Webinar or Talk
Who's Ripe for Revolution in the Middle East? with Micah Levinson
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Description
Revolutionaries have challenged almost every Middle Eastern regime since 2010. What are the factors that galvanize demonstrators? What explains why some countries escape revolutionary unrest (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Morocco), why some regimes succumb to protestors (e.g., in Tunisia and in Egypt) while others either repress them (e.g., in Iran) or find themselves embroiled in civil wars (e.g., Libya and Syria)? Which Middle Eastern countries are currently most ripe for revolution? In particular, what are the chances for regime overthrow in Iran?
Transcript Automatic captions
Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved November 12, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.
0:00 Hello and welcome to the Middle East Forum speaker webinar series. I'm Stacy Roman and I will be moderating this discussion today. We're pleased to have Michael Levenson, our Washington resident fellow here at the Middle East Forum join us to discuss who's ripe for revolution in the Middle East. Dr. Levenson will speak for 10 to 15 minutes, then open it up for questions. Should you wish to ask a question, please use the Q&A box located at the bottom of your screen. We will do our best to get to all questions, but we have many participants on this webinar. So, I apologize in advance if we did not get to yours today. And with that, I will turn the discussion over to Dr.
0:34 Michael Levenson. Thank you. So, what determines whether a country is right for revolution. By revolution, I mean the transfer of power over control of a state. So for example, you have the French Revolution overthrowing the urban monarchy, the overthrow of Thesar in Russia, or the Islamic Revolution uh in Iran ousting the Sha. Uh most political scientists do not include coups in the definition of revolution.
1:11 Uh this seems arbitrary, certainly unnecessary when we're studying the Middle East where you see uh for instance the 1952 uh revolutionary coup that overthrew King Farooq and created a socialist military dictatorship. And you had the same uh in uh Iraq and North Yemen and Libya throughout the 50s and 60s. So what we're witnessing uh in the Arab Spring is more reminiscent of the French, Russian and Iranian revolutions.
1:49 You have mass mobilization and demonstrations leading to regime change. So first I will discuss uh what galvanizes revolutionary mass mobilizations and identify the ingredients of successful mass mobilization uh revolutions. uh after doing that it will become apparent that Lebanon is the most right that looking at the news today perhaps they're already in the throws of such a and that Iran is virtually impervious to such a revolution.
2:29 So economic discontent incites mass revolutionary mobilization. Uh the sources of the discontent could be high unemployment, stark wealth inequality in the face of a kleptocratic elite or overturning uh a corrupt minorityled cast system. the Sunni monarchy controlling a majority Shiite country uh in Bahrain and uh in former Ba regime in Iraq, the Sunni minority controlling uh the country to the detriment of the Shiite So at first glance it might seem like a massive overgeneralization.
3:18 How could economic discontent account for an Islamic revolution in Well, simply put, the ideology of the intellectual leading economically oriented uh masses often transcends the economic. But these intellectuals often conceal much of their agenda from the public until the revolution has run its course. Uh even communist revolutionary movements which are the most overtly uh often uh pursue utopian projects that are less about uh improving the economic situation and more about transforming human nature violently like the Kim Rouge in So after taking power, Humeni famously
4:21 dismissed an aids concerns about inflation, saying this revolution was not about lowering the price of watermelons. But in the leadup to the Kmeni's cassettes that he sent to Iran from exile very often did deal with economic issues, social inequality, and the corruption of the Sha's uh regime that was siphoning off billions of dollars from oil sales when the rest of the country was suffering from inflation and uh higher and lower standards of living as a results.
5:02 Also, the sha had uh greatly alienated many of the segments of the Iranian population through various economic reforms starting with the white revolution in 1963. uh he alienated land owners through agrarian reform and also the agrarian reform led to large numbers of uh previously quiescent peasants moving into the cities and becoming part of the restive uh working class and inflation during the 1970s greatly uh lowered living standards while Lasha imposing price controls alienated the merchant class.
5:54 Also, it's important to remember that uh opponents of the sha were uh in many cases leftists who were not sympathetic to Kmeni's eventual theocratic uh regime. And Kmeni went to great lengths to obscure what he actually wanted to create. He downplayed his political ambitions and the severity of the Islamic State that he favored. Ultimately, it was his militant cells, core of which was actually trained by the PLO, which along with defectors from the military imposed the Islamic regime on the country and they were only able to finally marginalize many of the leftist opponents of the Sha during the Iran Iraq war when uh most of the population rallied around the government.
6:56 So the economic motives of the Tunisian and Syrian protesters are also very Tunisian youth unemployment was at about 30% before the revolution and much of the job growth was very low income jobs. You had many strikes and most of the benefits coming from Ben Ali's uh privatization reforms were acred by a small politically connected elite and the growing increasingly luxurious lifestyle of the Tunisian president and his family uh aroused the indignation of much of the population similar to Iran where the Sha's profleacy particularly when he celebrated the 2500th anniversary of the creation of the Persian Empire at
7:58 Procepilus the most expensive party in history that greatly increased So uh Bashar al-Assad similarly presided over a privatization policy that favored the upper and middle classes while or harvests swelled the population of the shanty towns and perceived government towards the Alawite minority which Bashar al-Assad comes from also inflamed Now, it would be remiss to ignore religion's influence on demonstrators.
