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"Iranian Power and Influence in the Middle East" | The Forum Roundtable Ep. #01
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Prior to October 7, 2023, Iranian-sponsored terrorism and influence in the Middle East was pervasive and insidious, growing ever more dangerous as it inched its way to nuclear weapons and threatened Israeli and U.S. interests in the region. While Iran continues to pose an existential threat to Israel and edges closer to producing nuclear weapons, Israel’s military achievements post-10/7, along with Donald Trump’s win and foreign policy objectives, have significantly diminished the Islamic Republic’s ability to project power. The targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the destruction of much of both terrorist organizations’ infrastructure in Gaza and Lebanon, and Israel’s direct attacks on Iran have all significantly reduced the Mullahs’ ability to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic hegemon and Shia crescent from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea, including a “ring of fire” surrounding Israel.
Iran’s capacity to threaten Israel and the West in light of these setbacks will be our topic for discussion on the Middle East Forum’s premier episode of a new monthly webinar series featuring internationally-recognized experts and hosted by Lauri Regan. Join us this week for an all-star panel featuring Behnam Ben Taleblu, Gabriel Noronha, and Michael Rubin.
Lauri B. Regan serves as the vice president, treasurer, and board member of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East and as a board member of Polaris National Security. She previously served as the New York chapter president and vice chair of the executive board of the Endowment for Middle East Truth.
Michael Rubin is the director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Gabriel Noronha is the executive director of Polaris National Security, and a fellow in the Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy at the Jewish Institute for National Security in America (JINSA).
Behnam Ben-Taleblu is the senior director of the Iran Project and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Transcript Automatic captions
Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved October 20, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.
0:09 good morning and welcome to the premier episode of the Middle East forum's new monthly webinar series The Forum Roundtable during which I will be moderating insightful and informative discussions with leading National Security Experts on relevant and current events surrounding the Middle East today I am honored to host three men who I follow closely and I highly recommend that you all do as well through their frequent appearances and various news programs published articles organizations websites and social media platforms for regular followers of the Middle East Forum you must be familiar with the work of the unbelievably prolific Michael Rubin who serves as mef's director of policy analysis as well as being a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Gabriel narona is the executive director of Polaris National Security as well as a fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America's Gunder Center for defense and strategy and benon vental serves as the foundation for defense of democracies Iran program senior director so we have quite an impressive panel for our conversation on Irani Empower and influence in the Middle East today we have a lot to discuss I'll just add that today's
1:11 program will be recorded and available for viewing so i s i urge you all to share it Forum wide as these are critically important National Security issues that we'll be covering and I urge you to continue following and supporting the Middle East forum and promoting all of its critically important work and programming within your networks um I'm going to start by by asking Michael to spend a few minutes talking about Israel's various military achievements since October 7th and their impact on the Islamic Republic of Iran's ability to project strength and Mayhem across the Middle East I mean for instance in Gaza we know that despite the demise of much of its leadership Hamas still retains control of the strip and one recently released hostage indicated that the digging of Terror tunnels continues unabated despite the devastation above ground and of course we've actually seen Rockets this week from Gaza directly into uh the middle of Israel in Lebanon while much of hezbollah's infrastructure has been destroyed Israel still finds it necessary to maintain maintain five outposts in southern Lebanon despite the terms of that ceasefire agreement and while Israel decimated Iran's missile
2:14 defense systems last October the clock is ticking without any follow-up um attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure so Michael what are your thoughts on the strength of the Islamic Republic's ability to continue its march across the region to the Mediterranean and to attack Israel and other Western Assets in the region and and you know again please touch on the the recent fighting that's escalated again in in Gaza thank you very much Lori I'm thrilled to be on this panel especially with Gabrielle and benam um in in US National Security they teach that every strategy has a diplomatic and informational a military and an economic component the so-called dime model and what Israel has demonstrated is great progress on the military side of this but the Iranian strategy is more multifaceted and traditionally what has happened when Iran has its axis of resistance when it has the terror groups it supports is it
3:17 will try to strike blows militarily but if it can't achieve its aims militarily it will fall that back for example with a diplomatic strategy or an informational propaganda strategy to try to buy time for Hamas or other Terror groups to rebuild the danger is that others with a 7,000 M screwdriver will try to micromanage the conflict in a way that actually snatches uh defeat from the jaws of Victory now this Dynamic has changed a little bit uh with the incoming Trump Administration which is much more willing to be supportive of Israel in its fight against terrorism rather than um to to have the moral equivalence that we saw too often among some within the Biden Administration that said there's much more that can be done and there's also some faults on the Israeli side first of all the positives what Israel has done especially with what Michael Duran called operation Grim
4:21 beeper in neutralizing Hezbollah was truly impressive and provides a model for why we don't need to constrain actions against terrorists when people will say in the case for example of Hamas that it's just a fact of life that therefore we need or someone else needs to engage them that they can't be eliminated I would point out examples such as the terrorism we saw uh with the toml Tigers who were eliminated as well as the horror we saw in the 1970s with the c Rouge which some of the same NOS which Now sing hamas's praise like the American friend service committee also ran interference for that murderous regime that I mean killed a million cambodians the fact of the matter is ideologies can be delegitimized they can be eliminated so Israel has done well with regard to Hezbollah and of course the Assad regime is gone too although I worry a little bit more about what comes
