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China Disrupts the Middle East with Ilan Berman

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Description

Xi Jinping's China is quietly but dramatically becoming a power in the Middle East. From oil deals with Saudi Arabia to high-tech investments in Israel, the Chinese Communist Party is involved. How is this changing regional dynamics? What are Beijing’s objectives? And what does this mean in the context of the Sino-American competition?

Transcript Automatic captions

Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved November 11, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.

0:00 all right hello and welcome to the middle east farm speaker webinar series i'm stacey roman and i will be moderating this discussion today we're pleased to have elan bourbon senior vice president of the american foreign policy council join us to discuss china disrupts the middle east mr berman will speak for 10 to 15 minutes and open it up for questions should you wish to ask a question please use the q a box located at the bottom of your screen to type out your question and now with no further ado i'll turn the discussion over to mr alan oh thanks very much stacey um i'm uh let me start by saying thank you to the middle east forum for having me uh and thank all thanks to all of you for joining um i wish we could do this in person but this will have to do for now um let me uh spend a few minutes walking uh sort of what's changed in terms of chinese foreign policy towards the middle east because i i think we're witnessing a uh very significant shift chinese uh foreign policy and strategic

1:06 and it has all sorts of implications for the united states and for countries in the middle east itself so i i think we have to sort of to understand where we were to understand where we're going historically uh china has had only interest in the middle east right and you could essentially boil them down to two things uh on the one hand china was very interested and has historically been very interested in uh middle eastern oil uh china is heavily dependent on oil imports uh to sort of keep its economy humming over the last decade or so china has routinely garnered close to uh eight nine even ten percent uh gdp growth uh on a sort of per year and very much of that is driven by by energy china doesn't produce enough energy at home so what you've seen in tandem with this economic expansion from china has been a quest further and further afield for reliable sources of energy

2:10 china has engaged with uh countries in the middle east uh very substantially on that front the other uh area of chinese historic interest has uh arms uh the mid uh china ranks today as uh one of the world's top five uh arms exporters i think it exports something like six percent of uh arms globally um accounts for six percent of global arms sales uh the middle east is a very very big part of that entire package for china um and historically uh china has benefited from uh military sales uh to the region in particular to countries like iran which have relied heavily on chinese weaponry but uh more recently what we've seen is pretty significant strategic shift that's taken place in chinese foreign um and it's attributable to uh essentially to two things uh the first is that there really has been a fundamental change in chinese strategic culture and also

3:13 the way china thinks about the region uh china in foreign affairs in general but foreign affairs towards the middle east in particular has uh relied on uh its former leader deng xiaoping's old axiom uh it needs to keep a low profile uh it needs to serve to not cause waves and international affairs um that uh over the last seven years or uh has changed very dramatically and i say seven years because it was in 2013 that uh the current iranian uh right excuse me uh current chinese president xi jinping uh took office and he has proceeded to reorient chinese foreign policy in a more uh in a more confrontational direction we're seeing that play out now uh not just in what china is doing in the middle east but also uh in terms of uh the sort of the unfolding great power competition between china and the united um the other uh the other

4:16 main driver of greater chinese interest in the middle east has to do with the belt and road uh uh the same year uh as xi jinping uh took power he laid out a sweeping vision of uh essentially a forward uh forward-looking thorough-going engagement policy with the world which has come to be known as the belton road initiative it's a little bit of a misnomer because it's not one belt one road it's many belts many roads it's essentially a full court press by diplomatically politically economically to expand its influence and one of the principal vehicles that china has used in order to do that in order to engage with countries in central asia countries in europe middle east north africa even latin america has been uh infrastructure projects uh greater business development and uh loans that are very favorable at least in the near term to

5:19 uh governments that are often seeking foreign assistance um so this has resulted in uh a surge of interest uh on the part of china in the middle east over the last um over the last uh five years or so and you see that uh i think play out in what i would argue is three uh three of the most prominent uh avenues uh right the first is the first has to do with chinese investment in israel um china has uh you know israel has been uh for well ever since uh 2009 when uh the book startup nation came out which all of us have read um israel has really thrown open its doors to international investment um and sort of you know trafficked on the idea that it is a global hub for innovation for very good reason uh israel's high-tech sector is dynamic it's robust it's booming um and countries are taking notice and china is one of the ones that is sort of first uh first among equals terms of trying to take advantage of