8:43 Uh, one must also acknowledge though that Islamic revolutionary rhetoric often promotes the idea that Sharia protects the economically disadvantaged and that clerics are less corrupt than secular leaders. Many Iranians saw the religious leadership as more sympathetic to their You also saw this in Algeria in 1992 which led to the Algerian civil war where the Islamic Salvation Front was considered to be a less corrupt alternative to the FLN which had run the country since independence.
9:29 So what are the ingredients of successful mass mobilization initiated So modern policing methods and crowd control techniques today prevent or preclude mobs from ousting a government by themselves. So they need to either win over defectors from the regime security forces, mostly the military. So you'll see in Tunisia and Egypt how the military often defected and told the leaders Ben Ali or Mubarak it was time to step down.
10:07 And short of that you need a guerilla movement to oust the government. Uh a guerilla movement with a territorial base that can operate outside of the government's control. Uh in some cases like Syria and Libya, you have partial defections that lead to civil wars. Uh but uh you do need defections if you do not have a guerilla army. Now when when are you likely to see these defections?
10:43 So soldiers are more loyal when they belong to a different religious or ethnic group than the or they share a revolutionary or they share the zeal of the government some kind of regime's ideological zeal. So you'll see that in Bahrain where as I said before you have a Sunni elite that enjoys certain privileges when they were faced with majority Shiite demonstrators the military remained loyal. Similarly in Syria, you find that the especially the Alawite leadership of the military remained loyal in the face of Sunni would have not just uh removed Alawite privilege but very well might have engaged in a genocidal policy against
11:48 the Alawites. But uh in Tunisia you did not see that because the soldiers belong to the same group as the Tunisian demonstrators. And uh the cases where you have soldiers killing their co-ethnics with abandon it's usually because there is some strong identification with the regime's ideology. So you think about Venezuela, which has suffered an economic but much of the military remains loyal because of their adherence to the Hugo Chavez's socialist ideology.
12:35 In fact, a general who did defect from the Venezuelan regime said in quotes, "A deeply impregnated filial commitment to the late president Hugo Chavez and his ideology explains why the Maduro regime is still in power." And this also applies to Iran where you have seen multiple largecale demonstrations, mass movements caused by economic dislocation and increasing prices, inflation and also the results of the sanctions.
13:14 Uh but every time the regime has cracked down ruthlessly and the revolutionary guard has not seen any defections. This was even true during the 2009 contested presidential election where there was even some disscent within the regime elite but still you did not see any defections from the revolutionary So that means that for there to be a successful revolution in Iran, you would need the revolutionaries to have a guerilla army uh that operates outside of the control of the reg areas controlled by the regime. And they have not proven able to do this. In fact, there are only a couple small guerilla movements that have proven able to do this in Iran. One is the Kurdistan Free Life Party and the other one is the
14:16 Baluchi separatist movement which operates in Pakistan and the Kurds operating in northern Now uh the revolutionaries in Iran uh really can't avail themselves of the Beluchi's territorial base in Pakistan because the Beluchcci separatists are a salify group that shares almost nothing ideologically with the Iranian The Kurdish revolutionaries do support a democratic pluralistic Iran.
14:56 But uh even if the revolutionaries were to avail themselves of the territorial base that these Kurds enjoy in northern Iraq and try to build a guerilla army there, they're unlikely again to succeed because of the extreme power of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. And what's more, uh, only about half of Iran is Persian and like the elite, and they're unlikely to want to see their power diluted in a revolution that is So I would like to just add two last points and that is Lebanon seems to be the country most likely to see a revolution. We right now see mass demonstrations and just today the prime minister has said that his government will step down. We don't know what this will lead to ultimately, but uh it is
16:01 very likely that you might see some fragmentation of the uh Lebanese military and security forces and an unwillingness to preserve the corrupt elite there. one last point is about military revolutions. Are there any like So in the uh past in the past these were coups against monarchies and the uh you saw this in Iraq, you saw this in Egypt. The militaries in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have been kept intentionally weak and due to their compensation uh it's unlikely to see them rebelling anytime in the near future. So that's my uh overview of revolutionary the ingredients of revolutionary success and my predictions
17:04 for the region. So let me turn it over to you for questions. Wonderful. Thank you so much. Uh so with the Lebanese government stepping down, um do you foresee Hezbollah losing political power in the next government? I think that it is definitely possible that their power will be reduced. I think we should look back to the Rafaeri sass ass assassination. So, Hezbollah was willing to use force to try to maintain control in Lebanon, but in the face of such large the Syrian military had to pull out and Hezbollah essentially had to stand down temporarily. It is possible that if you get the same threshold of demonstrations that they will again have to step down uh after facing so many losses in the Syrian civil war.