5:25 next than many other people the Iraqis have been very very quiet and I mean what we've seen is prime minister Muhammad Al Shia Alani was able to successfully Force the islamist militias the Iranian back militias there to stand down the houthis remain a problem now here's what what I worry about besides simply Hamas being able to rebuild I think that too many in Israel and too many in the west are a little bit too um too confident in their own deterrence back in April of 2024 when we saw the Iranian missile barges at Israel people said this was a great um outcome that showed deterrence that 293 out of 300 some odd missiles and drones were shot down that's not successful deterrence because if any of the seven that got through had chemical biological or radiological Warheads we'd be in an entirely different conversation now so I
6:28 do worry about that and we can't let the enemy be um we can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good when it comes to the nuclear issue we may Define a nuclear weapon as 20 kilograms of 90% highly enriched uranium but the bomb on Hiroshima was only 78% highly enriched uranium nor do they need a file um a file explosion if a dirty bomb lands in the middle of Tel Aviv the economic impact would be immense that's one problem where it would actually fought Israel is in Mis analyzing Iran Israel has responded by showing its great Precision for example taking out s300 anti-aircraft missile batteries uh around Isfahan and they showed they can hit with impunity and they can hit hard and precisely the problem is and Shiki has written about this within um the Middle East Forum Observer our daily that Ayatollah Ali H's um supporters only listen to what he says they only
7:32 watch Iranian State television and they will believe that the Iranian missiles at Israel both in April and October were wildly successful and that Israel wasn't able to retaliate effectively perception is more important than the rues so if Israel wants deter to to work it needs to hit Iran and hit Iran hard in a way that the regime can't deny I mean taking out the Islamic revolutionary guard core headquarters I mean taking out other elements which ordinary Iranians will see that's where I think Israel needs to take the next step um and it needs to understand as Daniel pipes talks uh has written a book about that the gold needs to be an Israeli Victory you can't put out 95% of a forest fire and expect it not to regrow thank you Michael you've touched on so many things that we're going to continue to be talking about um with with you and Gab and benam so I'm going to turn now to Gabriel um because I I want I want you to share your thoughts
8:36 Gabriel on the impact that a trump presidency is having in the region I mean full disclosure for everyone I serve on the board of Polaris and Polaris during uh the last campaign provide a critically important foreign policy analyses to congressional candidates and um you continue uh to uh Gabriel put out very very important newsletters on these unfolding events Polaris has found found ER Morgan oras is now serving as Steve Wick Hoff's uh Deputy presidential special Envoy for the Middle East and uh Gabriel you worked with Morgan in the state department during Trump's first term and in particular when things like the maximum pressure campaign and Abraham ACC courts were implemented so now Trump Has Come Out Swinging with a lot of threats but so far while he's achieved you know some critically important steps and there's a lot of both living and unfortunately dead hostages that have been returned in phase one of the ceasefire with Hamas it's not clear what the big picture looks like in the region what impact Gabriel do you see Trump's policies as having on Iran and the proxies um I mean you know we I can also add in do you think that a a Gaza aargo
9:39 is a realistic vision for for the end end game here well that's a that's a that's a difficult question um maybe maybe starting with what's going to differentiate Trump 2.0 from Trump 1.0 um starting off is a lot more clarity about Iran and the Strategic Direction we want to see the Middle East going into um in the first Trum Administration United States stayed in the jcpoa for almost a year and a half trying to fix something that was irreparably broken um what you're seeing from this Administration is maximum pressure announced I think 12 days into the presidency uh a return to maximum pressure um a focus that Iran would not have a nuclear weapon would not be allowed to have a nuclear program which uh National Security advisor Mike Walt's extended to include ballistic missiles um and then a commitment to drive Iran's oil exports down to zero um what we've seen in the first two months is 116 sanctions um against the Iranian oil
10:43 industry um that is more sanctions in the Biden Administration imposed in its first 20 months an office combined now I'm not a believer that uh volume of sanctions is entirely dispositive um the quality of those sanctions is inre incredibly important and what we actually had yesterday was some of the highest quality sanctions which was going after the Chinese or so-called teapot refineries which have been importing uh vast amounts of Iranian oil going after both the refineries the business entities vessels and Executives um we have a lot more to sanction when I was at the state department there was often the question of haven't you sanctioned pretty much everything already um there are immense numbers of individuals entities relatives vessels airplanes uh left to be sanctioned there's a lot more work to be done and one of the things that we've seen already is that the treasury Department has taken off some of its own handcuffs that and is allowing itself to
11:47 go much harder much faster from the start so again if we're looking at what is the goal of pressure what does the Trump Administration hope to see um president Trump has always been a bit circumspect than many of sort of the the Middle East folks um might want he's always sort of put a couple caveats into into policies that some like Rubio John Bolton didn't necessarily care for one was he said he's not about regime change Iran um that's based on his own political Arrangement and Alignment coming out of the Iraq War and its consequences and really capitalizing on the on The View that United States does not want to get bogged down into something um and the other one is that he prefers to solve Iran's nuclear issues through diplomacy um I for one am extremely skeptical that that will work um I do not believe that the Iranian regime uh and supreme leader Ali hame in particular have any remote interest in
12:50 in reaching any kind of core that would be acceptable to either president Trump his team or congress but president Trump is giving a small window of opportunity for Iran to go when I like to go say go the easy way before we go the hard way um one thing that's also important about this offer um according to axios um the offer that President Trump offer of diplomacy that President Trump extended to hame was limited to a two-month time window and this was acknowledging that the Biden Administration got played for fools when they allowed negotiations over over the Iran deal to extend a year and a half um and then eventually even longer which the Iranian regime used to try to get sanctions Rel get all sorts of things so there are real constraints on on what president Trump is offering Iran saying this is a short Tim limited offer uh to do this the view from the Trump Administration holistically really
