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The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Why It Matters with Svante Cornell

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Description

Armenia and Azerbaijan went recently to war over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-governed territory within Azerbaijan’s borders. The two sides’ wide alliances imbue this conflict with regional implications. What are its roots, what explains Israel and Turkey both supporting Shia Azerbaijan, and what is the suitable U.S. role?

Transcript Automatic captions

Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved November 11, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.

0:00 all right hello and welcome to millie's forum speaker webinar series i'm stacy roman and i will be moderating this discussion today very pleased to have dr cevante cornell director of the american foreign policy council's central asia accomplices institute and founder of the institute for security and development policy in stockholm join us to discuss the armenian azerbaijan conflict why it matters dr cornell will speak for 15 minutes and open it up for questions should you wish to ask questions please use the q a box located at the bottom of your screen to type out your question now with no further ado i'll turn the discussion over to dr savante cornell thank you very much uh stacy it's a pleasure to be with you at this event and it is a uh i would like to thank the middle east forum for organizing so what i've uh been asked to do when i will try to do is to do uh to make a couple of quick remarks about the background and origins of this and also more specifically tried to talk about why this is happening at this time and particularly we could

1:04 obviously discuss the roles that turkey and israel have as well as now i'd like to start by by noting that the the resumption of war between armenia and azerbaijan at this point is not surprising i have been predicting it for a long time for example in a book published in 2017 called the international politics of the armenian azerbaijan conflict now i wish i could say i was the only one to do that but that would be a lie a lot of people have been predicting the the rise of tensions and the fact that this would eventually now if you want a very simple reason um i think the easy answer is that the power differential between armenia and is shifting too rapidly and the regional and global geopolitics were getting too uh for the status quo now if we back up and look at the roots of this conflict the uh armenia azerbaijan conflict in the late 1980s in the soviet period

2:07 primarily over this contested territory of nagoya karabakh which is an ethnic armenian majority armenian enclave inside azerbaijan and already in the late soviet period armenians in nagorno-karabakh wanted to be united with the republic of armenia something the soviet leadership as well as the republic of azerbaijan i'm sorry to interrupt uh could you speak a little louder we're having some trouble hearing you is this better perfect okay sorry about so uh this started essentially as a local conflict uh but with independence it rapidly became a war between the two states and almost immediately there was a russian intervention into the conflict which largely supported armenia against what was then a nationalist-led azerbaijani republic now the problem in this conflict is that armenia or rather by me the problem i mean the imbalance that's resulted in this conflict is the fact that armenia is three times smaller than azerbaijan it lacks azerbaijan's natural resources and azerbaijan's geopolitical location

3:11 still armenia won the war and not only did it win the war but it and take control over nagorno-karabakh with about 150 000 population but also seven adjoining provinces around nagorno-karabakh that were almost before the conflict completely populated by azerbaijanis and about 700 000 people lived there how this happened was really due to two factors the first was the internal turmoil in azerbaijan as well as the russian support for armenia coupled with some level of iranian tacit assistance at that time contrary to what has happened presently turkey sided with but because of nato eu and the traditional kemal is cautioned in turkish foreign policy turkey decided not to intervene at that time so the result of the conflict back in the 1990s i would argue is that armenia bit off more than it could chew it took over so much territory that it impossible for either the azerbaijani leadership or for azerbaijani society to somehow reconcile themselves with the way the conflict ended

4:14 then azerbaijan got rich with oil and at once point ended up spending more uh on defense than the entire armenian so this is what i mean by the disparity of between the two parties to this increasing rapidly to an extent that was no longer sustainable something had to unless there was a peaceful solution to the conflict and unfortunately the international mediation failed completely to provide any perspective now in the meantime this has been going on again since the ceasefire first came into place in 1994 so for over for 25 years this has been the situation but the geopolitics surrounding the the conflict in the two countries has changed a lot uh you can see that for example in the different roles that turkey and israel have played a lot of people uh note that israel and turkey find themselves essentially on the same side in this conflict both of them being important partners of azerbaijan and purveyors of military equipment but obviously this has its origin in the