18:10 Is there anywhere in the Middle East with a possibility of nonviolent reform? Well, I I actually think so. I I would say uh there there are some possibilities in Algeria right now. There are large demonstrations that are calling for some of the uh remnants from the former regime to step aside.
18:45 And so far the military, they've been kind of dragging their feet, but they have not engaged in a kind of crackdown like you have seen in Egypt by Cece and the military. So you might see something there. Uh but also in Lebanon I although you see some uh dispersion of crowds using water hoses and other tactics it seems that the resistance to the largecale demonstrations has been largely Thank you. What is happening in Libya?
19:24 Could the fighting lead to a war between Turkey and Egypt? And which side does our government support? the US. I so the it is probably unlikely. Uh the CC government has has made it pretty clear that they do not want a military confrontation with Turkey. If anything, you're more likely to see the Russians uh the Wagner the Wagner group uh which is operating in Libya. They have about 2,000 mercenaries. Also, Russia has brought in a lot of pro Assad mercenaries to fight the Turkishbacked government of national accord. You're probably more likely to see them sending in proxies to fight one another.
20:18 uh our government has sort of gone back and forth on uh which side it supports but uh I think in the long run you see right now that Egypt, Greece, the EU, France, they all are uh in telling Turkey in no uncertain terms that their agreement with the GNA demarcating territorial waters will not stand and I think it is unlikely that the United States would side with uh Turkey and the government of national accord against the European Union uh Egypt, the Israelis of course and the criates all have an interest in the energy resources in that part of the Mediterranean. So when you have all those countries and American allies on one side and just really Turkey and to some extent Qatar on the other in the long run will probably support uh our
21:21 European allies Egypt and the Israelis. So you mentioned that Iran is pretty much impervious to a revolution. uh what is the role played by Iran's organized resistance movement and can that element can that be the element that offsets the regime's oppressive forces and help creation of a continuous challenge for the regime's suppressive forces? Well, right now the there is very little organized opposition inside of Iran. We've seen uh by shutting down social media, the Iranian regime is able to prevent communication from city to city. Uh and it's virtually impossible. You have groups like the Muja Aden al-Hulk operating outside the country which has a lot of foreign support but their
22:24 actual influence inside Iran is so minimal that they're able to sometimes engage in some espionage uh provide some information on Iran's nuclear program but as far as organized opposition to the regime rather than more spont spontaneous opposition to, let's say, the Rouani government reducing fuel subsidies. It It's really Unmute. Um, what sort of factional inviting might be anticipated when Kamini dies? And the same question applies for Abas.
23:07 Same applies to I I didn't hear the last Abas. Oh, Abas in the Palestinian Uh, well, it does seem that uh the current Supreme Leader has made sure that the Guardian Council and pretty much all important bodies in the country are controlled by hardliners aligned with the Revolutionary Guard. So it does not appear like you are going to see much uh factional infighting. The influence of the revolutionary guard has continued to expand uh economically as well controlling more and more It appears like they have pretty much a strangle hold on the country and you will not have some dissident cleric trying to form an alternative base of As far as uh Mahmood Abbas,
24:16 there are uh within uh several people who could be possible whether there's going to be some sort of popular uprising to try to bring down the Palestinian Authority entirely like we saw in Gaza where the where FA was ousted. Uh I don't see that as a likely scenario with the Israeli military maintaining control of the West Bank. Uh it it seems that as long as Israel maintains its presence in the West Bank that there is likely to be an orderly transition of power without Hamas or other groups uh ousting the PA should Abbas pass away.
25:15 Thank you. And our last question of this webinar is coming in from Beirut. Um, so do you agree that Lebanon is heading towards a civil war? And if so, uh, the winning side would take power, but do you think federalism is the solution for Lebanon? And how can both Hezbollah and Israel agree on not attacking each I do not think that a civil war is likely because there is Hezbollah is certainly the most powerful military force in Lebanon and it the Lebanese military uh has largely been subservient to Hezbollah. I do not see factions of the Lebanese military wanting to Sunni members want or Christian members wanting to defect and actually fight So I I don't see any group that has the
26:18 capability of fighting Hezbollah. uh what I think is is probably more likely is a situation like after the rough hareri incident although there might be I don't see a federalist situation but there might be a change in terms of the allocation of various government positions by religious affiliation. So I I could foresee a situation whereby the entire corrupt political class is replaced and uh political offices are no longer earmarked based on uh religious That sounds good. All right.
27:09 Unfortunately, we have come to the close of our webinar. Thank you again, Dr. Levenson, for speaking with us today. Thank you so much. And for our viewers, please be sure to join us Wednesday at 3 PM Eastern for Ashley Perry's much anticipated Israel Insider Update. And again on Friday at 1 PM Eastern for our webinar with Sam West on more trouble for Islamic Relief. Thank you all again for joining us and I hope you have a wonderful day.