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Iran's Success at Destabilizing the Region and How to Respond

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How can the West effectively combat Iran’s proxy militias, counter its nuclear ambitions, and exploit the regime’s internal vulnerabilities? This Panel will examine the current internal situation in Iran, Iran's regional strategy, Tehran's regional proxies including Hezbollah, and how the west can develop a coherent strategy to contain and roll back Iran.

Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Senior Fellow in the Washington Institute's Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics, where she focuses on Shia politics throughout the Levant. The longtime managing editor of Lebanon's NOW news website, Ghaddar shed light on a broad range of cutting-edge issues, from the evolution of Hezbollah inside Lebanon's fractured political system to Iran's growing influence throughout the Middle East. In addition, she has contributed to a number of U.S.-based magazines and newspapers, including the New York Times and Foreign Policy. Prior to joining NOW in 2007, Ghaddar wrote for the Lebanese newspapers As-Safir, An-Nahar, and Al-Hayat, and also worked as a researcher for the United Nations Development Program regional office. A native of Al-Ghazieh, Lebanon, Ghaddar holds a bachelor's degree in English literature and a master's degree in Middle East studies, both from the American University of Beirut.

Saeid Golkar is a UC Foundation associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Concurrently, he is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a senior fellow on Middle East policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Golkar received his Ph.D. in political science from Tehran University in 2008 before moving to the U.S. in 2010. His first book, Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Post-revolutionary Iran (Columbia University Press, 2015), was awarded the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Silver Medal Prize. He has also published several peer-reviewed papers in prestigious journals such as Middle East Journal, Armed Forces & Society, Politics, Religion & Ideology, Middle East Policy, Journal of Contemporary Islam, and the Middle East Quarterly.

Alireza Nader is a widely recognized expert on Iran and U.S. policy in the Middle East. As a former senior researcher at the RAND Corporation and a senior fellow at FDD, he authored numerous reports and studies on Iran, the Middle East, and U.S. strategy. Alireza has advised the U.S. government on Iran throughout his career and is regularly asked to share his analysis with senior policy makers. He has testified before the U.S. Congress and is often interviewed by the media. He has lectured at the George Washington University and has conducted research and analytical courses for U.S. Special Forces and Department of Defense analysts. Alireza obtained his B.A. in political science from the University of California at Santa Barbara and his M.A. in international relations from George Washington University.

Jonathan Spyer, a journalist, co-founded the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis, reports for Janes Intelligence Review, writes a column for the Jerusalem Post, and is a contributor to the Wall Street Journal and The Australian. He frequently reports from Syria and Iraq. He has a B.A. from the London School of Economics, an M.A. from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He is the author of two books: The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (2010) and Days of the Fall: A Reporter's Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars (2017).

Presented on May 14, 2024 in Washington, D.C.

Transcript Automatic captions

Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved October 22, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.

0:04 and now we're going to get started with our next panel chaired by Middle East Forum director of research Jonathan Spire Iran's success at destabilizing the region and how to respond this question this uh panel will answer the following questions or attempt to answer the following questions how can the West effectively combat Iran's proxy militias counter its nuclear Ambitions and exploit the regime's internal vulnerabilities Jonathan and his panelists will examine the current internal situation in Iran Iran's Regional strategy Tan's Regional proxies including Hezbollah and how the West can develop a coherent strategy to contain and roll back Iran Jonathan thank you Greg uh I hope the microphone's on and everyone can hear me so we're going to be discussing the issue of Iran uh today yeah hopefully those will all come in and we can get started properly um before we begin however a very brief I wanted to give a very brief shout out to our hosts at the kimton Monaco Hotel we at the Middle East Forum

1:06 as you know PRI ourselves in our attention to detail uh it was important for us that the decor in the room for the conference was appropriate to the themes and as you can see the hotel has very effectively responded to our request for curtains in the shape of the Palestinian uh kofia so we're very happy about that and we're grateful for it uh to get to to the business never neveress of our discussion uh the Islamic Republic of Iran its Ambitions uh and its bid for regional domination uh is in my estimation and our estimation at least perhaps the central challenge facing us and Israeli policy in uh the region today and it's for that reason that the uh strengths and vulnerabilities of Islamic Republic of Iran must surely take a central role in any serious discussion of the regional of regional strategy uh today so we're going to be discussing in the next hour both the strengths and the vulnerabilities of Islamic Republic of

2:09 Iran and we have three very distinguished uh speakers to help us do that uh you have the full biographies of course in the brochure so I won't go into everything but we have fredman senior fellow at Washington Institute s goka who is a UC Foundation associate professor at the University of Tennessee in Chattanooga and last and definitely not least my friend ali reada uh a well-known Iran uh policy analyst we're going to do this in the following way each of the speakers is going to speak for about 10 minutes and then that will leave plenty of time for discussion and conversation uh s is going to speak about mainly the internal situation in Iran and he'll begin hanen will talk from her very deep base of knowledge about one example of and the most successful example of Iranian proxy Warfare in the region namely Lebanese Hezbollah and Resa will round it up with a discussion or a talk also on Iranian Regional strategy so I'm going to ask S to begin uh to have his to talk with us about the current internal situation in

