after they've been published so that's a kind of great huge bank of articles over the last now going back nearly 15 years i think of articles there's a search function there so you can put in syria for example and read a
32:27 whole bunch of cereal because that's what takes your fancy or whatever else we also have my organization which works together with middle east forum called middle east center for reporting and um and that website is called and there we have a whole bunch of interesting articles from friends and correspondents throughout the region in iran in iraq in syria and elsewhere that we're constantly uh publishing it's a whole bunch of interesting granular regional stuff there and i have my bi-weekly column in the jerusalem post and my stuff pops up here and there also in other places too so that'll probably give you enough or more than enough of me if you if you want to get into it wonderful thank you so much we've come to the coast of our webinar thank you again dr speyer for joining us today thanks stacey very much thanks to for our viewers and listeners there will be no israel insider this week but please join us friday at 1pm eastern for a webinar with sonar chapter thank you all for joining us and i hope you have a great day