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Israel Insider

Israel Insider with Yossi Kuperwasser

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Description

Can Israel improve on its “mowing the lawn” policy of repeated wars with Hamas and attain victory in Gaza? In this special Israel Insider, Ashley Perry interviews Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser about his much-noted, MEF-sponsored, recently published analysis that shows how to end this unacceptable off-and-on conflict.

Yossi Kuperwasser is a leading Israeli intelligence and security expert. Formerly, he served as the head of the research division in the Israel Defense Force Military Intelligence division and Brigadier General of the Israel Ministry of Strategic Affairs. He holds a BA in Arabic language and literature from Haifa University, and an MA in economics from Tel Aviv University.

You can read the full policy paper here: https://mef.pub/Gaza

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Transcript Automatic captions

Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved October 28, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.

0:07 wherever you are in the world um it's going to be a slightly different Israel Insider format uh tonight we are hosting Brigadier General yossi kubavasa who's going to talk about his recent policy position paper about the disarmament of Gaza what we will do is we'll start with 15 minutes um well I will ask um yossi uh some questions and then after 15 minutes we're going to open up for Q a um to those of you who are watching from around the world so if you have any questions please put them in the chat box I will also put a link to the position paper itself in the chat box for those who haven't seen it so they can read it after tonight's or this afternoons webinar uh I'd like to first of all start with the bio of Brigadier General you see yossi kupavasa is an Israeli intelligence and security expert he has served as head of the research division of the IDF military

1:10 intelligence and direct and her served as director general of the Israel Ministry of strategic Affairs um cooperavasa is currently head of the Israel intelligence methodology research institute and a senior project manager at the Jerusalem Center for public affairs specializing in the security dimensions of the israeli-palestinian conflict uh yossi good evening I will start with the first question with your permission in your position paper you attempt to examine and challenge the policy of just seeking calm between eruptions of violence can you please tell us how this policy came about historically and what drives it today well you know we left our Gaza in 2005 and we left it in the hands of fatah in the hands of the Palestinian Authority thereafter in 2007 Hamas took over and we were faced with a new situation and everything we did ever since then was some sort of a reaction without too deep

2:14 thinking about what we are actually trying to do and we were under the impression that uh what we do is the least worst uh option that's uh there are no good options with Gaza Gaza for us always seemed to be a chronic uh problem that you cannot actually solve nobody wants Gaza and the best we can do is uh have Hamas as a strong enough in order to control the more radical groups in Gaza and weak enough to be deterred by Israel and by create a situation where we have long period of quiet in between rounds of violence that was the idea we saw that we can mobilize for that purpose also Egypt and which we did in repeatedly and we know into the act in a way that allowed Hamas to run Gaza and to arm itself to his teeth

3:19 with the advanced weaponry and we thought that through our investment in advanced Weaponry from our point of view we should be able to create a situation where the damage is caused by Hamas is going to be limited and that was the case we invested billions of dollars in uh in the effort to control the the new toys that Hamas have employed again and again the longer longer and longer ranges uh Rockets the tunnels uh now uavs and the maritime Weaponry all these kinds of things we think that we can deal with but the fact is that this created the situation that that was never really deep discussion about in which we actually accept the situation where our security and the security of the people of Israel is under threat

4:23 continuously and whenever Hamas wants to start an attack because of all kinds of reasons they can do that when cause Israel paralysis for a certain period of time and sometimes even quite a few um thank you that's a little bit about the history of what some have described as mowing the grass your position is adamantly against this policy called knowing the grass whereby each round of escalation heavily damages hamas's infrastructure but really fails to prevent uh to prevent it from rearming rapidly we're more sophisticated and capable weaponry is what what's the you've laid out a little bit the argument for the so-called mowing the grass but what would you say to those who says that it really is unfortunately or fortunately really the best option available to provide security for Israel especially in the south