6:24 this so you've seen a surge of uh chinese investment in over the last uh five years or so um china is based upon the pace of its investments is now positioned to uh become the single largest nation-state investor uh in in the jewish state uh in the next several years eclipsing the united um and chinese investments have uh focused very very heavily on that main hub of innovation on israel's high-tech sector on uh israeli telecom on israeli uh and this is i think enormously significant because uh that sector is not hermetically sealed off uh from uh sort of what what else is going on in the country in national security terms and so one of the really interesting uh side of china's greater profile in israel has been that it's actually caused tensions between jerusalem and washington where the trump administration which is

7:26 uh overall very favorable and sort of very uh has expressed growing concern that uh this growing chinese footprint in israel uh growing chinese investment in israel could have the effect of adversely uh the special relationship and strategic cooperation between the two countries uh because precisely because the high-tech sector is such an engine for it's also an engine for a lot of the joint defense industrial projects that uh join that cumulatively animate the relationship so this is something to watch um the uh second uh sort of major prong is that i think you're seeing very the uh exportation of uh china's brand of digital authoritarianism uh into the middle east um it bears noting in a historical that china has been doing this for a while uh chinese uh telecom firm zte was uh one of the main

8:30 partners for the iranian regime in clamping down on the green movement protests uh that broke out in the summer of 2009. um and china so from those early beginnings china has really expanded its uh telecom presence uh in places like lebanon and egypt and iran itself all over uh north africa um but uh along attended with that commercial there is uh a lot of evidence to suggest china is also slowly but surely it its system of social control uh by providing authoritarian regimes with the means to more effectively monitor and surveil and uh if necessary repress their own domestic populations and uh it bears noting that china has been very successful at home in building this sort of this network of social control through things like the great firewall of china through things like a social credit system that uh incentivize incentivizes conformity

9:34 um with uh chinese government policies that model is slowly but surely making its way down the belton road uh towards the middle east and north africa um and the third prong uh and this is sort of something that's beginning to play out i think very significantly now is uh that china has managed through its investments to effectively buy the silence of the muslim world as it pertains to the way china treats its own muslims uh china has for the last four years or engaged in a wide-ranging campaign of against uh its own muslim minority known as the uyghurs they live out in a semi-autonomous province known as xinjiang in western china um and uh more and more i mean if you look at a map geographically xinjiang is strategically uh important because it lies along the road uh the land-based corridor through which china envisions trade flowing from china to central asia and the middle east and uh the other way as well

10:37 so xinjiang uh is very important to chinese plans in terms of needing to be pacified um and so what what that is uh resulted in over the last four years has been a campaign of uh repression against the weakers which has uh resulted in more than a million uh now in re-education camps uh anecdotes about uh four sterilizations of we your women uh anecdotes about uh what is effectively slave labor uh in which weakers are conscripted to produce cheap chinese goods for export um and all sorts of other uh frankly horrendous practices this is something that one would think would be of tremendous concern to uh co-religionists of the weakers in the muslim world and yet the silence has been definite and that silence has a great deal to do with the fact that china has managed to uh essentially shape the conversation over the uyghurs that's taking place uh in places like riyadh or dubai

11:39 because of its investment because of its level of economic activity um and so when muslim leaders do um do express uh sentiments about the uyghurs it tends to be in support of the chinese position rather than in opposition to it um so i think that in a nutshell sort of shows you where we are currently but i think we need to also talk a little bit about where we're going because um increasingly beijing uh is thinking much bigger about the middle east right if before its strategic interests were very limited uh today they're much broader tomorrow they have a lot to do with trying to the united states as this dominant strategic power in the middle east and so that's the context i think uh that's useful to to to have when you think about the new 400 billion dollar quarter century uh strategic accord that um china has just hammered out with the islamic republic of iran iran comes to the table because it needs an external

12:41 sponsor because quite frankly uh u.s maximum pressure policy is working the iranian economy is much weaker and uh at risk of being and so iran is increasingly looking to other countries uh for support and china is is is there but it's a mistake i think to think about uh what china is doing solely in the context of iran because china at the same time is making overtures to other muslim in the middle east as well so uh over the last four years uh the chinese have uh hammered out upwards of 120 billion dollars in trade uh with the kingdom of saudi arabia right and in the process they've made themselves a key stakeholder in um the saudi reform and modernization plan which is known colloquially as vision 2030.