3:11 Iran side please okay uh good morning still is morning but you know it's a very difficult panel we already had three panel is getting closer to the you know to the launch and everybody is hungry so and we're going to talk about Iran so uh you know there is a question very important question if you follow the news you already knows that the Islamic Republic attacked Israel a few days ago or two weeks ago for the first time with 320 you know drone ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and you're asking yourself what has changed why the Islamic Republic this time decided to respond and attack Israel directly if you go inside of the country you will see the morality policing is coming back the street one year after the end of the woman law Liber freedom and Liberties for Mass amini protest that killed more than 600 700 people blinded 1,000 Iranian you know put the jail 20,000

4:17 Iranian and took several months for the Islamic Republic to brutally repress it so the question is why the Islamic Republic is doing the same game and is actually became more Reckless there are different uh idea that Ali is going talk about it internationally regionally but they want to focus on internal politics in my opinion the Islamic Republic since 2021 is a new phenomenon I'm going to talk about three topics the personalization of Power by the re ideologization of the regime and domic of a state the first is personalization of power the Islamic Republic right now is authoritarian regime without any doubt but if you look at the authoritarian regime there are several type of totic regime militaristic regime one party system and you know Islamic Republic is

5:22 a personalistic system after 2021 ayat came to the power in 1989 and gradually personal Iz revolutionary guardan Army gradually personalized the clerical establishment or seminary school and finally personalized estate bureaucracy he tried to uh personalize estate bureaucracy in 2005 after Mahmud Ahmed NAD became the president but because of the personality of Ahmed NAD and because of the presence of the so-called moderate aah K was not able to do that but after 2021 by the appointment of aah REI I can tell you that the Islamic Republic right now is more than anything that the personalistic system it doesn't mean that the irgc is not there and militaristic Trend are not there it doesn't means that you know there is a political faction between the clergies but if you look at to the Islamic Republic right now aay is the most important political figure that makes

6:26 most of the decision the second phenomenon that I want to talk about it and it is important to understand why Islamic Republic is doing right now and what is going to do in the in the future is the idea of re ideological isation of this of the regime Islamic Republic from the beginning was ideological regime based on the idea or theism humism is a version of the political Islam islamism that is based on the idea of the guardianship of the jurist that one clergy should rule the countries islamization of societies and export of the Revolution they have all of the similarities with other islamist group they are anti-semitic they are anti-American and they want to create societies but what happened is after H died for a few years ayat was a weak leaders and other politician in Iran decided to lower down the political the

7:29 the ideological pressure over the societies H many gradually came back and from 2019 after he published a second his second Manifesto political Manifesto called the second phase of the Revolution he believed that it's time for the Islamic Republic to go back to its road to the ideological Road in his Manifesto he's talking about five stage of the Islamic revolution he believed in 1979 Islam Revolution was successful in 1918 we created an Islamic regime but he still believed that there are three phase that the Islamic Republic should work islamization of country islamization of government and islamization of liberal or uh Global orders or creation of Islamic civilization undermining International order he brought racy to work on the third phase that is islamization of the

8:32 government by RI from 2019 even before RAC came to the power there is a complete overall of the Iranian political system more younger generation of the elite are coming they are much more ideologic and zealous just to give you an example compare jaad zarif as the Iran foran minister with uh uh with Amir Abdullah the new one more ideology that if is the Satan there is no doubt about it but at he was able to English right you see the the new Iran new forign minister is not able even to farsy the third uh Trend that I want to talk about and it's very important to understand the Islamic Republic right now what I call it dumbification of a state a state became dumber and dumber why very basically when you have a personalistic system you try to promote

9:37 the more loyal people people who are loyal to you you don't care about you know expertise you just think about the ideological commitment and by bring all of these ideological younger generation zealous people to the state you are making your estate less or more inex in ineffective state are not able to understand what the problem is or how to deal it there is a cognitive problem you know we have a lot of problem in Iran including economic problem including high employment including you know but the state prefer to go for the moral policing and beat the woman because they don't have a hijob internationally we have a lot of problem but the state decided to attack Israel so if you want to understand the Islamic Riot now you have to remember remember we are dealing with the new Iran since 2021 this new Islamic Republic in Iran there is a difference between Iran

10:39 and the Islamic Republic this regime in Iran is more rational and more Reckless this is a characteristic of all of the personalistic system personalistic system in authoritarian among of authoritarian regime are most corrupted and most prone to the conflict they go more to the conflict they try to create crises if you want to understand the Islamic Republic you have to understand aay and his ideology don't see Iran as a nation state don't make a mistake to think Islamic Republic is a rational act Islamic Republic and is a ideological person who believes to the idea of IM and umat for him his in Lebanon are much more important that for example Sunni people in baluchistan or Arab people in

