Webinar or Talk
"If Iran Attacks Israel" with Behnam Ben Taleblu
Watch on YouTube
Description
The Islamic Republic of Iran threatens to respond directly against Israel in response to the execution of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Except for the launching of hundreds of missiles and drones versus Israel on April 13, however, the mullahs have avoided attacking Israel directly. Will they again depart from this pattern? What steps might they take? What concerns might limit the response?
Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focuses on Iranian security and political issues. He has testified before the U.S. Congress, Canada’s parliament, and provided evidence to the U.K. House of Commons. He holds a B.A. from George Washington University and an M.A. from the University of Chicago.
You can follow more of Behnam's work here:
https://www.fdd.org/team/behnam-ben-taleblu/
https://www.fdd.org/projects/iran-program/
Transcript Automatic captions
Source: Automatic captions from YouTube, retrieved October 21, 2026. Automatic captions are machine generated and may misspell names and terms; check the video before quoting.
0:12 all right hello and good afternoon welcome to the Middle East forum's weekly podcast series my name is anaf Kalam and I will be moderating today's discussion we are pleased to be joined by benam Ben tblu a senior fellow at the foundation for the Dem defense of join us today to discuss the topic if Iran attacks Israel Mr TBL will speak for 15 minutes followed by 15 minutes of Q&A from the audience if you wouldd like to ask a question you can feel free to use the Q&A box located at the bottom of your screen to type your question and with that I will turn the floor over to Mr bnam Ben talbl thank you so much shanov it's a pleasure to be with you uh thank you everyone for tuning in today uh let me just say from a distance uh been a longtime reader of the good material that Middle East Forum puts out particularly the journal Middle East gordley if you don't uh read it religiously I highly recommend that you do okay so uh with some of these introductions out of the way let's pivot
1:15 to the region uh where things are quite likely to go boom and with immense respect I'm going to tweak that title because it's looking very much like a matter of when and not if the Islamic Republic of Iran uh would again over overtly and directly attack Israel from its own territory you know we have a saying in Persian and and the saying is T it literally translates to your fear has dropped and the the drop imagery is supposed to be like dropping a glass or a bucket of water a liquid that rushes all the way to the bottom and the fear of the Islamic Republic after April 13 April 14 of an overt and direct but limited Military confrontation against the Israelis has dropped uh you know this was a country a regime I should say that had a four plus decade uh Shadow War uh against the Jewish State as well as against the Americans but increasingly uh with the erosion of deterrence uh with the ability to increasingly danger dangle uh its escalating nuclear program as some kind
2:18 of sort of democles against Israeli pressure against American pressure in particular uh it has been able to allow itself a limited War option while denying others a limited War option against it and then behind this entire evolution in the Strategic thinking of the Islamic Republic is a newfound military capability that is actually underwriting a greater risk tolerance that we're seeing by this regime uh than ever before while for instance you may see a lot of friends of Middle East forum and a lot of friends of the foundation for defense of democracies the thing tank that I've been working at for almost 12 plus years now here in the heart of the nation's capital in Washington DC uh talk about things like the Reagan strategy against Iran or talk about things like going after the Iranian Navy um the present era has created lots of credibility crisis that allow us to kind of immediately revert to that uh such that what may have been
3:20 a to paraphrase the late great Professor Bernard Lewis what may be a deterrent to some is an inducement to others uh there was a time when simply bringing more ships into the region would have uh pushed back some of these Iranian capabilities be they Regional be they nuclear be they missile or or any other kind of threat Matrix that they pose now the regime sees these as opportunities this is quite literally what the commander of the Aerospace force of the Islamic revolutionary guard Corp Amir Ali [ __ ] has been saying and this is brought to you by the growing lethality range Precision maneuverability and reliability of its ballistic missile Force you've had now for roughly two ades perhaps Just a Touch under uh multiple American directors of National Intelligence attest to the Islamic Republic of Iran being home to the largest ballistic missile Arsenal in the Middle East and in the first four months of 2024 the Islamic Republic actually employed these ballistic missiles in overt direct and intri attacks against two nuclear armed countries Pakistan in
4:24 January admittedly what they claimed was against Sunni uh beluch separatist uh as well as against uh Israel uh in April of 2024 during a military operation that they call true promise or in Persian V the ability for the Iranians to manage the politics after each strike also underwrites the next cycle of escalation and if you look since 2017 since the Iranians began to able to use these more precise uh ballistic missiles in their operations there have been about 14 I think now uh over direct military operations involving ballistic missiles from Iranian territory some of you may not know but in September 2022 uh a ballistic missile attack for the first time ever by the Islamic Republic killed an American citizen a Kurdish American who was in Northern Iraq when the regime was firing at Iraqi Kurdistan as it attempted to distract attention from the threat on the home front and that was with the spread of the woman life Freedom Movement in 2022 and 2023 so as these missile capabilities grow the