5:19 period back in the late 1990s when turkey and israel had a very strong strategic alignment and when both of them saw a value in the secular pro-western shia majority republic of azerbaijan right on the iranian border whereas on the other hand russia and iran supported armenia in order to stop or prevent western and turkish influence from spreading into the caucasus in central asia so in a way this conflict can be seen either as the contrary if you will of the huntingtonian idea of clash of or at least as an important exception to it given the fact that russia and iran are backing one party and israel and turkey are backing each other so it doesn't really make sense from those should we call them simplistic understandings of regional geopolitics things here are kind of complicated uh what happened in the intervening year among others is that turkey turned islamists under erdogan's rule and split with israel azerbaijan has managed to maintain its very positive ties both with turkey and with israel which hasn't always been

6:21 particularly turkey has been critical of azerbaijan's israel relationships but the two countries are azerbaijan's most important external backgrounds now one important question is why the war took place now and i think there are several explanations for this the first and broadest ones is that there has been as many scholars have observed a gradual weakening of international norms and international institutions and great powers today seem to do what they can get away with azerbaijan in many ways took this lesson to heart it had based its efforts internationally on insisting that international law was on its side and that international and through international institutions get a negotiated solution that would get its occupied territories but if international law isn't working anymore then why would you not try a solution after 30 years of negotiations that's if you will the broader systemic level explanation of why a war has been in the making

7:25 a second and very important reason that we see a war now is the change of the turkish position um that turkey increasingly saw itself as part of the country now it's interesting to look for those that are interested in turkey that why it has happened now because i i would argue that there this is a result of a shift in turkish internal politics we can talk more about this if if if attendees are interested but i would submit that this is inherently not rigid type erdogan's if you see what turkey is doing right now which is picking fights with greece and cyprus and the aegean and having a totally a much higher level of interest in developments in the caucuses and in the black sea region this is the traditional priorities of turkish nationalists just like the policies of turkey in the late 1990s just before erdogan came to and you could add to that of course the support for ukraine which turkey is displaying which makes very little sense from the point of view of an islamist foreign policy but it very much makes sense from the point of view of the nationalist foreign policy now i want to

8:28 make sure i'm not misunderstood here as my writings in the middle east quarterly and elsewhere have indicated i can indicate i have been one of the fiercest and earliest critics of islamization of turkey and his islamist foreign policy what i do argue is that i see a shift right now that can only explain by the loss of influence that erdogan has had following the 2016 attempted coup against him and what i see to be the rise of traditional turkish nationalist forces within the turkish state that have been stepping in to fill this void now that does not mean that erdogan has stopped doing especially hasn't stopped saying outrageous things uh but it means that there is increasing there are now increasingly strong forces in the turkish state that do believe that it was a totally frankly boneheaded decision to pick fights with both israel and egypt at the same time as erdogan did these people and i'm talking about the turkish nationalists in the military and in the state institutions have no inherent hatred of jews or israel like erdogan

9:32 does their natural enemy or adversary historically has been russia and not israel and i think the rise of this faction to prominence in the turkish state is something we should very much take into account when designing policy towards turkey we could discuss the implications of that but to return to the armenia azerbaijan conflict i'll get to a third point after the change of the global situation with the weakening of international norms and the change of turkey's position i would say that the most important of all has been the change in armenia's position in this conflict uh as many of you will know back in 2018 there was a velvet revolution that brought to power uh mr pacinia mr nicole pacinian who was an opposition activist who initially seemed interested in a in re-starting peace negotiations with azerbaijan their first meetings in dushanbe in 2018 apparently went very well but then something changed i very rapidly summarize the changes