11:48 for creation of this Islamic civilization from panar in Pakistan to Hazara in Afghanistan to go to the Lebanon and the whoy are more important than the national interest of the people he has a what I call it a theological rationalities is very different with instrumental or self-centered rationalities that we are familiar in the west you try to get to you know the point as fast as you can with let expense for the theological rationalities the T the target is much more important creation and Islamic countries creation of Islamic government and creation and Islamic International order I think that sets us up nicely also for hanin's discussion of Lebanese hisbah as an example of precisely the Iranian strategy which s has just

12:50 outlined for us so Han please than very much and that was great I always learn from uh your your your interventions and um it's good to go from what you said Onan hasah to uh Lebanon and Lebanese hasah I come from Lebanon from the south of Lebanon I have seen serious changes as Iran priorities has changed Hezbollah itself has changed drastically throughout the years 82 2000 2006 and today there have been several steps before we talk a little bit about what what what's happening now and why Hezbollah is reacting the way he's reacting today we need to understand these shifts and the shifts basically let me first say that hasah is not I don't see hasah as a proxy I know that everybody likes to refer to hasah as the most successful proxy of the Iranians I don't see Hezbollah as a proxy everyone else is a proxy a client you name it whatever you want Hezbollah is part an

13:54 original structural part of the irgc K Force they are part of it they were they do they are Lebanese but it doesn't really matter as the rgc K Force which is the regional force of the rgc hasah is the most important element of it they are not a proxy so the decision maker comes yes from H and the rgc but they are part of the system that that makes these decisions so it's not like hasah whether hasah has its own independence or not how hasah is connected to the others you can ask these questions about the Iraqi militias about the Syrian in hasah about Hamas there are a lot of leeway here about how these proxies are connected to Iran the hthis when and how depending on the occasions hasah is not that hasah is part of the ks force and that has been manifested in many many many ways when the decision making the decision uh making has uh has has shifted and this is also what made hezbollah's priorities and Mission

14:56 change since let's say 20002 6 until today in 82 2000 and 2006 if you want me to refer to these uh events quickly 82 is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon kicking out of Palestinians and the establishment of hasah afterwards inheriting that kind of like resistance uh liberating Palestine narrative and then 2000 is hezbollah's first Divine achievement big achievement which is liberating the South whether it's actually an achievement or not I think it was an Israel decision but for them they sold it as an achievement the third one is 2006 which they called The Divine Victory ended with 1701 resolution that basically stopped the war between Hezbollah and Israel which was the last war that 34 Days War until today which is not that kind of War it's not outscale war but there's a reason why so that's why I saying it things have changed drastically since 2006 today hasb back then was very restricted uh um

16:02 whether it was the actual ultimate goal or a tool to reach something but it was restricted to resistance it was restricted to liberating Lebanon from Israeli occupation it was restricted to fighting Israel that was the mission they had no other goal they had no other uh mission in the region their connection to Iran is was still organic but it was not as apparent and they were more focused on Lebanon on in the sense of resistance and Liberation then things changed drastically especially when Kim sumani led the C Force into Syria Iraq Yemen you name it the region the region happened Iran's priorities shifted from Iran's Iran's priorities shifted hezbollah's priorities shifted from like Israel and building their rhetoric resistant groups because that phase was basically to Lobby and collect support base and Sh and and and establish shm political Chism as as a big um uh

17:07 element of the Lebanese system and then they use the 2006 Divine Victory and order for them to to go into the region and their mission shifted from to protecting Iran's interest in the region today Hezbollah is acting and there's that's exact why hisbah is not engaged in the war in Gaza with Hamas the way everybody expected them to there was an opportunity for Hezbollah to jump with all its military might with all its assets and say this is the opportunity to actually uh H Corner Israel from both sides or three sides if you want to count the Goan and this is an opportunity to really exhaust Israel but they decided not to why because their mission today is not Israel and the resistance this is coming later but their mission today is not Gaza it's not protecting Hamas it's not the Palestinian cause it is they are the insurance policy of Iran the regional

18:11 military most important military ma asset of the rgc they are the defensive Shield of Iran's interest in the region this is their mission today and that's exactly they're acting how the way they're acting today they will not waste their military assets on Hamas these military assets are saved to protect Iran Iran's nuclear weapon if it gets hit Iran's in main interest in Iran and the region and the surv survivability of the Iranian regime if any of these three priorities of Iran were jeopardized hezbollah's military assets will be used what are these military assets and this is where we talk about strengths right strengths are hezbollah's Precision guided missile system which they haven't really used in this war for the past since October 7 they've used drones more and more drones definitely more advanced drones in the

19:16 past few uh days than before definitely used like fighter drones drones that hit the Iron Dome they used uh some Precision guarded massage but not the longrange ones this is something that they haven't used the rdan forces the elite forces they haven't really ruse they've been using more younger fighters pushing up pushing them up to the front in order the dispensable ones the real assets are still hidden and one during if if Israel decides to attack Hezbollah and all out War they will use it but they'd rather not use it themselves because this is these are the assets that are going to protect Iran's nuclear weapon interest and the regime so their strength also is that I think they realized after April 13 when Iran attacked Israel and failed drastically they did it for the first time but they failed and Israel attacked back that was an equation where both