5:26 well I I say that it provides certain Security in between the rounds of the high level uh violence but it definitely doesn't provide the sense of security because you're always under the threat of Hamas and it doesn't provide security when there is an eruption of uh violence and we saw that in the garden of the walls in the best way but we saw that in previous rounds as well and we also see that today Hamas is not strong enough in order to take control and be responsible for the use of power from from Gaza Strip the original idea was that they will be strong enough in order to control groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad in fact they are not good enough in order to they're not strong enough you know to do that at home and they live they leave it to us to handle the person in Islamic jihadist we did in three rounds already in the last couple of years so it's uh it's not the best option and what what is needed what I recommend most of all before even changing the policy I

6:31 recommend a strong discussion about the policy and clarify whether this is really the best policy whether there is another policy and I suggest another policy a competing policy that may be better than the current one in in the sense that it would enable us to get rid of the permanent threat of Hamas and by that we shall gain a lot of benefits because this current situation not only that we are under continuous threat and we have the people of uh of Israel as a matter of fact and especially those living close to to Gaza we have them in a constant fear of the fact that something can erupt but the even more than that we actually prove Hamas claim that the best way to handle Israel is through the use of force and when able Hamas to become stronger and stronger inside the Palestinian Arena which is definitely not something we would like to see happening

7:34 so even from that point of view the concentration is not the best option or not necessarily the best document but sit and discuss it and uh maybe we have better options the problem is that Israelis are not available to this uh discussion because it's two seconds after the last rocket is launched from Gaza in a certain round of uh violence immediately the Israelis forget about Gaza and until the next round you they will never have any attention to that because they believe that Iran is more important this Baba is more important Arab Israelis are more important are the Palestinians in the Judaism area more important everything is more important than Hamas as long as no Rockets there are no rockets launched from from Gaza which is which is wrong because out of all the threats we are facing the one that is more

8:38 frequently ready to take action is Hamas and this is Hamas and the person Islamic they are the ones who are much more frequent than Hezbollah using the capabilities against us and causing a lot of damage on on on the debate you're saying especially within the security establishment which I know you I don't know very well and you were part of for many many years the argument would be that the current policy is keeps the loss of life to a minimum you obviously disagree with that assessment and the suggestion that perhaps what you um uh you know are recommending would lead to a far greater loss of life how do you deal with that criticism and what you say to it well fortunately we do have a low level of loss of life as a result of the Hamas threat because we developed and keep developing capabilities to face the

9:41 rockets and we had this wall that prevents the uh tunnels from coming in but this cost us a lot a lot of fun and keep costing us a lot of money and make us more dependent on the United States to get the money the 3.8 billion dollars a year to equip ourselves with the Iron Dome uh interceptors so it's uh it comes with the price this price is heavy and we can have less because let's put it this way Iron Dome can deal with 95 of an intercept of something around 95 of the Rockets targeted towards populated areas uh and at any given time let's say the Thomas today is so many rockets that they can launch in the launch in the last round I think if we remember correctly is something like uh close to 10 000 Rockets Let's uh say that the next time they will launched one thousand ten thousand Rockets which is very reasonable this means that uh

10:45 500 Rockets are going to hit I mean and they've improved the Rockets I mean the so many of them are going to be targeted towards populated areas let's say that out of the ten thousand eight thousand be directed towards uh populated areas this means that something like 400 Rockets will fall in in populated areas uh this is not a minor number what I suggest is to to prevent the Hamas from launching rockets at all and that will save us 400 rocket sporting in populated areas in the next round of uh violence with Thomas which is much I like I like to get a little bit deeper into that and you say or you call for Israel to rid itself of hamas's threat by disarming unit and then prohibiting its re-armament and demonstrating conclusively that threatening Israel is indisputably against its interests in other words defeating it you know

11:49 something that perhaps it could be argued Israel hasn't done it in any of the other rounds but how you know uh as they say initial toughness how would Israel go about them well I I say that the the most important the change in the policy should be that after then I'm not saying that we should go go there right now right now we should have the discussion and uh and if we adopt a new policy we should make it clear that we have adopted the new policy because this is going to deter Hamas very much because they wouldn't like us to adopt the new policy or to practice the new policy but uh but what I suggest is that after the next uh round of photographs Hamas we shall adopt a new policy that says that we shall not allow Hamas because today and then that this is very critical in any agreement that follows these round of violence uh today Hamas knows that we are not going to hit the production sites that it operates we just do that