10:35 in from 2019 spring of 2019 onwards the armenian side rejected the madrid principles as they were known by the osce that had been the basis for negotiation since 2011. pashinian then said that nagorno-karabakh should be represented separately in the peace talks but he also simultaneously said quote karabakh is armenia period unquote now these two statements were very provocative they also make little sense because after all if nagorno-karabakh is part of armenia period then why should it be represented separately in the talks mr pacinia's wife also dressed up in fatigues and wearing a kalashnikov and went for military training this year uh the couple sent their son to volunteer as a a as a soldier in the occupied territories already back one or two years ago and armenia started resettling armenians from syria and lebanon into the occupied territories now obviously we can talk about the rhetoric on the

11:39 azerbaijani side as well that increasingly has been uh bellicose and the sense of azerbaijan has said that if negotiations lead nowhere we are keeping the military option open but i think the the major shift that was not in the azerbaijani side because that position has been there on the part of azerbaijan for quite a long time whether you like it or not but the real shift happened in the in the armenian approach to negotiations and for the azerbaijani president and the leadership this uh they concluded that negotiations were not useless and at that point the only factor that was really protecting armenia from a military confrontation might be but what also happened and i think armenia made several miscalculations and one of them was to depend so strongly on russia while the leadership in moscow puts a premium on good relations also with and has made it clear that they really don't want to antagonize azerbaijan because it is a jewish strategically

12:41 most important country in the caucasus meanwhile because the new armenian leadership came to power in a velvet revolution uh i think most of you will know what mr putin thinks about velvet revolutions he doesn't like them very much and he does not necessarily seem to mind that mr prashinian is getting a slap in the face in the conflict and therefore the russian position which probably was a surprise to armenia has been rather clear that as long as the fighting that happens is taking place on international recognized territory of azerbaijan russia is not going to step in directly that is russia is still supplying weapons to armenia and so on but it is not yet engaging on the army side and my guess is that the russian position is really to wait and see and probably and try to use the conflict to its influence on both sides for example by trying to insert russian peacekeepers into the conflict zone we'll see what happens it's still early now to to to conclude on a point about u.s policy i think it is quite obvious that in this

13:44 very uh intense period of warfare the u.s policy has basically been misinterpreted uh even europeans have been slightly more active than the us the iranians the turks the russians are fired completely differently the u.s failure is not just an immediate one right during during these these hostilities it's been a failure for several administrations to engage seriously in the role the u.s has as one of the leading mediators of the i think largely we can attribute this to the feeling that this is a frozen conflict quote unquote but it wasn't really frozen and many of us pointed out that it wasn't and that the situation was shifting rapidly and i will say that this administration has been very good on central asia it has launched a new strategy for central asia that is very well written and was very well received in the region um while in fact the problem is that in order to have a strategy in central asia however geostrategically speaking the

14:46 only way you can get there from the united states and from europe is through the caucuses and unfortunately there has been nothing approximating strategy of this or previous administrations towards the caucuses national security advisor bolton tried develop more coherent thinking about the caucuses and went to the region but of course he's no longer there and the u.s in fact i would argue missed the uh escalation of this conflict in spite of clear indications that it was taking place over the summer that is not because there are no u.s interests at stake i would argue that for the u.s the main main interest is to maintain the south caucasus as a corridor linking europe and central asia this has meant helping maintain the independence of the states in the region and making sure that governments in the caucasus countries are able to make their own

15:49 this is what made the role of azerbaijan in georgia as the air corridor to afghanistan in the after 911 possible and which is made possible the development of uh of oil and gas and supplies from the casper to europe for example now i mentioned azerbaijan and georgia because they are more independent independent of russia that is and have been able to play that role whereas because of armenia's close relations with russia and iran has not quite been able to do so now at this point there is still a uh a situation where there is no uh power in the region that the two uh feel is an honest broker certainly azerbaijan does not think russia is one armenia does not think turkey is one iran doesn't really have a potential to play that role either so it is really only the u.s and eu that could have a role in being really neutral powers that could help uh find a solution to this conflict and i think