13:53 is that shared by King uh Solomon of Saudi Arabia who who once said that this um that Iran was the head of the snake and that is really the view of this that if you can deal with the Iranian regime and cut off its ability to fund its proxies that all the problems in the region become a lot more easy to deal with um on Israel um look this is one of the most difficult negotiations um for for two reasons there's the hostage negotiation but it's also really tied up with the future of Gaza the future of reconstruction and in the Arab mind the future of whether there's a Palestinian State um there are no easy answers anyone that thinks that we are going to get a magical deal that gets all the hostages out that makes the Arabs happy and the Israelis happy is simply not living in reality we do not live in the world where where we get that kind of magical realism uh in in into effect but what we've seen is the Arabs come to the
14:57 table with a proposal it's not the kind propos I'd love to see but it's better than things that they've done in the past and there's a slow and steady work towards a compromise solution to try to move us out of sort of the the October 7 world into a post October 7 world where we can move out Beyond there I think we're still a few months away um from that going into effect now that the fighting has resumed that's going to delay that a little longer the outcome is not going to be something that anyone is Terribly Happy I think that's again important for us all to lower expectations but say how can we have perhaps not let the perfect be the enemy the good and figure out what is the best solution that we can reasonably work with and then try to move progress Along on all other files on Arab Israeli normalization on Israel's security objectives on dealing with the Iranian nuclear program and so much shells but a lot of that you kind
16:01 of have to go through the first hurdle first and that's why Steve wickoff has been focused really singularly on the hostage file trying to fix that and then using that as a catalyst to then sort of solve the Gaza issue because those are the real predicates when you talk to anyone in the region everyone is still completely stuck up on this issue and it's very difficult to move on to all there the other secondary conversations we'd like to have have and we hoped that we would be having right now you have to address the sort of the it's like triage if you're in a hospital you have to deal with the patient bleeding out first and then you're able to deal uh with other issues on Gaza Lago uh we'll see um uh my hopes are low uh I think uh we will have some uh Apartments being rebuilt I think anyone would be a fool to pour a billion dollars into a fancy hotel and um until we see the the movement uh move on quite a bit further than where we are
17:05 today uh thanks for all that Gabriel lot packed in there and both Michael and Gabriel you you've set me up for my question to to benam um and I'd like to wish benam a happy New Year it is currently the Persian New Year um so um benam can you provide your insights on your the thought process of the mulas as they watch events unfold with Israel and the US fighting and decimating their proxies the amazing accomplishments of Israel's military and the direct attacks on Iran and the destruction of the Shia Crescent and ring a fire around Israel um president Trump posted on Truth social after the US began launching attacks on the houthis and I should say the US finally began launching attacks on the houthis um and we're going to talk about that more a little bit later but he he said to Iran support for the houthi terrorists must end immediately do not threaten the American people their president or worldwide shipping lanes if you do be because America will hold you fully accountable and we won't be nice about it so at the same time Trump's also as as Gabriel pointed out sending letters to hame in the hopes of
18:09 negotiating new terms of a nuclear agreement which would presumably look a lot different than Obama's jcpoa so what's going on in the minds of Iranian leadership and and perhaps even the Iranian people how do they perceive their influence um in in the region and what is your prediction for any possibility of these negotiations being um you know successful and again please touch on there's a new report that I'm sure you'll be talking about that FDD that you put out through FDD that lists uh 29 I think elements that the administration should include in any future deal so please share your insights on that sure well thank you so much for the invitation and the kind no R greetings no R beus to you and uh all my distinguished panelists and uh all the viewers and listeners out there uh party like it's 1404 they say so uh um uh moving on to a somewhat um tougher uh framing uh of a lot of the things going on in the region right now if I had to
19:11 put a a bow on the way the regime is looking at the region the way the regime is framing what's happening in terms of the ground game of its proxies and partners in the Middle East this constellation of Terror and proxy forces that in itself calls the axis of resistance um and that is of course uh down but not out that's how they frame it down but not out um what they're betting on and you know Michael alluded to this is the long game uh that the west or Israel or America uh will Tire when it comes to having a diplomatic ground game having a political strategy uh towards you know Central Authority in Iraq towards Central Authority in Lebanon towards figuring out what is more important in Syria counterterrorism counter turkey or counter Iran uh and in the space uh of that uh you know passage of time they're hoping that a disgruntled population a failed State
20:15 chaos still affords them an angle of Entry uh to fund and train and equip those who are willing to shoot at those that the regime wants to shoot at and ultimately uh that's what you see now with the way the regime is trying to diversify how it's still trying to keep Hezbollah in the game and at the same time how uh you know Iranian officials are now trying to publicly distance themselves from the houthis say no no these are a local actor a totally independent actor with pure agency yet uh for the past decade this regime has put state level capabilities in the hands of non-state actors like the houthis and I remember having this I don't want to say fight but this vigorous conversation with with friends and colleagues in Washington where many of them were focused on the the Hezbollah threat and I was like no no the houthis have capabilities that Hezbollah does not have the houthis have medium range ballistic missiles Hezbollah does not have that the houthis have paraded tested and have used anti-ship ballistic missiles they're the only entity in history that have like
21:18 live fire in a state of hostilities used anti-ship ballistic missiles they are the beneficiary of this axis of resistance because the who have also been supported by Lebanese Hezbollah some of them have been seen on the battlefield in Iraq for example one houthi official was actually even killed in Iraq but also they benefit from this axis of aggressors or axis of authoritarians as well you saw the stories about Russian Intel support to the hoies for example the alleged Chinese weapon ties as well and that's because the Islamic Republic of Iran sits at the helm of this axis of aggressors and axis of resistance this constellation of anti-American revisionist States Russia China North Korea and then Iran and then the constellation of Terror groups and proxies and you know Hamas Hezbollah houthis Iraqi Shia militias and what's left of the Mayhem in Syria and that is it believes its Secret Sauce that the regime believes is its way out that the West will Tire the West will not have a ground game and this marriage of the state and non-state actors that the