12:54 in retaliation and we do it in a very small volume after there are some rockets launched towards Israel and we shall allow them to to keep Army on themselves after any round and they know that we are not going to do anything economically against them they know that are not going to do anything against their leaders they are totally safe and this is a situation that allows them to to do all those steps that are threatening us and what I suggest is that in after the next round we should clarify to Hamas that we shall not allow them to operate new sites of uh production of arms we shall hit them as soon as we learn about them that's what by the way that's what we're doing in Syria for uh the last 10 years I think it has quite an impact on the pace in which Hezbollah arms itself because weapons are being hit while they're on

13:57 the way to Lebanon while they're in Syria and uh and that's what we do in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority we enter every day and we whenever we know about uh some grouped his planning to carry out an attack or it's planning to get some arms we we enter and confiscate the arms unfortunately we don't know enough so but we have to adopt this policy in order to be able to adopt this policy I say that we should we should improve our intelligence we have good intelligence very good intelligence but not good enough and that's why we have to improve our intelligence we have to improve our military capabilities we have to take harsh steps we should be ready to take also steps on economic and economic side and we have to take harsh steps on political side and the legal side now all the combination of all these efforts is necessary in order to create a new message but what I'm saying is that the International Community after the next round is going to be more uh able to to

15:01 accept such a change in policy as a matter of fact it's the same after each round there's immediately after the round there is Readiness from the International Community to to understand if Israel would have changed its policy but we never take advantage of that what I'm saying is that we have to take advantage of that because everybody knows that Hamas is a terror organization trying to kill Israeli citizens in an indiscriminate manner so it's uh they they will definitely understand what we are trying to do and we can even put Egypt on the wagon with us because the Egyptians don't like Hamas either so it's uh and if they understand that Hamas is the threat of stability and that eventually Israel may just force Hamas out of Gaza and I say I say that for that purpose we need also to create some sort of a threat that will be uh as we say within Iran a credible military Israel uh then the uh the chances of the Egyptians would also try to

16:05 join the effort to prevent Iran arming itself and they can do much more than they do today because definitely I'm not saying that they're not crying but they don't try hard enough they should try harder before we go to uh questions from the uh audience um you want this paper for the Israel Victory project the concept is to convince is those enemies to give up their dream of destroying Israel to accept defeat and finish their Victory so I'd like to take you a little bit to a a higher advantage point over this whole question would you argue that Israel would you accept or what would you say to those who say the Israel has forgotten or is just not interested in Victory as it once was in the war of independence The Six Day War Etc how can that be changed not just vis-a-vis Hamas but other uh enemies of Israel no I don't think that Israel doesn't

17:09 want the victory of course Israel wants Victory but the perception of Victory today is uh achieving the goals set by the by the uh government and the government goes Central the government today in Visa vigaza is long periods of quiet in between rounds that's uh that's the goal set and as long as we get long uh we always dream that this time we will have a longer period of quiet and as we saw recently it doesn't materialize but we keep dreaming about long period of quiet that's uh the idea that of the strategy of the campaigning between Wars knowing that a war is the war round of violence is the cannot be avoided and we just can prolong the the period between between the wars between the high level violent rounds that's uh that's the problem that that's the

18:12 definition of Victory and I say two things first of all we have to change the definition of victory victory is when we convince our neighbors that Israel has the right or at least Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people and you to stay and if they want also to accept our right for that to be even better but even if they accepted this effect it's a it's a move forward and uh and that and if this is the case there's no point in putting all our efforts in trying to wipe it off the map and uh cause it damage to the use of force and uh that's what we need to convince Hamas that there's no point in trying to to inflict uh damage on Israel because it's going to lead from us nowhere and it's going to put it in a place and that's exactly the point of victory in this respect if Hamas gives up