20:20 countries decided that this is not going to happen again right Iran attacked Israel and realized that not a good idea but what really came up from this event April 13 and the days after is that actually if Iran wants to do something substantial it's better to use its own proxies it's better to use hasah in Lebanon it's better to use theis they are much more effective than Iranian drones sent to sent to Israel this is something that also made Hezbollah added to hezbollah's strength that they felt a little bit more confident about their presence in Mission but this also makes it much more complicated and this is very much linked to the vulnerability as well if we're talking about the vulnerability you said you wanted us to to discuss vulnerabilities a little bit I think the death of the resistance rhetoric is one of their main killers they they had the people behind them in 2000 and 2006 even when they went to Syria to protect Iran and the Assad regime they

21:25 had big popular support the Arab but also within the Shia Community maybe you're not hearing many Shia voices and protests you know and everybody thinks that the Shia Community is still behind hasah it's not I am from this community and I wrote a book about this I've been doing research about all the changes within the Shia Community within for when it comes to hasah they do not support hasah out of loyalty they are the silent majority that are very very very afraid and that fear is real and they do not really speak out especially after the assassination of lman isim in 2020 especially after the 2019 protest and the intimidation and threats that happened afterwards it's not easy but they lost the popular support and this is going to come out one way or another they are more of seen as an authoritarian regime in Lebanon Hezbollah today for the Lebanese people

22:27 like me is an occupation Force it's not a proxy it's an occupation force and the Lebanese are silent because it's very authoritarian it's brutal and they kill and they have the arms that they kill and there's zero accountability this is a strength but this is also a weakness a weakness because people are afraid of them yes but they don't there's no loyalty there's no love for the resistance the death of the resistance Hassan after the Gaza War took him four weeks to speak and when he did first thing he said this is not our war this is the Palestinians War the death of the resistance free Palestine right and they have these weapons the Precision guided messad they love them they talk about them all the time but they are actually a few hundred mad once you use them you lose them what are you going to do afterwards right so what what like if they go to a war today

23:29 or if Israel starts attacking them today they'd rather keep this arms and use them as a threat because they're more powerful as a threat than using them themselves they can use them once they're not going to eliminate Israel by using these weapons they're going to harm Israel yes but they're not going to eliminate Israel but they will be eliminated afterwards because they're done and they don't have the money Iran doesn't have the money or the time in order to um re um rebuild this Arsenal their goal today is to waste time as much as possible delay the war as much as possible keep these arms and maintain them in their Arsenal especially the guided missiles in their Arsenal as much as possible until Iran is done with its nuclear weapon and then they can get rid of them and start a war to defend that nuclear weapon that's the goal that's what they're doing today and I think you know at this point a preemptive War might not on

24:32 Lebanon on on on the Iranian nuclear program a preemptive hit is becoming much more um apparent because this is really the challenge it's not the guided missiles are there just as a threat I have a lot more to say but I think I've exhausted my 10 minutes and I'm going to stop now and if you want me to elaborate on any of this like I can come back to these ideas during so I'll stop thank you honey we have many we will leave a lot of time for discussion so thanks for keeping to the allotted time frame and Ali Raza please the floor is yours oh thank you very much thanks to the Middle East Forum uh for inviting me to speak thanks a lot Jonathan I just want to uh briefly talk about uh the Islamic Republic's mindset as it perpetrated the October 7th Massacre of Israelis uh just a year before in Iran uh the regime faced the greatest challenge existence since 1979 um since the 1979 islamist Revolution uh on September 22nd 202 uh2

25:40 the regime um murdered a young Kurdish Iranian Woman by the name of Massa amini and that led to uh the biggest Uprising against the regime uh since 1979 and this was really a revolution uh I don't think this was just an uprising uh the people of Iran really intended to overthrow uh the regime uh after Mass Amin's murder and there have been a series of uprisings against the regime uh starting in 2016 there was a very serious upright against the regime in 2019 as well and the regime uh was very worried it was going to be overthrown uh regime officials talked about it their families talked about it uh there rumors of regime officials preparing to flee Iran uh even so this was a regime really on the edge uh but unfortunately the regime survived the uh woman life Freedom revolution in Iran

26:43 and there's several reasons for this I think uh number one is the fact that this is a very effective police State uh and the regime really managed to instill uh fear in the population and overwhelm the people's resol in getting rid of the regime also I really do blame the Biden Administration uh for not offering the people of Iran any help any material help and getting rid of this evil regime all we Stu from the white house uh was rhetoric which I think is worse uh than not saying anything and the third reason for the failure of the mass am Revolution was the inability of the Iranian opposition outside of Iran to come together unify and overthrow this regime uh and um I recently wrote about this we could talk about it more uh if you like so ultimately the regime survived uh and then the Empire decided to strike back and of course uh its