5:28 threshold to use them has been diminishing and with the employment of them against the Israelis starting in April 13 April 14 uh the regime is looking to find a way to continue its strategy of Death By A Thousand Cuts but on steroids now the fact that every single Iranian military operation involving these projectiles is framed as being in response to something uh also allows the Iranians to ability to use this large Arsenal given that they are framing this as being in response to the killing of isma hania the head of uh hamas's political Bureau even though I don't believe in this kind of needless uh bifurcation that a lot of press and analysts uh ascribe onto that Iran back terrorist organization uh on Iranian territory make no mistake that the cascading term across the Iranian Hardline press uh was the word which translates to blood lust actually uh the regime is looking to basically wash away blood with blood and that's why unlike between April 1 and April 12 where there was a flurry of diplomatic activity the
6:30 regime has really pushed away um from a lot of that diplomatic if you will mediation uh at least publicly this go around with the only major round being Jordan's foreign minister coming to tan to meet with the new Iranian president masud pesan as well as the uh you could say remaining or acting foreign minister uh Mr B R coni uh it's unclear that the foreign minister who probably called for deescalation was able to achieve what he wanted because the Iranians believe they need to be seen as overtly and directly responding to the very public humiliation uh imposed on them by the killing of one major head of an element of the axes of resistance uh who was in ton who was in their nation's capital and if you follow some of the Persian press you'll note that the regime has been trying to do everything it can to cover up the fact that this was a botched security uh Force issue at the heart of uh the killing of hania if you look at the New York Times reporting if you look at the axios reporting it's quite quite clear to me uh that uh the regime indeed did botch the security of
7:34 that facility which was part of which was for is hania given that they said a bomb was planted about five and a half weeks before that individual got there they likely were able to trace or detect where he would go given the fact that since October 7 is hania has twice uh gone to tan uh so they may have been able to tail him or track his cell phone or whatever else One Believes uh but nonetheless the pre-planting of the bomb has been rejected by the Iranian Hardline media they're saying there was a projectile with a 7 kgam Warhead fired externally and they've spent countless time uh and resources in their press and even in their aligned social media to try to push back on this Narrative of security Force penetration and the reason that this narrative is being pushed back by regime Elites is because um there has really been a string really in the past 10 to 15 years uh of covert activity on Iran on Iranian soil that highlights the shortcomings of this Force and reminds everybody that the only thing this force can really do is the mass grotesque domestic suppression that we've seen in multiple iterations
8:37 of Street protests particularly since 2017 when people pushed away from reform and are now seeking wholesale Revolution or change of the system in its entirety rather than settling for a factional reshuffling and you've even had a former Iranian intelligence Minister I think back from 2021 uh say that the Islamic Republic's official should not be sleeping soundly or should not be considered safe at night given the level of this penetration you know Les we forget I think about six or seven Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed on Iranian soil now we've had one member of the ax of resistance killed on Iranian soil two or three missile Engineers have been killed on Iranian soil you've had one member of the irgc in uniform killed on Iranian soil you had multiple cyber attacks and even kinetic attacks on Iranian military facilities like drone storage units uh over the past few years you've had cyber attacks against critical infrastructure you've had the stocket virus back in the day and by the way you've had the theft of the nuclear archive by the Israelis way back in 2018 so when you put this picture together it is not a good report card uh for the
9:41 state of the regime's security forces and that's why there is all this projection and that's why the regime throughout its press this week has been talking very publicly about another public military operation and had us or Israeli deterrence been functioning at the highest of levels it would have in my view been able to Tamp this down but as you know the bid Administration is Seeking a uh contradictory or conflicted course in the region it talks about from one side of its mouth the desire for deescalation in diplomacy but from the other side of its mouth the desire for deterrence you cannot achieve these two things at once in fact once you achieve one you likely fail to be able to provide the other if you're de-escalating you may not be able to Signal the commenor resolve to bolster your deterrence and if you are engaging in a deterrent mission you are likely not going to be able to engage in deescalation because you may need to climb the escalation ladder to really cement uh that deterrence so given this contradiction the Biden Administration finds itself in uh the regime is likely
10:43 again uh going to make it a matter of when and not if they use these overt and direct weapons of war and their press has talked about different attack vectors and for the first time layering on Iranian attacks against Israel uh with proxy attacks against Israel there's specific reference to the capabilities of the houthis in Yemen which essentially for a non-state group have the military of a state they are the only proxy of Iran with medium range ballistic missiles they're the only proxy of Iran with anti-ship ballistic missiles these are really game-changing longrange strike capabilities uh the regime has talked about what Lebanese Hezbollah could do there is increasing reference on social media about what the Iran B militias in Iraq could do they have shorter range projectiles like short range ballistic missiles as well as we think land attack cruise missiles as well as a variant of that sha head deltawing oneway attack drone as well so when you add this up the regime is likely in the M moment of trying to coordinate proxy and Patron Firepower against the Jewish state to try to kind of bolster its deterrence but bolster