19:15 or is forced to give up it's not going to give it up by its own will if Hamas is forced to give up its rearmament capabilities it's not going to be Hamas anymore this is a this is a victory because Hamas is is about you take it away from Hamas the capability to carry out Hamas to carry our job even if it believes in Jihad but it cannot practice it then it's a it's a different enemy and this is a victory and this is going to lead to not only better security situation but also to a greater chance that the Palestinians will eventually accept Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people which is which will be the ultimate victory thank you um let's go to some questions the first question is from Robert Slater he asks how much pressure has the US and EU put on Israel to limit its actions in Gaza well I don't think that they I don't

20:19 think that the issues on the table on the at this point so nobody puts pressure on Israel because Israel doesn't want to do anything so it's uh we are not under pressure but we definitely take into account I think the fact that if we do something out of the we are going to have disagreements with uh with the US and with the UAE and with the other members of the uh Obama quotes and that is something we would like to avoid so uh if it's not necessary and right now I'm not saying it's necessary but we have to say to the to the US and to the UAE if we eventually have this discussion about policy in Gaza once we adopt a new policy if we die if we decide to adopt one is to tell them in advance listen next round of atrocities in in Gaza enough is enough we are not going to allow Hamas to reality we are going to take all the kinds of all the steps necessary in order to prevent it and we expect you to to be on our side of this and uh I think that there is a good chance that both the US and the members

21:25 of the uh Obama courts are going to support the policy like that if we explain it in advance carry out this I'm talking in the paper about the campaign that has to precede the the adoption of all the implementation of the new policy and if we have a campaign that in which we explain all this new uh policies to to our friends we we may have their support it's they are not against it thank you um we have a question from David Levine um other speakers have highlighted the fact that Hamas and Hezbollah leaders will do anything they can to avoid being in the line of fire would you Advocate a policy of targeting killing the leaders of these groups with the expectation that Israel would decapitate the effectiveness of the terrorist groups by removing their leadership you know there are leaders that are getting rid of them has a major contribution to the ability to reach our

22:31 goal and these kind of leaders should be uh not every not every and each leader but some of them are uh but again not not right now out of the blue it's uh but in a policy in a different policy uh whereas the current rule of the game is that we don't do that future policy rule can be that uh it's not out of the question it can happen this is going to deter Hamas very much and keep them away from uh threatening Israel and they should know in advance that this is a policy but my my major issue is about armored I'm saying this this can change too but the major issue is realm it we managed to improve our capability to make it impossible for the for Hamas to realm itself leaders are less important okay thank you an anonymous attendee asks uh who would or what would rule

23:37 Gaza if Hamas were to be defeated well first of all Hamas will rural Gaza but it would not pose a threat to Israel they want to rule they don't want to lose it and we have to take advantage of the fact that they want to rule Gaza so much in order to clarify to them that if you want to rule Gaza don't mess around with us and that is the the message that we don't deliver to them today or not deliver enough clearly enough today and we have to to clarify that and uh I'm not saying that is though in the worst in the worst case I'm not ruling this option all together but uh for for a short period of time but uh but I do not Advocate taking control of Gaza and I'm definitely not in favor of bringing fatak to Plaza this is uh this is not feasible in my uh I don't mind if I'm asking keeps fooling us as long as it gives up the

24:42 idea of threatening Israel from God he brings up a point you you have related to this a little bit uh previously it was supposedly continually uh hitting Targets in Syria where Iran is stored or attempted to move weapons for Hezbollah um why is Israel not continually hit Targets in Ghana and Lebanon where weapons might have been known to prevented built up stored and also does Israel know where the location of these weapons are in Gaza and Lebanon and just decided not to why is the policy so radically different to the one taken in Syria well as I said in each Arena we have rules of the game uh Rules of Engagement and in Syria we have established these rules that we can attack Iranian weapons that arrive to Syria weather on the way to Lebanon or for uh use against Israel