27:48 number one target was Israel I remember uh when October 7th happened I have this bad habit of uh checking Twitter when I get up in the morning and the first thing that popped up was uh Ayah K's Twitter account um showing uh the Israeli Congers at Nova fleeing and uh the the joy that H many showed in this tweet uh you could feel it I mean this is a man uh who passionately hates Jews uh when uh the Islamic Republic conducts policies against Israel it's not just because of geopolitics or our hatred for the United States um this is an 84y old man that hates Jews and he knows he doesn't have a long to live and he wants to uh kill as many as Jews as possible um and I think this is something people Washington um a lot of people in Washington just don't really realize you know they they separate this regime into

28:50 moderates and principlist or conservatives uh but this is a a real uh uh anti-Semitic regime and that's what K's policies are based on um and the regime uh has in part achieved this stream it has opened up a multi-front war against Israel a multi-front war on seven fronts that has been preparing for for years if not decades uh you know Hamas would be nothing without the Republic and the regime has paid no price for these actions uh it has paid no price for killing uh the innocent people of Iran it has no paid no f price uh for massacring more than 12200 Israelis and uh the regime in tan pays very close attention uh to the discussions uh we have in Washington DC and the signals it

29:53 receives from the Biden Administration and the Biden Administration um since the start of the Massa amini Revolution and since October 7th has really loudly said to the world that uh we don't want this regime to pay a price uh and there are various reasons uh that the Biden Administration hasn't changed its policies on Iran we can talk more about that later I mean this this is a whole uh and so moving forward uh as I mentioned the regime had opened this multi-front war against Israel its goal is to disrup disrupt life in Israel uh by creating um hundreds of thousands of refugees from the North and the South and eventually uh there's strong indications that uh October 7th was also part of the regime's effort uh to weaponize this nuclear program I think just a couple of days ago uh the deputy

30:55 spokesperson for the state department uh well we have no evidence that the regime intends to weaponize this program but what what more evidence do we need uh the regime is closer to a nuclear weapons capability more than ever before uh previously and I used to work a lot with the panagon there's always discussion of uh Iran's weaponization or nuclear program in terms of it being a virtual nuclear state but I think we've uh moved Way Beyond that uh we should should be ready for the regime to assemble nuclear weapons and test nuclear weapons and I believe this is K's goal and the revolutionaries go guard's uh goal as well um so what do we do moving forward uh because Iran is still a very restive country yes the public is afraid of the regime uh but there are hundreds of thousands of

32:00 Iranians if not millions of Iranians that want to overthrow this regime and Han you said something very interesting and that really resonated with me you said that Hezbollah is an occupying Force for the people of Lebanon the Islamic Republic is an occupying Force for the people of Iran and I think uh Wars really matter I always call uh call it the Islamic Republic because it is not Iran the people of Iran are do not feel that they're represented by this occupying regime uh so Iran is still very restive uh in recent weeks there have been uh some signs of increasing demonstration especially after the regime um uh stated that it planed to execute a famous rapper by the name of Tage in Iran so any day we could have a new Uprising in Iran um you know I I find U the failure of the mass am revolution in Iran uh to overthrow the personally very

33:02 heartbreaking as do millions of Iranians but uh this is a regime that's in the last phase of its life it's very aggressive regionally as moving toward nuclear weapons uh but just like the Soviet Union when it seemed strong uh at the height of the Cold War uh this is a rotten regime and it has uh been rotting from the inside for a very long long time and uh we Americans should really be prepared uh to put pressure on the US government the next time the people of Iran come into the streets I I personally have very little hope uh that we'll see change from the bident administration especially because of the Personnel advising the president they're very committed to the nuclear agreement jcpoa um if uh president Trump becomes a president again uh there is some hope that the Trump Administration will again uh pursue a press a policy of maximum pressure against zamic Republic which

34:07 should be coupled with a policy of Maximum support for the Iranian people I think that's crucial and we didn't see that as much uh in the last Trump Administration but also we have to be careful Ambassador Bolton uh mentioned this last night at the dinner uh that there's a a possibility that Trump the Trump Administration being isolated aist potentially in the future more isolationist uh than the last time we'll pursue a a new nuclear agreement uh with the Islamic Republic uh which would be really disastrous for US National Security uh for the people of the Middle East and especially for the Iranian people thank you thanks Ali reso and that sets us up nicely for the discussion let me just add you said something very interesting that uh certain people in the uh Biden Administration advising on Iran uh appear to be still deeply committed to the jcpoa and my impression frankly also as certain people advising the president on Iran appear to be deeply committed to

35:10 the Islamic Republic of Iran also and this is no less a problem uh okay good so let's move to our uh our question uh period And if you would like to direct your question to one of the speakers please do so if not the viewers want to throw it out there that's okay as well so I think the microphone is waiting for us and we can go straight to it who would like to ask the question yes over please how how really effective how really effective is uh Israel's war against Iran in Syria um does it really push it back to what it wants to do or is it just mowing the lawn where are we with that how do you people feel about that I can I can tell you know if you know one of his characteristic is being a stubborn very stubborn you know and I'm I'm I'm quoting somebody who knows a before he became even Iran president

