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“The Iran War: Strategy, Strikes, and the Risk of Escalation” with Andrew Fox
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In this week’s Middle East Forum podcast, Lauri Regan is joined by Andrew Fox, a frontline conflict researcher and senior fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and a former British Army officer who served sixteen years and deployed on three tours of Afghanistan.
Fox breaks down the opening phase of the U.S.-Israel campaign against Iran, including the intelligence-driven strikes that rapidly targeted Iran’s senior command echelon. He explains what Israel and the United States appear to be prioritizing next, from missile-launcher “shoot-and-scoot” tactics to the systematic pressure on Iran’s security apparatus, and why regime change by airpower remains difficult without a credible ground component.
The conversation also explores how the war could reshape regional dynamics, including the status of Iranian proxies—Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias—the pause and uncertainty surrounding Gaza and the Trump peace plan, and the strategic vacuum that could expand Turkish influence in Lebanon and Syria. Fox closes by outlining the key constraints that could determine how long the conflict lasts, including ammunition stocks, political time pressure, and global market volatility.
Subscribe for more conversations with leading analysts on the Middle East and beyond.
Transcript Automatic captions
Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved October 15, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.
0:09 Good afternoon and welcome to the Middle East Forums weekly podcast. My name is Lauri Rean and on behalf of MEF I once again thank you all for joining today and for your continued support of the critically important work that we do. Uh of all times the past several days I think is is uh very illustrative of how important our work truly is. I'm very pleased today that we are joined this afternoon by Andrew Fox who will be providing his analysis of the war with Iran as well as discuss the Trump peace plan and progress in Gaza and how that may be impacted by the war. Andrew is a brilliant frontline conflict researcher and senior fellow at the Henry Jackson Society who served for 16 years in the British Army and deployed on three tours of a Afghanistan. He has visited the Gaza area on a number of occasions during the last two years of war and has been providing insightful and in-depth analyses on X in his Substack and his podcast, The Brink. All of which I urge you to follow as I do. Andrew will speak for about 15 minutes followed by 15 minutes of audience questions. So, if you'd like to ask a question, please feel free to use the Q&A or chat function at the bottom of your screens
1:10 to enter your submission. We'll do our best to get to as many of your questions as possible. I'm sure there will be a lot of them. Uh, today's podcast is being recorded. It will be available for future viewing. So, please do share the link with those in your network who would be interested in learning more on this very important and timely topic. Welcome, Andrew, and thank you so much for joining us this afternoon. The floor is yours. Well, thank you for having me and thank you for everyone who's who's joined us. Um, so it's been an incredibly hectic what are we on now? 48 hours only. You know, maybe slightly more than that. Um, and I think we've seen uh quite a remarkable achievement militarily from from the first word go. And I think we should start there. We should start at the beginning and talk about how this war began with that incredible strike, three simultaneous strikes on three locations in Tehran. Uh, and it seems very much from everything that we've learned that this was an intelligence-driven trigger. So rather than set a line in the sand and say we are going to launch uh at H hour which will be at this time on this date they
2:11 were actually waiting for that moment uh when the leadership would come out of their caves and their holes uh be all together and strike them all at once. first of all the intelligence penetration to achieve that that that insider information is quite remarkable. You know, that shows you we we know repeatedly, you know, from the Haneia um uh strike through to last summer's 12-day war through to this that intelligence penetration by Israel particularly has been remarkable. Uh but this really was next level. And then to get it synchronized so they hit everyone at the same time and took out pretty much all 40 of uh Iran's command echelon is astonishing. It also speaks to a really strange mentality on the Iranian side. Um because we often struggle to get inside the psychology of our enemies. Um certainly we've struggled repeatedly with Putin in in in Eastern Europe to understand exactly what he's doing. And a great example given that we've just had the anniversary of that war is how many analysts, myself included, were completely wrong in
3:13 thinking that Putin wouldn't invade um because it made no strategic sense on any rational logical basis. It made no sense. And of course, it has been a disaster. But that because we didn't understand Putin's psychology. And I think there's just a very strange psychological thing here when you have two US carrier groups, the entire Israeli Air Force just waiting to pounce, having been told that they're going to pounce and knowing what happened the previous summer where talks failed and and Trump struck the next day. You know that all of this pattern was set and yet they still thought that they could get away with going up to the surface having group meetings and discussions and then nothing happened.