22:21 regime both supports and gets supported from will allow it to in short limp along for the duration of Max Pressure 2.0 uh you know you still have the regime doing things to put out a whole host of fires on the domestic fronts and you also have the regime being the regime which is as they put out fires they create a whole host of new fires they're vastly seen as illegitimate by large swats of their population uh you know the fact that the regime has so prioritized their revisionist and islamist foreign policy over the national interest and the public good is quite literally since I think 2009 been an angle entry for Mass Street wide protests against this regime and even yesterday in Iran where where Persian new year was being heralded you had significant uh you demonstrations protests could be the word but you had large swarms of people at these major kind of poet shrines poet tombs across Iran uh really kind of reclaiming national identity reclaiming National symbols and then shouting political
23:24 slogans essentially calling for regime change at these major uh places the regime will wait to use violence against them in the F in the future but is trying to kind of have a I think what melli was allegedly calling politics of the artichoke dealing with foreign enemies one time dealing with domestic enemies another time it's very much a one at a time uh kind of approach here and when it comes to Trump's offer and Trump's letter uh the uh invitation to negotiate you saw hame the supreme leader uh you know quote unquote immediately reject it but then Iranian official will say we're still studying the offer you know there's a Persian saying for this which is he pushes away with the hand he pulls towards with the foot they're basically still trying to run the clock they're trying to have their cake and eat it to engagement with Trump uh as much as you know we are critical of the idea that there is even a deal to be had we are putting forward the idea of that at fed if you are Desiring a deal president trump it shouldn't be arms control it shouldn't be something like the jcpoa it shouldn't
24:26 even be something like the INF the prism or the framework if you're going to use max pressure and get something from this regime through diplomacy coercive diplomacy at that needs to be disarmament and the models are some good some bad Ukraine Libya but also South Africa South Korea Taiwan uh some of these models are better than others but in in the aggregate they represent fullscale disarmament this is a position consistent with actual us sanctions law for example uh I think um you mentioned ballistic missiles also have to be included gabee did Michael did if I'm not mistaken Michael Waltz mentioned that this is something that has been in law since 2010 in the US this is part of the comprehensive Iran sanctions accountability and investment Act of 2010 that forms the bulk or the pillar of much of the really hard-hitting us pressure against the regime so uh in short while this stuff that we're putting forward is a high bar and engagement uh would be a very high price for this regime almost akin to drinking from a poison chalice these guys are Masters for for playing for time and
25:29 what this two-month window that the Trump Administration offers uh the Iranians is a way to a not be able to run the clock B cognizance of these real domestic push factors that are going to be putting the regime in a box over time C cognizance of these Regional factors that the proxies are down but not out and in fact D cognizance of a diplomatic strategy that there will be another IA Board of Governors that actually if you are going to have snapack you are going to have to have the Europeans involved by late spring early summer so this two-month window actually nicely packages and I would say takes advantages of the regime's vulnerabilities and does not let the regime play to their impression of us which is that we are irresolute and don't have the will to stay in the fight and in these two months hopefully we will continue to see more things like we just saw from the Trump Administration which is as Gabe mentioned go after the first time ever uh this teapot refiner so not doing uh what our friend and and colleague at CFR Ray te has called the junk food of sanctions but really
26:30 qualitatively meaningful sanctions but also at the same time doing historic first like preemptive military action against the houthis trying to get the regime to realize if they'll do preemptive military action against the proxy perhaps the West may do preemptive military action with the patron and use all of this to force H uh into a highly suboptimal solution for him than thanks that was not surprisingly very insightful Ben on um Michael there's there's been a lot of upheaval and instability in the region given the fall of Bashar Al Assad's role after more than a decade of civil war in Syria uh with turkey menacing the Kurds and looking for its own expansionism which some would even argue is aiming to replace Iran as the regional hedgemon um lebanon's been a mess for decades and the US left Iraq in shambles allowing for Iranian influence there you've labeled Syria's new president and an islamist and turkey's erdogan we know is an islamist so on the positive note lebanon's new president Joseph Bon has inspired hope that he will not allow
27:32 Hezbollah to regain power and influence in the country but the Trump Administration seems to be putting him on a tight time frame for that one um threatening to unleash Israel once again if things aren't done within a short period of time I I I know there's a lot here but but can you spend a couple minutes just uh telling us how you see these players interacting with Iran and do you believe that new and dangerous alliances will form between any of them because of the back okay well first of all I'm glad you talked about vacuums the important thing big picture that the United States needs to remember is when there is a vacuum in the region it's not going to be the forces of altruism which fill it it could be the Islamic State it could be the Islamic revolutionary guard Corp it could be uh turkey and the al-Qaeda Affiliates which they have sponsored but the point being that we have to have a strategy that fills vacuums and we also also need to recognize that our strategy can't be either or all extremism and Terror support that's ideologically
28:35 driven is a problem we can't choose between uh turkey's Sunni back terrorism versus Iran's a Shia terrorism even though again we also know Turkey supports Hezbollah now Iran supports Sunni groups like Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas we also need to recognize that the basis of our diplomacy has always been well Iranians can be pragmatic and therefore uh we should try to reach out we should extend our hand here's the problem the pragmatism which our diplomats identify in Iran can just as easily be pragmatism to work with enemies of Iran in order to screw over the United States in fact that's what we see repeatedly especially for example with regard to Iran's Outreach to Sunni in insurgence in Iraq back during the Heyday of the the Insurgency there or Iran's hosting of al-Qaeda leaders we need to not we need to recognize that the Iranians can be