36:14 before of the Revolution he described him as a stubborn and he he is really is and if you think about the mentality of Mar you know you if the pressure is high you get back a little bit and then come back to continue what you are doing what we are seeing in the region from 1982 creation of hisbah to now you can see there are much more Shia Malaysia around the region there are much more support of the Islamic movement around the region so you can say by now all of this policy was not very effective maybe short term yes for one week two weeks withdraw you know all of these uh IRG to come in there and then go back and start again so we have to think about the policy that the Sol of the problem completely you know right now just think we have a cancer we have a patient with the cancer and we are just putting the Band-Aid of any places that is bleeding if you want to fix a problem you have to

37:20 deal with it with a root go trying to push you know I'm always saying that in islamist Genie came out of the battle and destroying the whole Middle East and you know uh in the world you have to push it back and by pushing it back you have to deal with the Islamic Republic you know you have to get rid of that an would you like to add something on that sure I definitely agree with you on this and I think it has been effective on some levels and ineffective on other levels it was has been effective on destroying the majority of Iran's and hezbollah's Military infastructure in Syria like we're talking about weapons depos military um uh you know um convoys especially going between Lebanon and and Syria so that's been effective tactically uh on the long run when it comes to you know like did this derail hezbollah's capability in Lebanon did this derail hezbollah's capability in Syria not really they continue to become to to be the threat

38:22 so on the long run yes it weakened them uh it definitely tactically weakened hezbollah's military capabilities Iran's military capabilities in the region but it didn't really stop them they continue to be a threat I think at the end of the day um the the if this was the goal to just like keep them keep pushing them then Israel probably succeeded if the goal was to actually eliminate that threat then it didn't depends on what the goal was yeah if I can just add my two sense to that absolutely I mean if we you know C tactical successes tactical capacities without any question but to today Islamic Republic of Iran controls uh an contiguous Corridor all the way from the Iraq Iran Border through Syria through Lebanon to the Mediterranean Sea into the borders with Israel and that has not been fundamentally altered by the uh Israeli campaign between the wars as it's known in Hebrew yes please Judy at the back so we've heard some good news and some bad news so some good news is good um I just wanted to ask if you could briefly

39:27 comment on the fact that the United States of America has been helping sort of revive uh the life in in Iran and uh as things are going down are we supporting it to go up also quickly mention about the tunnels in the north the uh the first question I'm not sure if I understood well we we were discussing how the um how things are starting to come apart in Iran but yet we in the United States through our current government and previous government have really helped support the the bad Al maybe on that so I believe your question is uh how is the United States uh helping prolong the existence of the Islamic Republic and it's really through the nuclear agreement or the joint compreh comprehensive plan of action at the JCP way uh which the Obama Administration

40:30 claimed to be its n number one foreign policy achievement uh as as long as uh Washington has this vague hope of reaching some sort of diplomatic solution uh then it's going to be really hard for the people of Iran to overthrow the regime uh you can either have a free Iran or the jcpoa uh you can't have both and ultimately uh ambass Bolton talked about how we set back uh the regime's nuclear program yes Israel can do tremendous damage uh to the nuclear infrastructure in Iran uh the United States I think could absolutely destroy it uh but I don't think that will happen um I think our best hope is that the people of Iran rise up in Revolt overthrow the Islamic Republic and then we have a relatively more Democrat IC System in Iran that represents the will of the Iranian people and the people of Iran do

41:32 not want to be isolated they don't want their children to go hungry uh they don't want to destroy Israel you'd be surprised there's a lot of uh pro-israel sentiment in Iran uh we've seen it in the diaspora after October 7th you know I can't recall any other Middle Eastern uh population or any other population originating from the Muslim world that has supported Israel as much as the Iranian diaspora and I think that's where the solution lies you asked about tunnels also J right so maybe if you could resp that the tunnels in the north yes they're real they're big they're uh they're they're very uh serious and I think the um the ran forces the for the elite fighting force that uh I talked about first uh is the force that very is very similar to Hamas and NBA that actually did the October 7 event and and the rwan forces are trained their main mission is not to fight per se the way everybody's

42:38 fighting now their main mission is to use these tunnels they're trained very well trained to use these tunnels in order to infiltrate Israel and that's exactly why current diplomatic efforts to ceasefire is not just about ceasefire is to push Hezbollah away from the borders for at least a few kilometers mainly because they want to make sure that Hezbollah doesn't have access to these tunnels but these the rwan forces and these tunnel are one of their main assets the assets the main assets that I talked about earlier and hasah will not accept simply will not accept so the other option is destroy them with war so it's either Hezbollah AC sets via current diplomatic negotiations which seems it's not going to happen or Israel will have to do something about it because you have 60,000 Israelis from the north who are displaced they have to come back and as long as these tunnels exist and as long as hasbullah has access to these tunnels most importantly

