“Hezbollah Makes Peace between Lebanon and Israel Impossible” with Ibtissam Klait

0:01 Good afternoon and welcome to the Middle East Forums weekly podcast. My name is Lori Rean and on behalf of MEF, I thank you all for joining today and for your continued support of the critically important work that we do here. This afternoon I'm pleased to share that we're joined by Sam Clay, a scholar and educator specializing in international relations, political science, public policy, and global affairs. She will be providing her insights on how despite the recent direct talks between the Lebanese government and Israel and the Lebanese leadership's desire to deescalate and stabilize relations between the two countries, Hezbollah nonetheless makes peace currently impossible. I'm looking forward to hearing ifam's remarks which on the heels of last week's podcast will add further insights on this very important and complicated situation in the Middle East. Ifam will speak for about 15 maybe 20 minutes followed by audience questions. So, if you'd like to ask a question, please feel free to use the Q&A or chat function at the bottom of your screens to enter your submission and I'll do my best to get to as many of your questions as possible. Today's podcast is being recorded and it will be

1:04 available for future viewing. So, please share it with those in your networks who you think would be interested in this very important topic. Welcome, and thank you so much for joining us this afternoon. I hand the floor. Thank you very much Lori and thank you for the me. Good evening, everyone. Thank you for joining me tonight. I want to discuss one of the most consequential questions facing the Middle East. Why despite repeated ceasefires, negotiations, and international mediation has peace between Lebanon and Israel remained so elusive? This is not merely a military question. It's not only a diplomatic question, nor is it solely a religious question. It is fundamentally a question about who possesses sovereign authority to decide war and peace. For nearly half century, Lebanon has lived two competing centers of power. One is the constitutional state, its president, prime minister, parliament, judiciary and armed forces. The other isah, an organization that is that is

2:09 simultaneously a political party, a social movement, and an armed group that maintains military capabilities independent of the Lebanese state. The result is that Lebanon has often faced decisions about conflict and peace in circumstances where the government's authority has not been the only force shaping events. Today I will argue that Hzbalah's evolution from a movement inspired by the Iranian revolution into an organization with significant military and political influence has profoundly affected Lebanon's ability to exercise unified national security policy. To understand how we arrived here, we must begin long before Hzbalah officially announced its existence in 1985. We must return to the life of one of the most influential and so mysterious figures in modern Lebanese history, Imam Musa Sad. His disappearance in Libya in August 1978

3:13 remains one of the Middle East's greatest unresolved political mysteries. His legacy continues to shape Lebanese politics, Shia political identity, and debates over regional influence. Understanding that legacy requires separating what is well doumented from what remains disputed and then carefully dis considering what those competing interpretations might tell us. Every political movement begins with an idea before it becomes an organization.

3:45 Ideas require leaders. Leaders require followers. Followers are not mobilized merely through policy papers or military strength. They are mobilized through narratives, identity, symbol, and rhetoric. Political scientists have long examined how leaders construct collective identities and persuade populations to support ambitious political projects. Charismatic leadership can inspire civic engagement and reform, but it can also facilitate movements that seek sweeping political The mechanisms of mobilization are therefore analytically important regardless of the goals pursued. One historical case that scholars frequent frequently study is the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany. The comparison here is not one of moral equivalence but of political technique. Historians have documented how Hitler combined powerful public speaking, repeating slogans, emot uh repeated slogans and emotionally

4:51 charged narratives, mass rallies and appeals to collective grievance to transform a fringe political movement into a dominant force. He identified perceived enemies, particularly Jews, Marxists, and the political establishment as the source of Germany's problems, and presented himself as the leader who could restore national strength. Those techniques illustrate how rhetorical identity can become instruments of political mobilization. This analytical lens can also be applied carefully and without implying equivalence to other leaders who successfully mobilized large constituencies through emotionally narratives. I mean here Moses Sader and others. Mosad was born in K Iran in 1928 into a prominent clerical family with roots extending into both Iran and Iraq.

5:53 In 1959 following the death of say Abdul [snorts] Hussein Shariff Dean he relocated to the southern Lebanese city of tier where he become where he became the leading Shia cleric. At the time Lebanon Lebanon's Shia population experienced significant socioeconomic disadvantages compared with many other communities. Southern Lebanon and the Bikha Valley had comparatively limited infrastructure, educational opportunities and public investment. As southern emerged as a prominent advocate for greater representation and state attention to these regions, he established schools, charitable institutions, vocational programs, and organizations intended to improve social conditions. In 1969, he became the first president of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council, giving the Shia community a recognized in institutional voice within Lebanon. His message resonated because

6:57 it addressed both material concerns and questions of political dignity. While his study's work focused extensively on Lebanon, his activities also reflected engagement with wider Shia scholarly and religious network. across the region. He maintained relationships with clerics and institutions in Iraq and Iran. He played a role in theological discussions that had regional significance. One notable example concerns his reported recognition of the Alawite community in Syria as part of the broader Shia Although they are not Shia, Musa Sutter Southern's recognition of the Alawites strengthened the religious legitim legitimacy of Hus al-Assad's regime and contributed to closer relations between Syrian Lebanese and Iranian Shia actors.