29:40 pragmatic but in a malign way I I really commend the work that FDD has been doing because maximum pressure isn't just a theory we have seen Iran and we've seen ayatollahi change direction because of maximum pressure in the past um benam had made the comment about a chalice of poison and many in the audience may not actually know the origins of that phrase but after swearing that he would never stop the Iran Iraq war until not only Saddam Hussein was oued but Jerusalem occupied after more than eight years and a million deaths ayatollahi got on the radio and he said it's like drinking from a chalice of poison but I have no choice but to drink from this cup if I want the Islamic Republic to survive it was the pressure of that and the isolation of Iran that led H to accept a ceasefire short of his declared
30:43 objectives and it was also the isolation of Iran the sanctions that forced humi to release the American diplomats whom he had taken hostage it is an Evidence historically that Iran is susceptible to maximum pressure and even if Americans conceive of history in 4year units the fact of the matter is a broader sense of History shows that the strategy which president Trump is on can be the right strategy now um my final Point here is that when I look at Iranian rhetor and this has been reflected again on the Middle East Forum Observer our daily rapid reaction uh site uh you no longer have to wait for the Middle East quarterly you're going to get things in your inbox every single morning at 0600 the fact of the matter is we've seen in his rhetoric just in the past week Ayatollah Ali the supreme leader distan himself and pretty much ackowledge that there is no nuclear
31:45 fatwa that everything which Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry based their nuclear diplomacy on was an elaborate fraud an elaborate scheme and so US National Security we can differ with some of the tactics which president Trump is is is taking but US National Security is always at its strongest when it's based on reality rather than wishful thinking and that applies to Turkey that applies to Iran that applies to the houthis as well but with that let me turn the floor back over thank you Michael um so I'm glad you ended with the houthis because I do want to come back to them and I'm going to ask um Gabriel just to if you could spend a few minutes um discussing the importance of that um the houthis and the Iran Terror proxy Network and you know I it's important to recall I think the audience should recall that when Biden entered office the sais were fighting the houthis until the administration removed the terror designation off of the houthis and forc the sties to stand down um Gabriel you've actually pointed out that Biden
32:48 let the the houthis build back better so I'd like you to spend some time talking about both the US interest in destroying the the hou's ability to impair the safe and secure passage in the Red Sea as well as Iran's competing interest in supporting Hy terrorism um support that in in recent report indicated is is coming directly from the irgc and hame um we we know how bad everything is in in the Red Sea these days but I'm not sure if people are aware that that while Western ships are not able to Traverse and have to go Around the Horn of Africa um China and Russia have retained unrestricted Transit through the Red Sea and they both sell the houthi weapons on top of the Supply Center from Tyron so if you can um maybe touch on you know do you see the Saudis rejoining any fight against the houis with the US um do you think that um the US will hit Iranian Targets in Yemen as Mike Waltz has suggested and do you see Tron abandoning the houthis as it faces Mountain prep uh problems both domestically as we've
33:50 heard about and militarily great great questions all around uh you know I'll start by couple couple observations on the houthis themselves one is that they're a bit more of an indigenous Force which also means that some of these air strikes which are intended uh when we're looking at what is the intention of these air strikes it's not like Al-Qaeda or Isis where they are Sweeping in it's more these people have been here they're deeply again I hate to say this deeply embedded in in the fabric uh but that's the reality they control most of Northern Yemen and have for some time um and then the other point point I'd make is that as we rank the proxies by how responsive they are to uh to Tyron um hesb is sort of a perfect proxy Hamas is a moderately good proxy and the houthis are the least responsive they do a lot of what Iran wants but they have some of their own will um what Trump is trying to do is to actually try to change that uh Dynamic and they are and one of the
34:58 things that we saw from president Trump was the statement that we will hold Iran responsible for the actions of the houthis hom just tweeted this morning trying to dispel that notion because that linkage is so problematic for Iran if if the United States says if Iran strikes if the hoodi strike a US ship we're going to hit an Iranian ship that creates real problems for Iran's strategic um calculations and one of the best ways the United States can actually cause the to continue to be a promise regardless of whether they are your perfect command and control relationship or not we are still going to treat you responsible that would force heran to then really reel in the houthis as much as possible in terms of us interests you know I don't think a lot of people appreciate the grand scale to which the houthi uh campaigned since October 7th has H the international economy roughly $20 billion is the cost international shipping from just the fuel cost of
36:00 having to go around Africa um each ship uh is roughly about a millionar in extra cost and there's been roughly 20,000 ships that have had to divert to the Egyptian economy it's $800 million a month um that is the cost of decreased Revenue into the sus Canal so Egypt's been you know under huge economic strin from very bad economic decisions so there's there's that and then 174 War us attacked I think the where it starts to get tricky as we start looking at what are our goals in this operation that we're doing and do we have the means to achieve those goals the Obama policy from sorry sorry the Biden policy from since October 7th was sort of try not to look completely cow strike here and there strike some weapons Depot but is very much a mowing the grass kind of approach at a very high setting so you're not even clipping that much of it the and the houthis you know survived pretty much most of this without
37:04 Consequence the question is is a few fold is the intent to degrade to eliminate and then if it is the latter or even if it is the former with what are we filling that void and so Michael's talking about the president of ye of uh Yemen coming on to uh The Forum or sorry yemeni foreign minister um and then you know you have the you have the Sou transition Council which is sort of the back Force the question that I think we should think about is what is the endgame here um Beyond simply the degradation of forces um a lot of people who are smarter than me on Yemen often point out that the huies are unlikely to be deterred by themselves the deterrence question is the Iran question the degradation question is is what we're trying to do right now um on Saudi Arabia you know they've had a they had a AE campaign against the houthis it went terribly um and then for the past two years of their campaign in 21 and 22 the bid Administration completely hamstrung