16:50 the operative word here is solution uh just a ceasefire and a refreezing of the conflict is not going to be sufficient it seems to me that we want to avoid a situation where this develops into something like the israel arab conflict or the indian pakistani conflict where you know you have a war every 10 or 20 years and smaller episodes in between but no long-term resolution there is it is possible to arrive at a resolution to this conflict but it's going to need a much higher level of international involvement obviously with the pandemic with the economic situation in in europe and the united states not to speak of the u.s election and a very polarized political situation it doesn't seem very likely that this is going to um i'll stop here uh in the interest of time and be glad to answer questions all right thank you so much for that so we have quite a few questions coming in the first one is uh what do you think the u.s should do here and the eu as well so

17:53 i think there are two parts of that one part of it is what you what should be done right away and another is what should be done in the long run i think the key thing um is preventing escalation and by escalation i mean a conflict that would um involve either russia turkey or iran directly we should remember that the fighting is taking place right on the border of iran there is a mobilization of ethnic azerbaijanis in iran along the border in support of azerbaijan which has forced iran which whose government has traditionally supported armenia to to you know to pretend to be supportive of the azerbaijani case and to if you will make statements that they support you know the restoration of azerbaijan's territorial integrity that's an interesting thing in and of itself but uh there are many different scenarios in which either of these three powers could be involved so that obviously is in the us interest to avoid a major conflagration among these eurasian but i think uh going back to what i what i said i think what is absolutely key for both u.s and european is not is to doing if you will turn this

18:58 crisis into an opportunity to actually arrive at a solution this has been festering for 30 years and this conflict has really been preventing the development of u.s interests in the broader region in in creating if you will a stable land bridge between between europe and central asia which is in the u.s interest it's enabled russia and iran to to to to play in the various roles in this region by exploiting the weakness of the countries and their conflict with one another it's in many ways prevented armenia from fully developing into into a partner for western countries and it's forced armenia into this unhealthy relationship with russia i think what is key is not as again as i said not to refreeze the conflict along some kind of new ceasefire line that's not going to solve anything and it's just going to uh we're going to set the clock again and there's going to be another war in five or ten years so it's really about a serious effort to to arrive at a final solution and a solution by the way to this conflict is not rocket science there are there have been a number of different peace plans that have been on the table they've been negotiated

20:00 they all operate essentially on the of returning to azerbaijan the occupied territories that were never really armenian populated and they were never part of nagorno-karabakh itself and deal and giving the nagorno-karabakh itself a an interim status that would at some point in the distant future be finally resolved through some form of but the key i think is to arrive at a situation in which occupied territories are returned pieces agree that there is economic a start of economic interaction between between the different parties in the region and this is all doable but it requires security guarantees that can only be done involving the united states and and financial and economic integration with europe that is only possible by an eu intervention i mean we can talk about this in much greater detail but i think that's what we're what we're talking about here thank you so much um we mentioned that there's the natural resources as well as land route that's at stake here but is religion

21:04 also a major factor in the struggle well as i suggested if you look at the the way outside powers are involved it is you have iran traditionally supported supporting armenia and you have and you have israel traditionally supporting azerbaijan so in that sense it doesn't appear to be quite quite of the contrary this is like i said either an exception or a repudiation of the idea now this uh already from uh from the early days of the uh of the conflict the religious leaders of both azerbaijan and armenia have been very careful to make sure that this is to make the point this is not a religious conflict now obviously there are there are elements in both sides uh and i would say primarily there is an element on the armenian side trying to portray this as a flash where the west should really be supporting christian armenia in case muslim but obviously i think the uh the the the involvement of turkey has if you will made it more

