Webinar or Talk
Peter Theroux – "In Obscura: Adventures in the World of Intelligence"
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Description
Peter Theroux, author and former CIA intelligence officer, delivers remarks on his time in the world of intelligence at the Middle East Forum's 2025 policy conference, "Statecraft Reimagined," in Washington, D.C.
Transcript Automatic captions
Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved October 19, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.
0:00 Good evening everyone. Hope everyone can hear me. Wayne, now you're too close. Yeah. I uh have the opportunity to have two speakers for our cocktail hour. Feel free to grab a drink, but I'm going to ask everybody to quiet down a little bit. We've got two really great speakers, so we'll be speaking briefly for 10 minutes each. right here. It's my pleasure to introduce Peter Thorough, who will be discussing in obscura adventures in the world of intelligence. Peter's an accomplished author, translator, and former intelligence officer who served for over 20 years in the US government specializing in counterterrorism. If everyone all please be quiet. Thank you. His service earned him the CIA's career intelligence medal, recognizing a career of deep expertise and impact. His latest book, Inobscura:
1:05 Adventures in the World of Intelligence, has drawn praise for its cands insight, and literary grace. Daniel Pipes, founder of the organization, called it a brilliant, elegantly written account of what it's like to live a life in the shadows, noting that the Rose Pros sparkles with wit and rare honesty. as he recounts the intellectual and moral complexities of intelligence work in the post 911 world. Please give him a warm welcome to Peter Hi, thank you. Thank you for having me.
1:39 And I will be pretty brief. Hey, as my second grade uh teacher sister used to tell her class, this is your turn to listen. Anyway, sorry. I'm not going to talk about my book, which is only part one of a book. I cannot write the second half yet. Um, but it might be out next year. Um, I'm going to talk for maybe 10 to 15 minutes. Um, I had asked Greg about what might be of interest and he said more or less the intersection of intelligence and policy. So, I have basically two points. One of them addresses the implications of flawed thinking when policy and intelligence don't completely match up. Also, um, we heard, I think, from Michael Rubin today how think tankers can tend to look at the trees and miss the forest. So, my forest here is the Asian continent. Not so far from what we're talking about because Israel, Lebanon,
2:42 Hamas, and the rest are also on the Asian continent. So the starting point of my first um topic here is the pull out from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 because it was a debacle and it create so I I spent 25 years as an analyst targeter and other things in a notorious three-letter organization and um the am so from my perspective one of the debacles in addition to the loss of innocent lives including American lives was the incredible chaos that um intelligence officers were on the hook to explain to their government. And I realized we were not alone in that. I mean CIA analysts when I was in um Asia. I was in uh Northeast Asia and Southeast Asian countries a year year and a half after that. And our foreign friends, these were intelligence officers from um East Asian countries said, "You have no
3:47 idea." They said, "That was a cataclysm. We felt it like an earthquake and we're still feeling it because everything about the pacing, the hastiness, the deaths, the chaos, the billions of do of equipment, billions of dollars worth of equipment left behind is still reverberating with us because when you see the great and powerful USA in that good war as opposed to if you remember when Iraq was a bad war and I think Obama himself self said Afghanistan was a good war. Run away from that so fast and so catastrophically. This individual said, "I leave to your imagination what every terrorist, drug trafficker, human trafficker, weapons trafficker, um trans um uh transnational criminal network to say nothing of Russia, China in Iran made of that retreat." He said, "We're still feeling it. I will add
4:51 there that um my career was counterterrorism mostly working against Iran and its proxies. Um but any of you who are familiar with counter narcotics might know how much bigger a field that is. I think we figure that the September 11th attacks cost $500,000 for al-Qaeda pull to pull off. Whereas you're talking tens of billions of dollars from who that drug cartels deal with who have armies and navies and air forces and submarines and you know Mexican and Venezuelan and Colombian drug dealers. They're in Kabell. They're in Pakistan. They are a global network that is more terrifying than al-Qaeda or Hezbollah. however evil they are is it they absolutely pale. By the way, I was chief of a targeting branch in my former organization. And when I hired a counter narcotics targeter to work for me, I of course I told him we do a lot of sensitive things here. It's very compartmented. You're not going to talk about it outside of here. Um but tell me about yourself. He couldn't tell me what