38:07 their efforts um cut off Intel cut off weapons arm sales so a lot of this could have been averted if we had simply just enabled Saudi Arabia and UI to go full Ham on this the success of that operation I think to be candid would not necessarily have been uh fortuitous um Saudi Arabia these days does not show signs of eagerness to re-engage because they don't want this to be a Perpetual conflict they atrociously failed at their counterinsurgency efforts in the past you know looking today who has the interest it's actually Egypt in theory should have some of the interest in getting rid the houthis due to their economic in uh interests but they similarly have a rather pessimistic view of their ability to do it successfully and they're not eager to make sort of permanent more permanent enemy enemies of the houthis themselves we talk a lot about how the United States doesn't want to be the world's policeman but what we've just done is effectively done the job of world policemen a lot of countries and actors are very grateful
39:10 that we're doing it um but no one wants seems to want to uh make the Investments to do it themselves um on the building back better this will be my last point because I know we want to get to questions you know one of the things that has happened in the past that has sort of been revealed in the past months uh the houthis have been buying hydrogen cell fuel cells from the Chinese so they can make their missiles and drones even further ranged they've been buying weapons from Russians they've been going delegations to Moscow and then again that immunity that they were providing these ships in return very smart from the huies very smart from the Russians and Chinese um and it should again be a clarifying factor to our Arab friends and Israeli friends that the r and Chinese are not your friends they are the friends of radical uh islamists that seek to undermine all of their interests again we should always remind those who sit on the sidelines that we the United States are the ones who have their
40:12 backs hey hey Lori since uh Gabriel uh stole my thunder I just wanted to point out for the audience that at the Middle East Forum conference in May one of our keynote speakers is going to be khed Al the former foreign minister of Yemen who resigned in disgust when the United Nations imposed an inspection regime that didn't work um and he's going to be talking to the Middle East Forum about how to counter the houthi challenge how to counter the weapon smuggling uh what's going on at the Port of Huda what's going on uh across the border from Oman something John shanzer at FDD just wrote about um it it's going to be a must listen to for those of you who haven't signed up for the conference please do sorry Michael I didn't realize that was to the panelist I just realized that but double advertisement no thank you I think that for saying that uh Michael because it's the Forum uh conference last year was terrific and I encourage everybody to go this year it's really check it out online the panels
41:14 are going to be amazing there's going to be uh War Games day lots of really great stuff so um I hope everybody uh attends um Ben um I just briefly Seth cropsy and and Joseph Epstein corot in last week's Wall Street Journal entitled azerbijan is Israel's new friend in the Muslim World suggesting that the US Israel and azerbajan could create a powerful Bull workk against the Islamic Republic um you know I I I'm curious what you think do you believe that they will join the Abraham Accords and what will the impact of that have on Iran especially since aaban shares a border with both Iran and Russia do you see an expanding Abraham Accord serving as an anti-iran Coalition and given that the Obama Administration leaked in 2012 that aeran granted Israel access to airfields to strike Iran and that in 2018 that country acted as a staging ground for Israel's theft of Iran's nuclear weapons archives do you see aeran helping Israel in an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities assuming um that something like that occurs and we
42:15 can talk about that in a couple minutes also uh well over to Mike now just k um listen um this is an area where I think Michael and I have a great amount of convergence actually I mean we tend to on a lot of Middle East foreign policy issues but I think especially on this one because this is one where moral Clarity and political uh and political strategy does indeed overlap for us but I think for many of our friends uh in Washington it may not necessarily have that it's one thing to say that obviously aeran a country on Iran's border trying to play up ethnic tensions uh can be a vehicle for a country like Israel uh to you know launch you know covert operations you know allegedly the atomic AR was driven out over land from Iran into aeran when the Israelis were engaging at that heist in 2018 uh or conversely this is a way to kind of offset Iran's border strategy the ring of fire that you mentioned Lori you know they play on our borders we'll play on their borders uh but I would say you know that would be counterproductive not in terms of the means but especially in
43:17 terms of the ends you know unlike many of the other countries in the middle least which have uh grown over time or you know been put on the map over time Iran today is actually smaller than it's ever been at least in the past 500 years and that of course is that if you ever do have a genuine change of regime in Iran you would actually have a broad amount of mass and popular appeal for Israel America and the west and that is something that could be significantly lost if you actually allow the Ali of governments uh in aeran this Freer hand to engage in stoking of ethnos sectarian intentions you know those who do point to this as a positive card against the regime you know they miss the fact that hame the supreme leader of Iran is half aeri you have actually in the past 900 years of Iranian history this azeri kind of Persian uh Alliance uh in terms of Iran's various tribes and ethnic uh minorities that has actually helped in you know become Partners in power kind of like that Robert D book Nixon and kiz and your partners in power almost to the point that when they have intermarriage and whatnot you have people who two
44:19 three generations back don't tend to live in the same places that those who say okay this is an azerbaijani uh Northwest Quadrant this is okay the p Heartland things are not as neat and parsimonious like that when you look at you know migration patterns and intermarriage over really the past 4 or 500 years that's one two is of course naturally I could see just geost strategically when you look at the Mill to Mill ties the Intel ties those deepening uh but again but then again as Israel you know perhaps is being more cautious about the friends that it cultivates or the friends that is able to keep in the west it may not be worth losing uh I would say broad-based Christian support given the Armenia a ban conflict the behavior of aeri troops during that conflict and of course uh the fact that the regime in in in Baku does indeed play both sides on the economic side it plays footsy with the Islamic Republic as much as it positions itself uh to be a counter Islamic Republic of Iran force and indeed uh it could be you know still falling prey to the you know the islamist predation uh of the Islamic Republic of Iran uh in