13:34 um so you take the iran component you take the saudi component and you take the growing investment in israel and what you see is a uh sort of a facet of great power competition um that is taking place in the middle east that frankly we haven't accounted for yet uh beijing it's increasingly clear has big plans for the region um and our great power competition with currently encompasses a lot of things but uh unless we begin to address significantly address what china is doing in the middle east we run the risk being outmaneuvered in there uh by the so i'll stop there all right thank you so much that's quite a bit of information in a short period of time so thank you um we're getting quite a few questions in regarding the port of haifa and chinese interest and that can you discuss it a little further sure so the port of haifa is i i think uh a good although not a perfectly representative uh example but

14:38 a good example of the inherent problems that come that have to do with uh chinese investment in israel so uh the contours of what's happening in haifa are as follows uh in 2015 the israeli interior ministry contact contracted with a group called the shanghai courts group which is ostensibly a private entity but because china a few years ago passed the national security law that mandates that all companies that not chinese national in origin uh refer and pay deference to the state on matters of national security it's impossible to say that shanghai ports group is really totally an independent company um but under the deal that was hammered out in 2015 uh shanghai ports group uh was contracted to do a build out and modernization of the haifa port um and to uh when that build out is done which was should be next year uh if the current schedule holds uh shanghai ports group will take over day-to-day operations uh in the port um the reason that's a

15:41 is because the hyperport is not just a commercial it is a commercial hub but it's also the staging ground for military exercises between the israeli navy and the u.s navy there's a lot of strategic components relevant to the bilateral relationship between the us and israel that take place in and around haifa which is why you've seen us military officials more and more say you know if the current status quo holds we're going to need to rethink for example port visits to haifa not because we don't like israel but because we increasingly feel and that the integrity of our military cooperation is going to be compromised by the chinese presence there understood thank you it seems that trump has made it clear that israel should limit its trade with china should israel follow trump's demand even if it goes against israel's interests and would baiden have the same concern about trade with china so that's a lot um but uh let me see how i can sort of answer this

16:42 um i i look i think the israeli interest in engaging with china is very natural um israel sees china as a rising power uh as a global economic power israel very naturally wants to have ties with china just the same way that it cultivated ties with the united states right this is a very natural but i think there is a fundamental um between uh sort of the way israel is thinking about china um and uh sort of the great power competition that's unfolded a great anecdote i can tell you is that uh the last trip i took before we all got locked down and were forced to communicate on zoom uh i spent a week in saudi arabia um and you know uh very interesting stuff uh sort of looking at you know modernization and reform and sort of their state response to uh sort of uh foreign fighter returning and things like that right that's outside the scope of what we're talking about but in a lot of those conversations china came up and the official line in riyadh at that point was

17:44 very clearly look i we get it uh america has a problem with china but it's america's problem we're sort of at this on the sides uh of this um relationship we don't really want to have anything to do with it we want to trade with both and so i think there's a little bit of that same sort of thinking that happens in israel now which is that israel has a special with the united states which is second to none israel has an increasingly robust relationship with china and never shall the team wheat but the reality is because of the strategic between israel and united states because uh great power competition between china and the united states is increasingly all-encompassing or encompasses a large number of things it becomes increasingly hard for israel to walk between the raindrops communicate with the united states and interact with the united states and keep the same robustness um with china um to the second half of or to the second question uh about whether or not this is gonna change um i actually think that uh there are

18:47 policies where there's uh if there is a first biden term um there are is gonna be a lot of difference you know uh policy uh approaches towards iran is a great example where uh the vice president has made clear that he wants to walk back maximum pressure he wants to reengage with iran on china though um a lot of the rhetoric that's coming out of the campaign uh a lot of what uh the candidate himself has said about for example uh chinese atrocities in western uh western china against the weakers suggest that there is that this sort of more confrontational attitude towards china is going to continue no matter whether we're talking about a second trump term or a first biden term um and that i think is important because a more confrontational u.s policy right not a more confrontational republican or democrat policy but a more confrontational u.s policy is going to have all sorts of implications for countries like israel countries like saudi arabia that are trying to sort of for the moment to split the difference or try to maintain relations with both sides perfectly then to the next question how