7:52 This religious bridge later became important in the formation of the regional alliance or axis involving Syria, Iran and it is reasonable to interpret these developments as showing that southern's influence extended beyond Lebanon's borders and that his efforts contributed to the strengthening of transnational shs. I contend that this amounted to a project aimed at future future transnational governance. Although it remains debated in the scholarly literature, many people assume was created after the revolution.

8:34 I mean the revolution of 1979. But that is incorrect. The doctrine was publicly announced in 1970 nearly a decade before Kumi became supreme leader. In 1979, revolution provided the opportunity to implement what had already been developed theoretically in Najaf ayati publicly articulated the doctrine of fak well before the 1979 Iranian revolution the chronology is important 1943 1944 in his book Kashal Assar unveiling of secrets Kmeni criticized monarchy and argued that Islamic jurists should have an important supervisory role in government. However, he did not yet fully formulate the doctrine of absolute that later became associated with him.

9:25 The ideas were present in emperionic form. January February 1970. This is the key moment. While in exile in Najaf, Iraq, Kumeni delivered a series of lectures between approximately 21st January and 8th February 1970 at Shikh Mortad and Sari mosque. In these lectures, he explicitly argued that an Islamic state is obligatory. Monarchy is illegitimate. Qualified Islamic jurists should exercise political authority during the uh occultation of the 12 im.

10:04 This authority constitutes 1971 the lectures were were transcribed and published as the book Islamic government governance of the jurist. The book was smuggled into Iran and became one of the principal ideological texts of the revolutionary movement. The historical evidence indicates that Mus and Rhali knew each other and almost certainly met on multiple occasions. But the exact dates and details of every meeting are not fully documented.

10:40 But in com 1950s, this is the earliest documented connection. Musan Sad moved to come in the early 1950s to study at the Hza after completing studies in Najaf was already one of the leading teachers at the K uh seminary. Mos attended lectures by several senior scholars including they belong to the same scholar network making personal interaction highly likely. Najhaf in 1965 1978 after Kuwomani was exiled from Iran 1965 he settled in Najaf Iraq. Mosas frequently visited Najaf because he studied there.

11:21 Many members of of his family lived there. He maintained close ties with Iraqi Ha. And in Tahan before 1964 uh before exile Mus traveled regularly to Iran. He maintained relationships with Iranian religious and political Although no official records survive, avail available memor and historical studies suggest that they discuss the future political role of Shia clergy opposition to Shia conditions of Shia communities in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, Islamic political activism.

12:05 Okay. I further argued that Assad occupied a foundational historical position in the development of modern Shia political mobilization through his intellectual leadership, institutional uh building efforts and political activism. Assad helped transform Shia communities in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria from marginalized religious populations into organized political actors. In doing so, he paved the way for the broader realization of Alaki, creating the social, ideological, and institutional foundations necessary for an active Shia political movement. His efforts strengthened Shia collective identity, expanded the political role of the clerical establishment, and demonstrated the capacity of religious leadership to mobilize communities beyond purely spiritual domains. From this perspectives, a southern legacy represents a crucial stage in the historical development that culminated in Kumi's realization of Alaki after the Iranian revolution. Although Kumi

13:10 ultimately instit institutealized the doctrine within the Iranian state, a southern's earlier work helped prepared the prepared the broader Shia political landscape in which such a model could emerge and gain influence. Therefore, a southern should be understood not only as an influential Shia leader in his own right but also a foundational figure whose efforts contributed to the conditions that facilitated the expansions the expansion of Kainis revolutionary vision rhetoric against Israel one of the clearest windows into Assad's political thought is his rhetoric regarding Israel and a lesson dated 20th January 1978 he declared quoting quote, "We consider Israel an absolute evil. There is nothing worse than Israel in the world. If Israel were to fight the devil, we would stand with the devil. If Isra were to fight communism, we would stand with communism. If Isra were to fight the political right, we would stand with the

14:12 political right. This is our logic. Uh Israel is absolute evil in our view. Personally, based on my reading and my convictions, I know of no institution more dangerous than Israel. Quoting quote and of that quote. The statement illustrates the intensity of his opposition to Israel. [gasps] Um, okay. as toi was emerging as the central figure of position to the sha of Iran. It is not worthy to highlight that following the 1979 Iran revolution articulated the doctrine of argued that a senior Islamic jurist should exercise uh that authority. Okay. During the absence of hidden imam, this doctrine um a foundational principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The new Iranian leadership also adopted enduring

15:16 revol revolutionary slogans including death to America, death to Israel. These slogans became prominent in official uh com commemor commemorations, speeches, speeches and demonstrations associated with the Islamic Republic. Supporters have often interpreted them as opposition to governments and state policies rather than to populations. While critics argue that the slogans contribute to a climate of hostility, of hostility and regional confrontation.