45:23 terms of you know trying to co-opt a lot of the activists there arm them or find a downed and dispossessed person and put a gun in their hand and give them radical ideology so long story short in terms of geopolitics I understand why the Israelis are doing this uh and MTO Mill at Intel naturally I think if there is uh some kind of an attack you could see the Israelis try to have a northern front or a northern Corridor uh but um I think politically uh this has a much shorter uh time Horizon and in fact the relationship would indeed have an expert date if you do get a fully different regime in Iran so I'm I'm one who is much more dubious of this relationship and I understand marriages of convenience and I understand the Middle East is actually in so many ways very Byzantine and it's not about ideology it's about uh real politi and M politi even uh but this is one where I would see it actually as as having a much Runway Lori I'm going to just add in 10 seconds it's clear that in NATO turkey
46:26 has become a trojan horse using its position in NATO to disrupt the organization now Haider alev the pre the former president of aeran who's the father of the current president described the turkey azerbajan relationship as one nation two states my fear of aeran joining the Abraham Accords is that it too could become a trojan horse as turkey and as turkey's um in azan's capacity as turkey's little brother might actually use its position within the Abraham Accords to disrupt further expansion and pursue an anti-israel agenda if azaran is forced to choose between turkey and Israel there's no no question that it's going to choose turkey thank thanks to both of you on that very very important points that were not raised in the Wall Street Journal column um I want to POS actually a few questions before we have to go to to all of you to sort of chime in as you deem a appropriate uh the first question
47:29 is what are your thoughts on the relatively new Russia China Iran North Korea axis um in the context of how it's helping to empower Iran and help maintain Iran's hegemonic influence and goals in the region do you view and expanding Abraham Accords together with a strong centcom as a counterforce to that new access that can keep this dangerous Alliance anybody look big picture the post World War II liberal order is under threat and we need to recognize that when George W Bush was pillared for talking about the aess of evil he was actually on to something the fact of the matter is revisionist States want to upend the the world order as we see it and so we can talk about the Abraham Accords we can talk about the quad we can talk about any numbers of these other sort of coalitions among democracies Co coalitions among um Western minded more liberal states even if not democracies that is important and we we need to recognize this now this is more FDD and
48:34 Ben arms biley Wick but one of the things I most worry about when I look at the sanctions regime on Iran is that Iran and North Korea or Iran and Russia can sort of do the three anti-sanctions three card Monte look centrifuges to enrich uranium take up a fairly large amount of space but the mathematical modeling for Warhead design doesn't or for Warhead construction so who's to say that Iranian scientists aren't going to be operating in North Korea and North Korean scientists evading sanctions there inside Iran but the the narrowness with which the international atomic energy agency monitors actually makes this a um give gives these countries an ability to avoid um uh basically to avoid accountability as they proliferate thank you Michael anybody have anything to add um before we move on you know just go ahead very quickly
49:38 I'd note you know the Abram records are not gonna be able to fuel a a military counterweight to the to the axis of aggression um what needs to happen really there is building out the economic and diplomatic linkages to serve as a as a as a bit of a bull workk but it is West um in its in its you know dysfunctional form that must increase the defense spending and defense co-production build the Arsenal that's necessary to build that out without that um and without real European and East Asian uh defense spending were were Upp andreek this is just a a final little political point about these countries versus you know our block you know these countries actually have a fair amount of disagreements the economic political and even ideological uh lack of synergy but they have a least common denominator uh that is growing and sometimes unlike us particular unlike us here in Washington uh these countries this authoritarian axis uh are often able to uh build on
50:45 this least common denominator and compartmentalize their baggage and compartmentalize uh their rivalry so their relationships really will be kaleidoscopic I mean look at Iran and Russia uh they in terms of economies are literally opposed to one another but politically there is a drive to bring them together so they're compartmentalizing one problem and then focusing on the area where they can collaborate and there's stuff that's in the public and then there's stuff that certainly is in the private sphere there still are so many unknown unknowns about Russian support for Iran space program for example so word to the wise policy makers in Washington with respect to our allies rather than play up the differences with our allies let's play down those differences you know let's not air our Dirty Laundry public and the same goes for our allies with us and let's build up on that least common denom because our allies are quickly trying to turn a vend diagram into two overlapping circles and we have to detect that and put in bright lights but step number one no own goals we can't afford for our own overlapping circles to be turned into a vend diagram to be turned into two separate circles Lori
51:48 let me just very quickly add to that we also can't Naval gaze when you're as bald as I am you have to wear many hats and one of my hats is the columnist for um first post which is an Indian Outlet that's owned by CNN India and when I talk to the Indians about what's going on in Yemen they have a very different narrative from what we hear in terms of the Israel Hamas conflict and so forth back in September 2023 um the India Middle East economic Corridor was unveiled by um Joe Biden and Prime Minister Modi at the G20 Summit I mean basically speaking what it would do is ship goods from India into across by sea to the United Arab Emirates across to Saudi Arabia Israel and then into the Eastern mid what was cut out of that was Iran now the Islamic revolutionary guard Corp as FDD is expert at is I mean a major economic Force within Iran and so when the Indians look at what the houthis are
52:51 doing they see this as not just about the Israel conflict they see this as targeting Indian ships because Iran wants the money Iran wants to divert the trade we if we don't Naval gaze and only accept one narrative if we recognize that the Islamic revolution guard core strategy is always to kill multiple birds with one stone we may find allies that we don't know truly exist on this a very insightful points great points from from all of you um I I don't I don't want to let you all go without focusing some time uh these last few minutes on Iran's nuclear weapons program um you know we you all mentioned that Trump keeps saying that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapons program which includes no missiles no weap weaponization no enrichment um and he has stated outright it seems seemingly that the US would use military force if necessary he said and I think one of you has already repeated this I would rather have a peace deal than the other option but the other option will solve the