19:52 should the us reshape its strategy towards iran given that china is a friend of iran which makes iran less vulnerable to economic sanctions sure well so the question's a little bit far afield let me see if i can uh sort of uh navigate it um because uh i'm sure all of the viewers the uh the action right now on iran sits at the united nations security council because last month the uh trump administration um uh issued or proposed a resolution to extend the arms against iran which was part of u.n security council resolution 2231 which accompanied the jcpoa the arms embargo expires in mid-october and so the idea was to at least keep the status quo for now and extend the arms embargo into the future that measure though got a lot of resistance in particular it got a lot of resistance from countries like russia and china not coincidentally those are the same countries that are likely to be the

20:55 largest military suppliers of an iran that is unfettered from the arms embargo and it's rearming and by the way if you remember if you a dozen years or so ago when uh before there was really sort of any concerted international movement to curb iran's nuclear program the idea that iran was building uh a nuclear capability that iran was essentially unconstrained in doing so essentially touched off a proliferation cascade in the middle east and north um i think at the sort of at the height of this trend back in 2008 um we were looking at something like 13 different countries in the middle east and north africa that were in various stages of nuclear some of them like tunisia and morocco they weren't really so concerned about they were concerned about things like uh walmart qaddafi's stranglehold on oil in libya for example things like that right but a lot of them like the uae like bahrain like jordan egypt saudi arabia most of their concerns most of their

21:57 movement towards a nuclear capability was driven by concerns over a rising and nearly nuclear iran the reason that's significant today is because we're on the cusp of that trend happening again because if iran is unconstrained by uh meaningful international sanctions if iran has the ability to uh sort of move forge ahead with its military uh modernization plan rearm itself you're very likely gonna see the same sort of proliferation cascade happen in the middle east as well right not just not in terms of nuclear weapons but in terms of skittish neighbors of iran that increasingly look to rearm themselves as a counterweight to an iran that is acquiring more and more sophisticated conventional weaponry right and by the way frankly i i think that's exactly what moscow and beijing are counting on right by being intransigent at the united they are guaranteeing that the arms embargo expires and they're guaranteeing that nervous regional neighbors of iran not just iran will look to them

23:02 to sell them the weaponry to essentially maintain the regional balance so it's true business for sure it's a very ploy but it has the potential to generate a lot of instability in the middle east in the near future thank you for that answer uh what is the israeli government's attitude towards chinese digital authoritarianism is there pushback or is there any receptiveness towards implementing aspects of it so i in terms of digital authoritarianism there isn't a lot of uh evidence that i've seen that the israelis are really sort of embracing uh the sort of um the chinese model or uh importing you know chinese suppression technology things like that that's not sort of that's not where the bread and butter is frankly for the israeli government what worries me about israel's engagement with china is something else which is that israel does not currently sufficient safeguards uh for monitoring chinese investment into the country right one of the big uh

24:05 debates that's happened quietly between the u.s government and the israeli government over the last two years has the fact that israel needs to build that can keep track of what china is investing in um so here in the united states we have an inter-governmental body called uh interagency body called uh the syphilis the committee to protect uh committee on foreign investment in the united states and that's a body that gives recommendations uh to congress into the executive branch about whether or not uh a sort of a large-scale investment by a foreign uh country in things like for example uh strategic minerals uh should be allowed to go forward or if it adversely affects national security israel doesn't have anything like that and they uh they only recently set up a mechanism in response to u.s concerns so they did that in late october early november of last year but that uh syphilia right committee on foreign investment in israel um actually doesn't even encompass the israeli high tech sector there's a six

25:08 billion dollar carve out for israeli high tech because israeli high tech is nimble and it's agile and wants to attract as much capital as possible so i would make the case that u.s over unregulated chinese investment in is really the sort of the irritant in the relationship currently and the israelis have taken some steps but they haven't taken enough well thank i guess the last question of the day is where can we find some more information on this and specifically some more of your work sure sure well i i write about this a lot i've had a chance to write about this for middle east um at the uh at the risk of flogging your work and mine um the uh fall 2019 issue um of middle east quarterly i sort of i lay out the case for sort of you know the pernicious effects of chinese policy in the middle east um i've continued sort of working and writing on that subject if people want to read it they can visit um the american foreign policy council where i work uh it's www.afpc all right thank you so much and the the

26:14 middle east quarterly article you were speaking of there's a link in the webinar invitation for today as well if our viewers would like to see that so we have come to the closed row webinar thank you again mr berman for speaking with us today oh my pleasure thank you of course and for our viewers please note we will not be having a webinar on monday for labor and our weekly webinar offering email will be sent out within the next few thank you all for joining us and i hope you have a wonderful day