3:50 Um, and I think it speaks to that religious psychology that that sort of inshallah approach where, you know, if it happens, it happens. We'll be safe because Allah's protecting us or or whatever it might be. Just a very very strange piece of decision-making from the Iranians, but hey, it worked out well uh for the forces of good. So, so there we are. The war begins that way. Now, what have these air strikes that we've seen repeatedly on TV and on social media, what are they actually striking and why? I think is a really important thing to look at from a military side of things. Well, the first thing we're looking at is that strike on the leadership and uh even the strike that didn't take out everyone they've been mopping up senior commanders ever since and that's been obviously very very high on their priorities list. The next thing we've seen particularly Israel hitting is the the missile launches. Now, I had meetings in the Curio just last month and they told me um as for those who don't know, the Curio is the Israeli Ministry of Defense um in Tel Aviv. So, I was they told me in a briefing that um Iran had returned its missile stocks to where they were
4:55 before the 12-day war. That's how quickly they turned this around. And then on top of that, they were focusing on solid fuel missiles rather than liquid fuel missiles. Now, what's the difference, you might ask? Well, the difference is the speed you can get them off the ground. So, Iran is a learning organization. They had seen the missiles that were taking a long time to fuel up and and get warmed up, ready to launch were the ones that were getting taken out by Israel and those were the liquid fuel missiles. So, they switched to production of solid fuel missiles because they knew they could launch them And so this huge missile stock that they had recovered uh in the the short few months since last summer um that would have been a very very high priority and we've seen many many images of the Israeli Air Force hunting these launches and it's difficult to do. It's not an easy task because they're quite small and people sometimes don't understand that when you're looking from the sky you have to be looking at something to find something. So you can't just say hey go and scan that grid square on a map and and see what you can find.
5:57 That's not how it works. You have to tell a drone or tell an intelligence asset in the sky what you want it to look at. And so they're relying on things like electronic warfare, radar signatures. Um they're trying to hoover up this information so when something flashes up on the screen, you can direct the fighter aircraft towards it and drop the bomb accordingly. So it's not as easy as just saying, "Hey, we'll just take out the launchers." They're actually quite difficult to find. And the tactics uh the Iranians are using is what we would have called in Iran Afghanistan a shoot and scoot where they they pop out of cover, they set up, they fire, and then they disappear again really quickly. And that's why we're not seeing the big waves of missiles that we saw last summer. Um they're firing in kind of three round bursts, disappearing, and then firing again. And that makes it much much easier for them to intercept.
6:44 Uh, and on the interception side of things, look, we've seen a huge amount of hits around the Gulf in various countries. Aramco in Saudi Arabia got hit just this afternoon, UK time. Um, but they're few and far between. You know, most most of the interceptors are doing an incredible job. The UAE are claiming that they had something like 760 interceptions since the war started. Um, they were claiming 100% interception rate yesterday. Uh, we've seen very few impacts in Israel given the amount of rounds that have been fired at them. So that just shows you how that degradation of launcher capacity gives the defenses on the other end a much better chance of intercepting rounds as they come in, but there's always going to be falling debris. Um something is always going to get through. So there's always that risk and that's some of the hits we've seen and unfortunately some of the lives that we've seen lost uh over the weekend. Uh the next target um on the list is going to be the security forces.
7:39 Uh Iran is a very veryworked security apparatus. They've got 11 regional headquarters for the the IRGC. Each of those 11 regional headquarters has numerous headquarters below them. Uh things like the Basie and then you move down to the regular forces as well and it cumulatively is about 1.3 million men under arms. It's a huge huge apparatus. Uh and that's very very difficult to start taking apart. So what I expect to see over the coming days and weeks is a focus on certain regions, certain critical towns, tan being the most obvious, where they're going to try and remove as much of the security apparatus as they can in the hope that the local people will be able to rise up uh and seize control in those really critical nodes. Um and from there you've got a chance at regime regime change because there there's a real contradiction uh between what we call ends and means in this uh it's one of the things they hammer into you at staff colleges is what are your ends your political end state? Where do you want to get to with the use of force and how are you going
8:42 to get there? And regime change with simply air strikes is very difficult if not impossible. You need something on the ground. Um if we look at uh Syria when they recently um got rid of Assad, of course there was the HTS forces under al-Shar that came through and were there to to drive that regime change. If we look at 2011 um the Gaddafi overthrow in Libya, there were rebels on the grounds that were backed by Western special forces and other advisers. They were ready to take, you know, fill that void and take over once Gaddafi had moved on.