43:41 as long as heah has access to these tunnels that can send the redwan forces no one in the north will be safe so yes they are very very serious that was a question yes uh first this has been a very clarifying presentation thank you what is the IDE ological threat that Iran represents I I understand the its possession or potential possession of nuclear weapons makes it very uh uh scary uh particularly to the those Arab countries and that are prepared to make accommodations with Israel but don't want to get their feet wet before they're certain that uh they're they're not going to drown but uh what is is is there really a fear that somehow Iran is going to take possession of the feelings of the Muslim world and become the uh a kind of a a caliphate what is it precisely that that they're afraid of

44:44 thanks who would like whoever would like to uh actually this uh not not the Khalifa because Kord is a Sunni political system that the Sunni islamist try to recr create uh even in the west that there is a khif and you know with all of the characteristic in Islamic Republic in political idea is imamat system imamat system is after the prophet Muhammad there was 12 Imam the last Imam is in aan Hidden and the clergies are the representative of the Hidden Imam and based on that politicize this idea that this clergies who are representative of the hien Imam in the spiritual matter should be representative of hidden Imam in political matter too so the Shia should follow that many got this idea and believe to this idea you know maybe you don't know that but also translate that say the islamist radicals you know the the Muslim books so he believed to the

45:48 militant Islam he believed that we have to create this uh Shia um if the Sunni join they have to join ultimately but you know that's out of the role right now we have to think about the Shia communities in the Middle East North Africa and Central Asia K see himself as Imam of this umah and that's why he refer to the irgc go Force as a borderless soldiers of this umah doesn't really matter there is a very interesting poem I translated he talk about doesn't really matter if you die in Iran or in other places if it's not martydom is not important and if it's martydom doesn't matter if you being Marty in Lebanon or Iran you know the whole idea is a very ideologic form in the west we decided you know uh after the H died without the Islamic Republic is rationalizing we forgot this ideology and it's very difficult for the Western

46:50 audiences to understand this political view you have to see when I talk about the his is not a proxy of Islamic Republic I prefer to call them as a soldier of the Imam Imam has a different Army the Lebanese Army you know the the Hy Army the more loyal one are the the Lebanese one because of the historical institution but they don't see thems as a proxy they see themselves as a army of Imam yes most of the Iranian don't believe to this yes but you know there are there are a small group The Shape the base of the regime and we can talk about how many in my optimistic opinion is less than 10% and I I can tell you why but 10% believe and then that's why the Islamic for the Islamic for is much more important to reach out to the husin Yemen to the Shia Iraqi to the lebanes to the Pakistan isia to Afghan isia to

47:53 Kashmir isia trying to mobilize and bring them he lost Iranian population and he need Army for this amount so if you want to understand the Islamic Republic please forget the rationality instrumental rationality and think about the ideological point of view on this so you want I think there is a a major immediate threat to us coming from the regime in Iran if you look at us college campuses just go to GW or UCLA GW is my alma mod and I grew up up uh near La I bet you 100% that the regime in Iran is connected to these student protesters uh that's somehow it's funding them uh the Islamic Republic has a pretty big Lobby in the United States we talk about the Russia Russian or Chinese that work in the United States but the Islamic Republic has very successfully managed to create a pretty effective Network you know there isn't one organization that

48:55 lobbies for the Islamic Republic necessarily but it's a group of people H and they've been active for many years uh if you look into prinston Iran program it's 100% pro-islamic Republic 100% And this program has been allowed to operate freely for years and it's brainwashing kids uh to not necessarily pursue uh you know to defend the Islamic Republic but promote policies that uh help the Islamic Republic in Iran and the Islamic Republic will work with anybody Sunni Shia leftist communist alter nationalist so I think it's very vital for the US government uh to look into the regime's network and uh dismantle it uh the Iranian American Community has been really pushing hard on this issue uh but I think more Americans really need to speak up about the regimes in the United

49:58 States there was a question at the back there yeah go is it unrealistic to see uh regime change as the superior alternative to taking out Iran's nukes and missil capacities because a regime ready to go down needs very little time to break out a a bomb can actually be fashioned at 80% 90% that is a myth a little boy dropped on Hiroshima was 80% it just is larger and can't be fitted on a missile but it could be made it can be used so isn't it really both regime change and uh wmd risk reduction must be taken together okay who would like to address that who whoever was uh if you know uh the attack on Iran nuclear program May postpone may you

51:03 know uh slow down the Islamic Republic desire to get the nuclear weapons but it's not going to solve it uh the you know replacing the Islamic Republic with a more you know modernizer Pro Western regime is the solution uh we don't know to what extent Islam Republic is close to get the bomb but we know that they have invest since you know uh 19 uh 19867 to build this program when you build the program why you putting the you know rail railroad and putting it on for example South if you don't want to go to the South the Islamic Republic ultimate goal is to get that now there are argument this is a deter policy the Islamic Republic wants to deter other countries to attack it or no like other military equipment they can profer to the other group