5:55 he was doing in narcotics. He said it's Central Asia. I really can't go beyond that. I'm his top secret cleared boss. He said, "No, we have very special programs. I can't talk about it." So, in terms of the worlds of um analysis and policy not being totally happy with each other, the decision to get out of Afghanistan um created uh bureaucratic chaos, substantive chaos, and um rattled our friends, delighted our enemies, and it was um it was completely crazy. That's my first point. Again, I'm being brisk because we want to we want to have dinner. The second point I wanted to make was um back in the counterterrorism targeting world, I I was looking at Iranian proxies specifically against the very very nasty Lebanese organization uh the most prominent Iranian uh proxy and I moved um into that space as they say these days
6:58 um in a in a very non-political workforce where people are um they don't have titles Unlike the Department of State, they don't wear a rank here. Unlike the military, they're mission focused people, they work in the field, they work in the big building. And um one thing you're always advising your people is don't get demoralized what you see in the paper. Just do good work. Stay mission focused. You have a problem, come to me because people say ridiculous things about about but I was so I worked against his bulla.
7:31 You've all figured that out. Um I was in the field when a new boss took over the Iran department and he was very focused as to quote him directly and I can get away with all of this by the way. Uh I I cover color within the lines. He said what was his number one goal? He said I want them to experience failure. I want them to to be pushed back and I want them to wake up every day feeling like they're failing and they're being pushed back. There was one individual I'm not naming who was his number one target and he was this gentleman who took over the Iran department in that agency inherited a department of very gifted people but they had been acclimated to supporting the JCPOA uh negotiations. No surprise we work for them. We work for the executive branch. So if they're saying like what are the negotiating tactics?
8:27 What are the issues we need to know? What are the what keeps them up at night? on analysts and targets throw them into answering the questions that they are asked, not the questions they feel like answering. But this person who is a very rough human being, very rough personality, um um was entirely disgusted because he asked him about the individual who he saw as our number one adversary. and they handed him um an analytic um assessment of the person and he threw it back at him and he said, "I cannot possibly use the colorful language he used." He said, "Um, I want the targeting study, not the biography." They didn't have one. And uh again, I cannot reproduce, at least on half a drink, the language that he responded to them with. but he pulled me back from a field position because he I had targeted his bala and he wanted to target this individual. So I have to apologize to Ali and Jon to a couple of friends who've heard me say
9:28 this before but um we had a very tight and small cell of one targeter, one analyst, one psychologist, um a branch chief, maybe one other to start to put together the thing that you would figure out intelligence agencies do. What does our target look like? What are the strengths? What are the vulnerabilities? How does he or she travel? How do they communicate? What does the bench behind them look like? If they were captured, would they be any good to debrief? If they were removed, um what would be the impact? So, we in the course of talking to my colleagues about the target to get smart, I learned that everyone was in love with the idea of supporting an Iran deal and having peace in the valleys between the USA and Um, I asked about the history of correspondence between the top of the US government and the top of the Iranian government. And I wanted to hear it was brief and unfriendly and I was told the Valentine's have been plentiful and they've all gone in one direction. I was very depressed to hear about that. And um I think I only have one minute left.
10:35 So that I will say um despite the headwinds because politics had infected the worst place a little bit because there was this understanding of h how people who are kept in this building saw um what the future should look like and I and they were greatly misguided. Um anyway the person is dead. He he did he did not die on the soil of his own country. He was one of the most careful individuals who has ever lived. But his children, his drivers, his bodyguards, his pilots, his u colleagues were not as careful as he was. Uh hashem, thank you.