9:15 And even if we look at Kosovo, uh that was a 78-day bombing campaign in 1999. Uh and even then it took the threat of ground forces and another 12 months after the bombing campaign had finished before we saw that change in government there. So you need something on the ground. And I think what we're looking um what we're looking at here is is an attempt to set the conditions for the Iranian people or representatives thereof in the form of revolution to take over. Now I fully expect that there are um mentors and an assistance for them on the ground u before going in uh Israel and the United States of America would have picked their chosen successes and they would have thrown them resources not only Starlink terminals but weaponry training advis advising uh that'll look like the CIA maybe special forces um certainly maybe Mossad or something similar but this wouldn't be happening I don't think if there weren't those pieces in play to try and get something to happen once the regime were taken out. Because
10:18 if you think back to that 11 structure, 11 regional structure IRGC, you're not going to kill them all. You know, there is not enough ammunition in the world right now to kill through 1.3 million members of the IRGC and associated security apparatus. So, they need to do something next. And I think that's the biggest risk in this war is that at the moment, the ends and the means don't match. you you've got an end of regime change, but the means aren't there yet. So, they're trying to create that uh that ground swell to enable that to happen. What are the other concerns I have here? I mean, we we've always said that Ayatollah Ham was never going to defeat Israel and the USA, but there are three Ayatollas that might. There's Ayatollah time, Ayatollah ammunition stocks, and Ayatollah market prices. Okay? And these are these are three factors you have to consider. Now, ammo stocks is a big one. offensive and defensive. Iran have got missiles off the ground. They have absorbed interceptor stocks. Um if there comes a point where we start running low on um then there's a decision point there
11:22 as to how how long they continue the campaign or whether that you know or whether they try and sue for some sort of deal um that brings hostilities to an end because the last thing we want is the UAE or somebody else running out of missile interceptors and then we suddenly see huge cities like Dubai on fire. You know that is a disaster that I don't think they will allow to happen. So missile stocks defensively is a big deal and then offensively as well. You know, they have been preparing this for a number of months. They do have good missile stores. We've seen, you know, 78 day bombing campaigns in Kosovo, 222day campaigns in Libya. Like this is not a this is not a thing that that runs out quickly, but it does run out. And of course, they will have to slow that pace of targeting, which means they might have a chance of getting more missiles off on the Iranian side. So, there is a balance to be struck here with the amount of ammunition they're expending uh and how long they can keep the campaign going for. I'm not saying it's going to fail because of that. I'm just saying it's something that military planners and logisticians will be looking for.
12:25 So, that's Ayatollah uh Ayatollah munition stocks. Ayatollah time. Well, look, we're in an election year both in America and in Israel. Um this war isn't hugely popular on the American side. Um, most people want to see the regime gone, but they're not hugely keen on on Trump running a military campaign. And it's gone down especially badly in the MAGA constituency. The America first hardliners who were POP promised a peace presidents who wouldn't start any more Middle Eastern wars uh has dropped more bombs in his last year than than any president in recent history. um that is really unpopular and that you know the Democrats are making gains in in key seats as a result as well as the other polling issues that Trump has Um so time the longer this goes on the more politically expensive it will be on the United States side of things and so Mr. Trump will want a quick resolution and he's already talking about a four-week timeline. Um but wars don't always go according to a timetable or a spreadsheet. You know there there are other factors that might come into play that we haven't even foreseen coming. So
13:29 time is a ton of time is a big one. And then finally we have to look at the markets and we have to see what's happening there. Great example Aram co was hit this afternoon. What's that going to do to global oil prices if this war continues and all of a sudden people are paying a huge amount more for gas? If people are having to pay a lot more at the supermarket when they go and buy groceries um and you can pinpoint that to the moment this war started then that I think becomes politically more challenging to to sell to to domestic audiences uh certainly in the United States of America. So there are constraints here as well and I'll finish by just saying look regime change comes with three factors and we've seen one of them already and it comes with three factors namely psychological shock military shock and then public shock.