25:46 from Syria and the reaction to that is very limited everybody understands the Russians don't understand it maybe they don't support it but they understand it it's uh definitely the the Americans everybody understands and everybody accepted we have established rules in Gaza that are against our interests we establish tools let's say that once there's no uh severe round of uh atrocities we don't uh we don't operate these are the rules that we have established ourselves together with Hamas but we accepted these rules so to change the rules is something very difficult it's not easy and you've got to have an excuse or uh some reason to to change the rules right now nobody shoots as I was today driving all over Gaza for the entire day and I felt totally safe the uh right now nothing happens so it's there's no point in trying to change the

26:49 rules now but I'm saying if Hamas will give us the leverage that we need in order to change the the rules we should change them because we haven't changed them after cast Cloud we haven't changed them after the guardian of the walls we haven't seen them after all these operations that were there until now and we are suffering because of that because we are we this means that when there is a last Ramadan for example and Muhammad felt that well maybe we'll do something they started threatening and even without doing anything there was a lot of tension and there was uh people felt unsecure and all of that even without shooting we have to change that and we are we are committed to provide security and the sense of security to our population they deserve it and they are definitely thank you and finally um you told us a little bit about

27:50 creating the debate beyond the operations you talked about the fact that you know five minutes after the last rocket the debate moves on um how do you create this new debate because obviously your policy paper is about uh creating options uh about continuing that debate even beyond the how do you make this change that you seek is it from Top Down by influencing the decision Maker's opinion shakers in the political and security uh Assurance or do you believe that the debate should happen first of all in the public to try and make them aware that there are other options uh as opposed to the policy which is being enacted at the moment and hope that that will influence the decision makers and opinion Shapers what do you think is the best way to ensure that the option which you present in your policy paper is discussed becomes part of the debate and perhaps uh leads to uh another option on the table that perhaps can be used in the future

28:55 well uh I think all of the above uh we have to create a situation we have to discuss it with the decision makers and I'm trying to do that from time to uh raise this issue when when I see them and we also have to and this is the most important thing bring the people who are directly involved in that into the debate and mobilize ngos and think tanks and the projects like the Middle East form Israel Victory project and politicians that support it in the lobby Independence and so on so forth to to promote this idea we have you know we have this population this wonderful population of the people living around their voice is heard and everybody shows solidarity with them when the Rockets are flying stop Flying Day themselves are not doing

30:01 anything it's uh they should be more and demanding a debate uh when there's there are no rockets for uh launched because they suffered the post-traumatic uh syndromes and all of that so it's uh it's very interesting promotional it's an interest of everybody in Israel but definitely those who are interested in better security situation in Israel and in the Israeli victories as I defined it before to raise this issue constantly and bring about the change bring about first of all a discussion and if the discussion everybody can have their opinion there and we'll see what the outcome will be maybe somebody who's going to convince that what we're doing today is still the best uh I'm saying in the in the paper the the policy of today is the it's just a revealed preference because we are there but we didn't discuss it we just

31:05 happened to be there the we have to we have to discuss it and the all these groups together the politicians on their side the The Forum and the Israeli Victory project and the the population The Wider operations ngos and things should bring this uh to discussion the Press should be involved in that as well should pay attention to that there should be discussions there the media TVs and the so forth social media all these groups should be involved and this will create the necessity for the government to exert some time to spend some time discussing it today you know everybody is with the uh judicial issues and the if they have any time they spend it on we have to explain that Iran may be very problematic and I have my opinion on Iran as well but uh Gaza is still a very pressing issue and we have to deal with

32:08 thank you very much you'll see for your time for your presentation uh to all those who haven't read the policy paper it can be found in the webinar chat um if not you can go to the Middle East Forum website and you can find the policy paper the introduction the synopsis uh and everything related to this fascinating and now very well reported on uh policy position paper by Brigadier General uh yossi cup of yossi thank you very much again and a good afternoon a good evening to all our viewers around the world thank you very thank you