53:53 problem um so in in that how I and I know this is an intelligence question but do we know exactly how close Iran is in attaining weapons grade uranium if they actually wanted to how long it would then take for them to weaponize it in a deliverable missile form and um to add to this question is do you believe that a military strike by Israel alone would be successful or is US involvement necessary I have been told by some that Iran keeps burying this stuff deeper and deeper the more time that they have and that us bunker bunker bunker Busters may not even be able to reach the targets so um if there's you know other aspects to conducting strikes while Iran's def the other aspect to this is striking while their defenses remain impaired thanks to the Israeli strike back in October so if you guys can each address this before we have to go i' I'd appreciate it very very first crack which is on the you know the on the uranium enrichment
54:55 side it's 7 to 10 days to get that 90% which is sort of the perfect weapons grade uh uranium uh and then in three months up to 15 uh or or perhaps even more weapons the weaponization side is the hard part look I could I could go and say we think it's three months away but in reality we the US intelligence Community does not have a perfect track record of knowing everything and so it's the unknown unknowns that is very concerning that it could be a Breakout any time um if they have clandestine uh workshops that we simply have not found out about and are we really going to take that risk I don't think we ought to um in terms of military strike um all I would say is the United States needs to be involved that does not mean we have to be in the lead Israel is going to be in the lead they're there but we can't sit out that fight and Israel knows that they need to do this in coordination in conjunction with the United States that's all always been the view and I
55:58 think that remains the case today uh I will note uh there is a high level us Israel uh meeting next week on Iran uh and so I suspect see some uh further there terrific anybody else yeah just very briefly seconding all the timelines on the weaponization you know you popularly hear 12 24 months sometimes from the Israelis you would hear a little bit more sometimes you would hear a little bit less uh but I would Point folks out to an earlier story this year in the New York Times that actually talked about a even less than six-month time frame because again as Michael mentioned the perfect is not always the enemy of the good just because there is a declared technically sufficient way to do something does not mean that that is the way the adversary is going to proceed their military-industrial complex does not look like our military-industrial complex their decision-making tree does not necessarily look like our decision-making tree one rational view in one person's one one one definition of rationality and one person's worldview is not r profal in the other person's worldview and here they may believe they have a good enough for
57:01 government work kind of solution for a crude nuclear device that could be performative or or that could be announced and then be made performative later or that could be used in a low probability high impact scenario preemptive attack so I think absolutely you have to tread with the least you know worst case the most worst case which is six months or even less uh if they want to go there and then and then lastly uh to be able to shape Iran's decision-mak calculus which is if they haven't gone there already right why is that we have to think about the most secret side that Michael alluded to which was the weaponization side the stuff that could be happening in a phone or in a laptop or a briefcase or a schematic or in someone's textbook for example and you want to delay that process and hinder that process as long as possible remember when Ahmed inad was talking about they created a counter mosad unit and turned out the head of that unit was a mosad agent or uh when rohan's Intel Minister Mr unes he said that no Islamic Republic official should sleep safely at night because this is
58:04 the level which you are penetrated these are the things that can keep the hedging behavior of the Islamic Republic imp perpetuity rather than have them actually say oh you know what maybe we can go around these guys and then make that final Sprint turn that final screw uh and go for the bomb creating the Reasonable Doubt MAX Pressure Max support Max defections these are all necessary they're not sufficient there really does need to be an Intel ground game to show these guys how penetrated they are that if they would be doing this they would themselves be signing their death warrant because they would be caught and when you look at the things that have gone boom or bump in the night really since 2000 really since we kind of lost the fight over file material unfortunately G is 100% right they could do this in much less than a week go to 90% Purity and as Michael said they don't even necessarily even need to go to 90% Purity if they want to go all the way we have unfortunately lost that fight and what the Israelis have shown if one does believe that all these things going bump in the night for the past four or five years has been
59:07 them is that the hardest thing to penetrate has actually been relatively penetrated and that's not saying to take solace in that but that is to say take as much advantage of that as possible to scare them from going the final route um I'm not going to repeat what was said Lori I'm going to just make two quick points first of all what you had said with regard to their just going deeper and deeper in burying sites under mountains as Chuck Wald has said General Chuck Wald from jinsa you don't need to destroy those underground sites you only need to destroy the entrances to them and so it is possible militarily to counter this if the Iranian scientists want to be entombed under a mountain that's their decision now I also used to teach for the US Navy and for 10 years I would ask Admirals and Chiefs of Naval operation and so forth what posture should the US military should the US Navy take if we want the Iranians to take our diplomacy seriously and to a man and a woman what they said is we
1:00:10 need to withdraw our aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf now that might seem counterintuitive but in the Persian Gulf they're susceptible to missiles to mines to drones to the suicide speedboats but if we're 400 miles away in the northern Indian Ocean we can hit the Iranian they can't hit us and that military posture would lead the Islamic revolutionary guard Corp to realize that every time they go to sleep they might not wake up what a wonderful way to end I can't thank you all enough Michael Gabriel benam you are always uh surpris me at with your Brilliance and I love walking away from um you know discussions with you all with Having learned so much more um thank you everybody in the audience for joining us for premiere of The Forum Roundtable and I hope that you uh continue to support the Middle East forum and all the wonderful work it does as well as the organizations jinsa and um Polaris and FDD um that that our guests are affiliated with great work
1:01:12 from all of you thank you and I wish everybody a wonderful afternoon