14:16 The psychological shock is always the removal of a key leader, a key leader changing sides um or fleeing the country. Think Assad. Now, we've had that already clearly Kam and then his successor both getting wiped out in 48 hours. That's there, but it seems the Iranians are somehow absorbing that shock right now. So, you need the other two factors. The military factor. We're looking for troops changing sides, refusing to fight, uh refusing to fire on crowds. uh we haven't seen that yet, but that's certainly what these air strikes are working towards to incentivize uh that situation to happen. And then finally, we're looking for the public shock where people rise up. You start seeing statues being overthrown, palaces overrun, that kind of thing. And when you get all of those three things together, that's usually when regime change happens. And it doesn't happen slowly. Normally, it happens incredibly slowly to start with and then all at once. And the whole thing just goes in in a matter of of hours and days. So those are the things I'm looking for right now and I think that's 15 minutes exactly. So I'll hand
15:20 back to you Lori and we can do some Thank you Andrew. You covered a lot of ground. Um you answered some of the questions that are already in the queue. Um I'm going to take the moderator's liberty of asking the first question and again to the audience please feel free to submit your questions uh to Andrew as well. Um, Andrew, how since the topic of this podcast was supposed to be uh prior to the uh start of the war on Saturday morning um on the Trump peace plan in Gaza, I'm going to try to tie this into that now. Um, how has this impacted what whatever plans were to take place in Gaza? And do you think that ultimately you know more countries more players will join because of the success of this or maybe withdraw because they didn't like the the uh the unilateral action uh between the US and Israel. Um and what is the ultimate impact on Iranian proxies in the region in particular Hamas and Gaza um Hezbollah and Lebanon ahead of the attack on Saturday morning.
16:21 Israel was actually pounding some targets there I guess in in anticipation of of this attack. Um the Houthis are threatening in the straight of Hermuz. So where do you see that the proxies and the impact that this is going to have on Look the Gaza thing I think is just on pause right now that we we seeing all kinds of movement towards various peacekeeping forces that were frankly highly unconvincing like Indonesian troops coming forward and and that sort of thing. Um, the border piece. Look, I think Gaza is a bit of a mess right now, but look, it's America's problem. It's owned by America right now. It's not Israel's problem anymore. Trump has taken that and it's firmly Washington's bag as to what happens there. So, Washington are busy right now. So, we'll they'll be looking again at Gaza once this is all all died down. And I think that's as far as we go with that one.
17:08 When it comes to the proxies, that's more interesting because we've, you know, we've seen Hzbollah heavily degraded over the last two years and certainly in the last month or so, Israel has really up tempo very obviously as a shaping operation uh to minimize any response and obviously they opened fire last night. Again, it was minimal. Um it just shows how effective those Israeli shaping operations had been. So, Hezbollah are are not in a great shape. Um they're still extent. They're still trying to do stuff, but Israel is making sure they never have the opportunity. And and so far, we're seeing that being incredibly successful.
17:45 Uh the Houthis have been surprisingly quiet. So, I was expecting at least a couple of token uh missiles to be logged in the Middle East direction from there, but you know, they got absolutely hammered last year. Um it didn't take them off the off the off the game board, but it certainly degraded their capability to an extent. And since then, we've also seen an incursion from the government of Yemen forces. um pushing the Houthis back slightly. So, they're on the back foot and they're kind of worried about their own survival right now. I don't think they have the time or inclination to be chucking missiles um into the Middle East when they're worried about that. The one that really interests me is the Iraqi militias.
18:23 They are silent ever since 7th of October. They're they're a very significant force. Um at one point they were equal in size to the Iraqi domestic armed forces. um they are a political player certainly, but they haven't lifted a finger so far in support of um in support of the war effort from Iran side. I think that's largely due to American presence and so I do wonder if that might change and we've certainly seen attacks on the US um consulate in Baghdad in the last in the last 24 hours. Um there is every chance that that might escalate to a sort of more domestic insurgency campaign. Um but so far they've been minimal and then there is always that risk but but at the moment it seems to be deterred which is where you want it. The question is I think you know once the war is over if the regime falls what does the insurgency afterwards look like? Is there one? If so does it go transborder?
19:17 Is it is it going to be across the region rather than just in Iran itself? And then what can you do about it? So there's a few questions that are going to raise their heads that we don't have the answers to right now simply because we don't actually know how the war in Iran is going to end yet. Um so there's a few dominoes that need to fall before we can make a fair assessment of where things are going to go going forward. Great. Thank you. Um someone asked if there is a chance that Iran um Iran may fracture into its various ethnic enclaves and would that be advantageous? Yeah, I mean, look, Iran has an advantage over things like Iraq or Libya, uh, or Syria. In as much as they aren't western lines on a map that we drew in the 1920s, I say we, the French, the British. Um, you know, this is a country that's been contiguous for thousands of years. They remember Persia. They remember Cyrus the Great.