16:00 Just a moment, please. Okay. In 1979, the Iranian revolution succeeded. Three years later, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Lebanese civil war, a new organization emerged that would transform Lebanon's political landscape. To understand how evolved from a from a revolutionary movement, we must closely examine its founding document, the 1985 open letter, and the ideological commit commitments it publicly declared to the Many people mistakenly believe Hzbollah simply emerged as another militia during the Libanese civil war. This is historically incomplete. Hzbalah did not merely emerge as an armed resistant organization. It emerged as a revolutionary ideological movement.

17:04 Its word view was publicly articulated on 16th February February 1985 when Hzbalah issued what became known as the open letter also called the Husbala program. This document was not leaked. It was not discovered. It was not discovered years later. It was not an official public declaration. It was it was led publicly at the UA mosque in Beirut by Hbah spokesman Sheikh Ibraim al-A published in the Lebanese newspaper as Safir and distributed throughout Lebanon as a pamphlet. The opera letter therefore presents Hazbalah's original constitutional document. Every serious scholar of Hbalah returns to this document because it reveals the organization's foundational self To appreciate the manifesto, we must place ourselves in Lebanon 1985. The Lebanese civil war was raging. Israel has invaded Lebanon on 1982. The PLO had been expelled. Iran's Islamic Revolution

18:10 had succeeded only six years. Only six years earlier, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpse has deployed advisers to Lebanon's Bika Valley. A generation of young Lebanese Shia militants had become convinced that the Iranian revolution represented not merely an Iranian event but the beginning of a broader Islamic awakening. Hazbala emerged from this environment. It did not conceal its inspiration. Instead, it proudly declared it. We are the sons of the umah. The document opens with with this.

18:48 Notice what is absent. It does not begin we are citizens of Lebanon. It does not begin we are representatives of the Lebanese Shia. Instead, identity is immediately defined through membership in the broader Islamic community, the UMAH. For the political scientists, this opening sentence is significant because it places religious identity before territorial nationality. The primary political reference point is not the Lebanese Republic. It is the transnational Islamic community. This reflects an ideological orientation in which national borders are secondary to a broader religious and revolutionary identity.

19:35 We ab we obey one leader. This what the manifesto declares. One leader. We abide by the orders of one single wise and just command represented by ali. This sentence is arguably the most in the entire document is establishes that recognizes the doctrine of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist at it as its guiding political and religious Then this was a declaration of political An illegitimate state. The manifesto devotes extensive attention to Israel.

20:24 It rejects recognition of Israel and characterizes it as an occupying entity that should ultimately cease to exist. Rather than treating the conflict as one over borders or diplomacy, the document presents it as a comprehensive struggle against what it describes as Zionist uh occupation. The manifesto rejects negotiated settlements with Israel and frames armed resistance as both a political necessity and a religious obligation. This position represented continuity with broader revolutionary discourse after 1979 and also it reflected immediate experience of the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon following the 1982 invasion. The document therefore fused territorial, religious and ideological arguments into a single occupation into a single conception sorry of resistance. Uh, United States and France

21:29 are also enemies. Jihad is a political strategy. The Islamic State question, one of the most discussed sections concerns letter expresses support for Islamic inspired by Islamic principles and the Iranian revolution. However, the text also states that such a system should sorry [clears throat] the free choice of the of the Lebanese people rather than being imposed by force. But that was uh a manipulation.

22:10 This passage has generated considerable scholarly debate. Asbala's view of Lebanon. One striking feature of the 1985 document is its limited emphasis on the Lebanese state as the primary framework for political authority. The manifesto portrays as one arena within a wider struggle involving Islam, revolutionary politics and regional conflict. This differs from conventional nationalist movements whose central objective is usually the strengthening of a nation state.

22:50 Instead, Hazbala's founding charter pri priorized revolutionary identity resistant resistance and religious legitimacy. After four decades, okay, the opera letter remains indispensable for for understanding Hbah's origins. It reveals that the organization began not purely as a military resistance movement but as a revolutionary project grounded in allegiance to related to commitment to armed resistance, rejection of Israel, opposition to American fresh influence and broader vision linking Lebanon to the post 1979 revolutionary order.