52:07 likeah that's that's argument then all right so thanks yeah we if you want to get otherwise we'll move on to another question yeah just I if I can say one I the United States and Israel should be prepared to take out Iran's nuclear program and not just count on a revolution in Iran and succeeding because we don't know what's going to happen in Iran uh this could a revolution in Iran a successful revolution could take many many years especially after the failure of the mass Amon Revolution and so I think we uh both countries the US and Israel but especially Israel should really consider uh the kind of policies that could do physical damage the Iranian program and my advice for Israeli officials would be as well to really prepare for the next Uprising in Iran how uh how can Israel help the people of Iran free themselves by targeting senior revolutionary guards commanders like uh

53:13 the guy who was in Damascus disrupting Communications Network that could be uh very important uh because as long as the regime controls Communications and Iran can Crush uh protest I think not only should we think about how to destroy the nuclear program but how to overthrow the regime uh through much more aggressive ways again I have really no hope in the Biden Administration doing this uh hopefully uh the Trump Administration uh will will be more willing to act like that I have a full on question if I on this to either side or yourself Ali there are those who make the claim that the Iranian people because of their deep and legi attachment to their national identity and and history uh would mobilize around the regime in the event of an attack coming from the outside in the event for example of an attack on the nuclear facilities what would you how could you would you respond to that my answer is if it was 20 years ago you were right but right now I don't see it you know there is always a threat of the Iranian

54:17 nationalism but the regime is so illegitimate the people are so fed up right now that they are not going to do that the new the new generation is not as ideological no at all the Iranian people in general are the most pro-american Pro Western and pro-israeli population that you can see in entire Muslim majority countries that we are talking about 51 you cannot you cannot believe it it's not because the US did no it's mostly because of the enemity and alienation of the Iranian people toward the mullah they so hate it that they love everything that they are against it so Islamic Republic is anti-American they are pro American they are pro Palestinian they are anti- Palestinian at the back there you had your hand up for a while so so um what sort of October surprise might I Iran uh present us with uh to try to possibly

55:25 affect our our our national election what might Iran come up within the during the time of the US presidental election res I think it's already doing it frankly uh just by striking Israel the way it did it has really affected politics in this country this the student and agitator protest on campuses are affecting politics in this country they they could potentially s s an election and offici in tan know this very well uh and pay very close attention to what's happening in the United States can I add to it uh just on from from the hasah scene because after April 13 I think Iran is starting to use hasah more and more to send effective messages and strong messages we saw after April 13 immediately after April 13 the quantity and quality of escalation from Lebanon against Israel has become very apparent extremely

56:28 apparent the advanced drones and and and the depth that they can reach um plus the killing of Israeli soldiers and civilians has really accumulated so what I'm trying to say is that Iran is going to invest heavily in the rift between the United States and Israel for them this Rift they will invest in it rhetorically politically milit arily they see whether it's true or not they see that Israel is becoming less supported less isolated more isolated which means in their opinion that's weaker and this might Point uh uh might imply actually that this is an opportunity to escalate against Israel while investing in the rift between the US and and Israel and I think this is the moment where the US should actually make it very clear to the Iranians that this Rift doesn't mean that Iran is the

57:32 US is not going to support Israel and its next war in Lebanon or Iran or whatever so this is this is very important is important the Islamic Republic of Iran however is also important and for that reason I would like to take one more uh hopefully brief uh question uh yeah sir thank you um any you would what do you think the rationale is behind our administration's apparent passive approach to these malevolent developments in the Middle East a good question on which to to close the session so whoever would like to question again what is the rationale behind the United States administrations stand towards these malevolent developments in the Middle East why do you think there is a rational behind it sorry why do you assume there is a here okay just just one one one thing and I I think there's I am sensing at least like more awareness and realization in the United States whether current Administration or former

58:35 Administration people because no really since Obama through Trump until today nobody really did anything to curb the uh the the proxies or the Iran's Assets in the region it's not about Democrats Republicans it's about you know new shift and priorities for the Americans Obama did a very bad thing with the with the with the Iran with the with the nuclear activity but you know Trump didn't do that much or when it comes to hasah at least like I didn't see anything that had really changed maybe on Iran but not on hasah they contined doing what they needed to do in Iraq and Syria and Lebanon nothing really changed and today I think what happened really is when it comes to the importance of these proxies and the importance and the significance of these proxies to Iran is becoming October 7 really highlighted the importance of these Proxes to Iran the houthis were never really on the radar of anybody now there's a coalition against the houthis Hezbollah was left to do what it really needed to do in Lebanon as long as it

59:38 keeps deterence now Everything Has Changed same thing everywhere there is a realization which might lead to policy might not who knows it could not lead to anywhere it there might not be any R rationale but I really think that there is this realization everywhere among every body that Iran really relies on these proxies and this is going to to to to to to shift some kind of like at least the policy rhetoric not necessarily the itself I think the answer to your question lies in an interview President Obama uh did with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic and he said Iran and Saudi Arabia need to learn how to divide the Middle East between themselves this is pro this is probably a good point on which to finish as long as it didn't ruin your appetite uh so questions of profound importance the Middle East Forum as you know has put on its Banner the support for regime change in Iran for the bringing down of Islamic Republic of Iran and I think that we've heard today many reasons why that is the correct approach to take uh thanks very

1:00:40 much to all our distinguished speakers