20:06 There is a there is a sense of country and history in Iran/Persia that that doesn't exist in other countries around the Gulf. Um that said there are regional grievances with things like the Kurts and that's part of been part of the problem in the past in getting some sort of cohesive opposition together is they all want slightly different things and they rally behind slightly different banners and there's no central point of focus which is why I think for the last 6 months they've been pushing Raza Palavi so much um to try and give that focal point for any any insurrection against the regime.
20:38 Um is civil war a possibility? Yes. Is it a high possibility? Probably not. Um, but it's going to depend a lot on how the regime falls, if it falls, and then what comes next. Um, and hopefully there is some serious planning going on in in Jerusalem and Washington as to what that looks like and how it makes sure that all of those different factions within Iran are happy or happy enough with the with the with the solution they're presented with. Thank you. Uh, someone asked if you see as uh possible reactions or military moves by Turkey, but I I would actually um take that a step further and ask you your thoughts on assuming you know post-war goes in our in our favor. Now you've got this void of power in in the region and you know Turkey has its own or Erdogan has its own his own aspirations of up forming a caliphate in the region. What are your thoughts on Turkey in all of this?
21:36 Well, Turkey are hugely empowered. They did they did really well out of Gaza um as a Muslim Brotherhood country. You know, the way Trump got the hostages released was to bribe Hamas's two biggest backers in in Katar and Turkey. Kata get huge security asurances. They've been boosted now as a a major player in the Gulf, which they never really were. You know, they were hosting World Cup football tournaments. They were hosting a Grand Prix, but it was all pretty bahrain level stuff. um the two years since October the 7th have boosted them into this incredible position of primacy uh when it comes to diplomatic status in the Gulf. So they're they're flying high. Turkey similarly, you know, the F-35 offer they got um was an incredible one given that they still have Russian S400 air defenses, which is why they were booted out of the F-35 program in the first place. Um and then of course they get a free reign in Syria to do to do whatever they want as America withdraws it.
22:29 That's now Turkeykey's playground. So these two countries were hugely boosted by that hostage release deal that Mr. Trump made with them. The um the drama is nature of B is a vacuum and we're going to see the you know if if if the Iranian regime falls to the extent that we hope it will. We're going to see that vacuum appearing across that northern band um above Israel uh in Lebanon and Syria. Um, and there is a danger, I think, that that will be filled by Turkish influence. And it's there's going to be a real influence competition. Um, Israel's got a problem with Lebanon, and that is that their public image there is so low. It doesn't matter which group you're talking about.
23:07 If it's Shiites, if it's Sunnis, if it's Christians, like Israel is not a popular country. I've got friends living in Beirut who even they talk about, you know, these weird greater Israel conspiracy theories and and the fact is Israel bomb their capital city a lot and they don't like it. It's a fairly understandable human reaction. So when you're fighting for influence in a country like Lebanon, Israel starting this this foot race from 400 meters back. Uh and that's going to be quite difficult to overcome. Um Syria is already lost to Turkey, quite frankly. Um Israel's done enough to deter, you know, with the air strikes um during the slaughter of the the Drews, with the seizure of Mount Hermon, with the buffer zone they've they've put into place there. you know, they're safe enough, but the rest of the country, I think, is definitely going to fall within Erdogan's neuttoman empire. Um, so that is a threat to Israel. Um, and of course, all of Israel's enemies play a very, very long game. Um, which is easy to do when you're an autocracy. It's very, very difficult to do when you're Israel and
24:09 you're a democracy. And we see that problem time and time again in countries across the West. We work in electoral cycles, not in generations, half centuries, or centuries. and our enemies have that huge advantage over us in that. So yes, I think Turkey is a significant threat. Uh not as much as it could be um but it's certainly a strategic competition that Israel and any allies of Israel in the region are going to have to manage going forward. Thank you for that. Uh Andrew, I I want to touch on the Gulf nations. Um we did a I held a round table podcast for MEF about two weeks ago on Saudi Arabia and we a lot of the focus was on um the alliance between the Saudis and the UAE, the Amiradis um and and the divide that was developing between them as the Saudis looked like they were turning towards the Muslim Brotherhood allied Turkey and Qatar. But it since this war broke out and Iran has been lobbing missiles and drones at Gulf nations, the Saudis seem to have taken the lead uh on on the defense of the Gulf nations. Do
25:11 you see that as a long-term um development or when this is over, do you think that the Saudis will turn back to Turkey and Qatar? Um, I know just as an aside, the UAE, I saw Bloomberg report earlier that the UAE and Qatar have both lobbyed or are privately lobbying the Trump administration to end this sooner rather than than later. What are your thoughts on how the Gulf nations are playing in all this? Yeah, it's been fascinating and it's certainly the biggest revelation of the weekend, I think, was that it was actually Saudi and Israel were the two that were lobbying Trump to start the war. um given that Saudi's public face had been very very different to that. Uh and what I think that proves and it speaks to the wider answer to this question is that the Gulf States always always always play both sides in public and in private and they never quite tell the truth in the in the public sphere.