22:07 natural on some sides to draw that type argument make that kind of arguments because of the uh increasingly islamist policy of uh president erdogan over the over the past many years but at the end of the day if you look at what this conflict is about it's it's it's identical in many ways to the conflict between russia and ukraine or between russia and georgia in the sense that this is a this is a conflict over territory this is a conflict between two states that make claim to the same territory it's at the base as an ethnic conflict uh sure i mean you could turn it into a residual conflict if you wanted to but uh so far there is there is that there on both sides and at least an effort to prevent it from being subsumed on the broader civilization so how has the current conflict affected the israeli relations with azerbaijan well i think that's hard to say i don't think they have been affected very much

23:10 um i think that israel let's put it very frankly if azerbaijan buys weapons from israel it shouldn't come as a surprise that they were intending to use them so i think in that sense i don't think that there is anything particularly to israelis and i think however obviously that there are forces in israel that do not necessarily think that this is a particularly wise there are all there's always been a tension in israel between a certain kindred feeling towards the armenians because of the joint historical experience of being subjected to genocide on the other hand the from the armenian side there has been this if you will the uh an intention to conflate the the genocide issue with the karabakh issue after all the issue of the armenian genocide didn't happen in the caucasus it happened in the ottoman empire in what is today turkey and i think from the israeli side overall there has been an ability to

24:12 keep these things apart and to realize that the strategic interest of israel has very much been in developing its close relations with all the secular muslim majority countries in central asia and azerbaijan this is not just azerbaijan this is also uzbekistan kazakhstan and others which are you know the very idea that you have in this what you could call if you will the northern part of the middle east you have these uh countries that are you know can appear to be peripheral in a muslim world but historically they were actually very important in the development of of of the history of the islamic sufi brotherhood came from central asia you know the the collection of hadiths of buhari were the second most holy book after the quran and after all bukhara is in the middle of central asia so this is not a region that is historically to the muslim world but it is a place in which you have vibrant jewish communities and governments that

25:14 that are opposing every form of anti-semitism and are happy to have close relationship with israel long before the likes of bahrain and the united arab emirates decided to do that and i think that that has been the israeli perspective on this on this region and that i think it very naturally continues to be these re the main israeli interest in this area so in your opinion is is the peace talks and how might nagorno-karabakh be governed in the future given some sort of azerbaijani victory well that depends what that victory looks like i think there are two aspects here one is what is the easy picking and what is hard militarily speaking and the low lands where the uh low-hanging fruit if you from an azerbaijani military perspective the the territories that the armenians captured the easiest back in the 90s are also the ones that have been the easiest for the azerbaijanis to take so when you get up into the mountains into karabakh itself

26:16 and also territory that you know after all occupied territories even if some armenians have begun to call them liberated territories quote unquote they all know that these were not traditional armenian lands uh their parents didn't live there but when you get into karabakh itself i think that gets to something much more difficult for the armenians to just give up and that means it's going to be militarily much harder for azerbaijan now i i am not a military specialist i can't tell how the military you know technological superiority of azerbaijan is going to play out or how much there is going to be an international intervention if the war gets into nagorno-karabakh what i do think is that at some point it is going to get more difficult and i mean i would personally be surprised if azerbaijan is able to get all the territory back then there's a difference between like i said even even in terms of the way the international community if there is one approaches this conflict between the occupied territories and nagoya and i think obviously for nagorno-karabakh to have any form of

27:21 there that that assumes that the conflict hasn't really gone that far into nagorno-karabakh itself assuming that i think the um first if the question is if i think that it's achievable i think in theory yes but in practice the international environment right now is not very conducive to a serious solution you could see something like a a turkish agreement of sorts emerge in one way or another it's not it's not impossible i see a danger that the west is being completely sidestepped here because of the way the us and the eu have not been able to insert themselves and to be a factor in this conflict but i think the azerbaijani position has traditionally been that they would uh respect some form of self-government for the armenians of obviously there is the issue of the azerbaijani minority that existed in nagorno-karabakh itself back in the day but that there are many questions that remains to be resolved but i think some form of a real solution will require