23:39 hazala in 20 in 2009 uh political manifesto okay changed this rhetoric just to enter elections. However, it u its experience reveals that it was against the state. It was a state within the state, parallel to the state and also against the state. okay. From a state within a state to a state against the state's transformation and the erosion of the Libanese sovereignty. Ladies and gentlemen, throughout this presentation, I've argued that understanding requires more than recounting its history. It requires understanding its institutional evolution. My central analytical argument is thatah has undergone three distinct stages of development. First, it emerged as an armed resistance movement during the

24:42 Lebanese civil war. Second, it evolved into what many scholars describes as a state within a state. During this phase, Hazbala developed parallel military, social, financial, educational, and political institutions while participating in Lebanon's constitutional system. Today, however, I argue that HBA has entered a third stage, one that is qualitatively different. It has evolved into what I describe as a state against the state. it's breaching the sovereignty of Lebanon because of time limit. And I'm very sorry. I want to move.

25:22 Hezbollah involved in the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah involved in Gaza war when it provided it assistance uh regional integration and uh it's competing the authority uh of uh of the Lebanese state. Uh the constitutional consequences extend far beyond military affairs. Economic recovery depends upon stability. Foreign investment depends upon predict pred Diplomatic agreements depend upon implementation. International confidence depends upon unified governance.

26:08 Whenever authority becomes divided as in Lebanon these foundations become more Um the human cost is uh high. Okay. And families displaced from their homes. Children's education is interrupted. Businesses are closed. Communities live under recurring insecurity. Whether Lebanese or civilians, civilians, uh whether Lebanese or Israeli civilians be the greatest burden whenever political disputes become military confrontations. This security should remain the ultimate their security. Israel and Lebanon should remain the ultimate objective of any durable political settlement.

26:55 Uh this brings me to my principal conclusion. The greatest obstacle to durable Lebanon uh Israel peace is not simply disagreement over borders or hysterical grievances. It is the unresolved question of sovereign I'm sorry for the time. No, thank you. This was a very I'm sorry for the time, but there is something very important I want to say. Please give me the time. Uh, China um is strategic in resolving the uh problem.

27:36 It is a critical uh major power in resolving this problem. And I want to end in something that in Lebanon there are synagogues, there are Lebanese Jews, they have the right to return to [clears throat] their country of origin. Uh and uh uh the last the last page, please. just a moment please. Okay, I want to to conclude with Isra's treatment of its Arab citizens also deserves consideration in this discussion. Ezra is Arab citizens including Muslims have the right to participate in uh in the country's political and civic institutions and some have chosen to serve in the Israel Defense Forces. One example is Captain A Wawya, a Muslim Arab Israeli who served as an officer in the IDF and became known for her work communicating

28:38 Israel's perspective the Arab world. Her story illustrates an important point. Arab citizens of Israel can if they choose participate in the country's national institutions including its military. Okay. Uh this does not mean that discrimination or inequality does not exist in Israel. No society is free of such problems, but it demonstrates that Israeli citizenship does not inherently prevent an Arab or Muslim citizen from serving the state at the highest levels. This reality should also be considered alongside the historical experience of Jewish communities in many Arab countries. Following the establishment of Israel in 1948, large numbers of Jews were forced or pressured to leave their countries where their communities had existed for centuries.

29:29 Many lost homes, property and livelihoods or they fled or were ex or expelled. The contrast is significant. While Arab citizens remain part of Israel's civic and political system, the Jewish populations of many Arab countries experienced mass displacement and the near disappearance of communities that had existed there for generations. Another important issue is the protection of civilians during the Israeli conflicts including the 20 24 escalation escalation and sub subsequent fighting. Israel repeatedly issued warning to civilians in areas it intended to strike calling on them to evacuate before military operations.

30:18 These warnings have taken different forms, including public statements, evacuation orders, and direct communications. The stated purpose has been to give civilians an opportunity to leave areas where military targets are located. This raises an important questions. Okay. Uh but time is uh over. We should not only make uh peace agreements with Israel. There's a call for all the Arab countries countries to normal normalize with Israel. Thank you.

30:54 Thank you so much. That was a very thorough analysis and your insights are greatly appreciated. There are a number of questions. Unfortunately, um we don't have time to get to them, but um we can maybe bring you back another time. People are also asking for a transcript, and I want to share with everybody that I believe that they we will have a transcript for this. So, um, any questions that you have, maybe send along to us at the Middle East forum and we'll pass them on to Tasam and maybe she can answer them in writing for you as well. So, thank you so much. It was it was great to have you this afternoon.

31:28 We appreciate you taking the time. Um, I thank everybody in the audience for joining and uh being as engaged as you were for this very important topic. And uh, just join us. I hope to see you on Wednesday at 3 p.m. for uh, Ashley Perry's Israel Insider podcast. And again, thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you for joining me and I welcome any questions if they email me. Okay, great. Thank you very much. Okay, thank you again. Bye-bye.