26:01 Um they are very slippery um and they will do what is best for them whilst trying to keep everyone happy. That seems to be the theme that's emerged across this. Look, I think stability is the one thing they're really interested in right now. Um, that is a real key driver because instability affects the markets which affects barrel price which affects their ability to spend money and and you know it's all interconnected. We can't just pull the military apart from the economic, the diplomatic and the rest of it. So stability is is the number one thing here. Um, and I think that is that is going to be the the sort of prime driver for those states going forward.
26:39 um at the at the time of the war launching, Iran was starting to look very unstable. Um they were, you know, they've spent two years creating instability that didn't need to be there. 7th of October didn't need to happen. That horror didn't need to happen. They didn't need to cheer it on. And I think that was kind of a penny drop moment in the sense that they realized that Iran was a truly destabilizing factor. But at the same time, they had to balance their own domestic populations who were incredibly riled up about the Palestinian cause. Uh, and the last thing they wanted to do was back Israel so that they ended up with an insurrection on their own streets. So, they've been playing this delicate, delicate balancing act due to the Iranian caused instability for two years and now they've seen an opportunity to try and put it to an end, but immediately stability is going to be their main concern going forward.
27:27 Thank you. And, um, let's tie Russia and China into the picture. Uh do you want to maybe touch on the impact that this war will have on their influence in the region as well as um their domestic situations in particular Russia? Um you know Iran's been supplying Russia with cheap bomb with cheap drones that that now Iran is using against uh the Gulf nations. So what are your thoughts on Russia and and China? Yeah I mean the drones piece is slightly misunderstood because Russia have onshored all of the production of garant as they call it the shahid. So the Iranian drone is the Shahi. The Russian version is the Garan 2. They're pretty much all made in Russia now. Um it's actually the other way around. I think Iran were interested in Garan 2 technology now from Russia because they've advanced it and built on it a bit. [snorts] Um actually I think Russia's a bit of a winner coming out of this because of what it's going to do to to the oil supply piece and and the gas supply. You know, Russia provides I think 40% of the world's gas. Um and then if we look at Trump's operations in Venezuela and
28:32 they together provide 20% of China's oil supply. Um which is going to give America a huge lever over over China going forward. And and look, I don't think this is entirely um you know a humanitarian gesture by Trump to try and free the Iranian people. there was a very clear uh incentive to try and cut that China fuel supply and have some sort of American leverage over them as a result. So this isn't you know completely magnanimous act by the United States. There's definitely some national interest in it as well. Uh so China you know they are the single biggest investor in the Middle East financially and I don't think that will change. Um what I do think will change is perhaps um they're more likely to make trade deals. they're more likely to sort of play a bit more nicely with the United States going forward. Um, Russia will benefit if if gas prices are are stabilized and and you know, I think there's there's less tie here than than perhaps we're we're reading into it. Um, so which is one of the reasons why I think Europe is probably staying out
29:34 because they know that they're going to have to to deal with Eured or wanted in this war particularly, you know, Israel and the USA have got it on the military side. Um, and we're going to have to deal with that instability that comes from Russia going forward. So, it's all a bit of a network. Um, but the main focus, I think, is stability in the Middle East and and that's going to be the biggest thing going forward off this war. Thank you so much, Andrew. And we actually are ending exactly at 30 minutes. So, um, I appreciate you taking the time. I know how busy you are and I hope that everybody follows your very important work as I said on X your Substack. you have a um a podcast yourself and you are making many appearances on in the media. So again, thank you for taking the time. Thank you to the audience for joining us and please do pass the recording on which will be available I believe later this afternoon. Uh it's an important conversation. I learned a lot from you today. So thank you a lot.
30:28 Thanks for having Have a good afternoon everyone.