28:23 a that there be a very high level of self-rule for the armenians of and that there be very serious security guarantees from the outside for this the problem of course is in today's world whose security guarantees with armenians in nagorno-karabakh trust and under what conditions especially since now they they've tended them for 30 years they trusted the russians and it didn't seem like that paid off very so i think they're they're we're in a situation where there is not a lot of trust for any institutions or any foreign powers and i think that's a serious complicating factor understood thank you um is the u.n involved at all in solving this conflict the u.n back i think was it 1992 or 93 you know uh this was the uh immediate post so post communist situation where a lot of conflicts were breaking out in um in in the balkans uh in the caucuses elsewhere and the un basically subcontracted the uh the uh this conflict to the organization for security and cooperation in europe the

29:26 and therefore we have this weird situation with the so-called minsk group which is named thusly only because there was supposed to be a peace conference in minsk in one of the years of the early 1990s that of course never materialized but it's still called the mints group and you have russia the u.s and france being co-chairs of this group and they don't seem to be able to agree on much in general let alone about how to go about this conflict but no the the u.n has very little if any of a role so what percentage of the occupied territory is armenian if there are relatively few azerbaijani people in nagorno-karabakh how feasible would it be to relinquish this territory to so that depends on what you mean by our meaning if you mean what i was referring to earlier why i'm saying that is because both azerbaijan and armenia have published huge books

30:29 explaining how all of these territories historically belong to them for example if you go back just a month or so to mr pacinian's bbc hard talk interview he talks about how for six thousand years this has been armenian territory and so on the azerbaijanis would make similar claims uh but if we go back to the more recent past so to speak and uh i think the what's clear is that if you look at one of the detailed maps you'll see that nagorno-karabakh was majority armenian it had about an 80 75 80 percent armenian majority and a smaller azerbaijani population the territories surrounding nagorno-karabakh that were occupied by armenian forces in basically 1993-94 were almost entirely populated by ethnic azerbaijanis and a lot of kurds as well especially in the western parts the little sliver of land between karabakh and armenia was heavily kurdish uh but there were essentially no armenians there though all those people were removed they were ethnically cleansed back in the early 90s and they're living as internally displaced people in azerbaijan everest for the past 30 years

31:30 so um in that sense uh i think the the answer is that you know and one of the reasons why there has been little of an international outcry over what's going on is that like i said initially the in my remarks that armenia bit off more than it could it uh it had benefited from this tendency by the international community particularly the western world to view armenia as a victim of the conflict which had more to do again with the history of genocide than anything else and also to some extent to the soviet and azerbaijani policies in the late soviet period which also forced some armenians to flee from parts of their homes in azerbaijan but as soon as the armenians emptied these large territories of azerbaijanis the international perceptions of the conflict shifted and armenia essentially never was able to gain acceptance for the fact that it had just taken over these territories and evicted people from it and i think that's one of the reasons you know azerbaijan by the way has been spending 30 years

32:32 explaining to the world that these are occupied territories where no armenians traditionally have lived and i think that's one of the reasons why why the international reaction so far has been comparatively muted which obviously could change if the war moves nagorno-karabakh itself in populated areas there or onto the territory of the republic of armenia well thank you so much i apologize for going over our time a little bit here we have so many questions coming in uh before we leave can you just give us some more information as to where to find some more of your work sure um our institute has a website called that's silkroadstudies.org and there's a section on the right side of the screen in which we have a link to basically to resources on the armenia azerbaijan conflict where we have collected some of our work that's been published both by myself and by contributors to our journals over the past several years i welcome anybody's interest in that and also to contact us if they have further all right well thank you so much for

33:36 speaking with us today unfortunately we've come to the close of our webinar for our viewers please join us at 3 p.m eastern for our weekly update with ashley perry and thank you all for joining us and i hope you have a wonderful day thank you