11:46 its image of being seen as responding which they think will go quite away um uh in its kind of death by thousand cut strategy against Israel and securing its strategy as well as underwriting its values of death to Israel for those of you who are uh close followers of Iranian domestic politics you know that this these are things that the regime has not been shy about saying or doing I'm reminded of a hame quote back from 2012 uh where he says that you know they would support anybody who is basically fighting the Israelis uh that stuff has grown on steroids now and that's why you can't afford to disconnect the dots particularly in the post October 7 Middle East between Patron and proxy so we are teetering on the edge of a potential region-wide conflict that's why the US has moved at least 4,000 additional US service persons plus lots and lots of more air and missile defense assets that will have the ability to engage in a more integrated missile and air defense architecture plug in with the fact that Israel is now in sencom since 2020 that was one of the big moves under the late end of the Trump
12:49 Administration that allows for more of this interoperability more of this image sharing but also to bring in Arab partners and European Partners online to deny these Iranian projectiles but as technically complex as all of this sounds that may be the easy part because if there is no deterrence by punishment to follow that deterence by denial we will likely find ourselves in the future having another iteration of this conversation where the regime feels that its fear has dropped once again and that it can afford to continue to dangle its conventional options and not just its potential nuclear option against the israelies to push its strategy forward and I think uh with that mouthful and that kind of 360 degree picture I'll end there and try to make sure that we have ample time uh for Q&A given how topical this T this issue is all right well thank you benam that was uh that was an excellent presentation very timely as well uh I'll begin with a question from uh the Middle East Forum president Daniel pipes he says thank you for the excellent survey would you say Iranian leaders are in the
13:53 final analysis afraid or not afraid of Israel's power I think the regime is beginning to move certainly they fear Israeli capabilities uh there was a comment I think by a year and a year and a half ago two years ago by the Armed Force general staff major balery major general balery who was listing out Iranian uh threats to Iranian security and America was not even in the top three uh but certainly the Israelis were so they understand in terms of the capabilities uh the threats that the Israelis can pose but now I would say that because the Israelis are not able to win the politics War the regime feels that it can use military means to achieve its political ends whereas the US and the Israelis remain styed in using military means to only accomplish military ends and that's a very dangerous position for the Israelis to be in unfortunately I would say uh of the course of the past three administrations that's a position that we've been somewhat stuck in and the
14:54 Iranian people the Iranian government uh has been unable has been able ble to unfortunately masterfully exploit between Obama and Trump and Biden uh to dangle that Prospect of a larger war and to gut our resolve rather than our capability I don't think the Iranians should misjudge the resolve of these relies particularly after 10 months against Hamas and Gaza holding back a multif front uh war in the region as well as going after hania uh but by constantly threatening uh that this could get out of hand or that the Israelis uh cannot manage it any longer I think the regime is is beginning to believe its own propaganda and that's a dangerous position to be in and that makes conflict more and not less likely so forgive me for that long-winded answer but I do think the regime understands and fears and appreciates it but is now trying to employ a similar strategy against the Israelis that it has unfortunately successfully employed against the Americans now thank you um now Israel currently is anticipating retaliation
15:57 for the assassination of is hania and other senior Hamas and hisbah leaders uh which may well come on multiple fronts now do you think that this attack might be more or less effective than the April attack on Israel where we saw that a good number of the rockets and drones that were fired by Iran were intercepted by the Saudi and Jordanian air defense before they could even reach Israel and critically I would say in terms of the low and slow flying drones which were fired first uh intercepted between Iraq and Jordan uh simply with them machine guns of the Us f-16s and other air power that existed and there's a sharp contrast one can draw with Ukraine where those Munitions may not be there or may not be there in full and the Russians certainly have more air power uh and that's why Iranian drones work for lack of better word in Ukraine but don't work for lack of better word as they have to Traverse this trajectory towards Israel they are low and slow they can be shot down um so that also was one major handicap the regime had here I think
16:59 it's a question of if the regime is going to up the volume or up the quality but I certainly think it wants to up The lethality uh even in their Hardline press this week they've been talking a lot about uh going after kind of the defense industrial base of the Israelis rather than limited targeting of the bases they've talked about uh how they want to do a 360 degree attack so you could have simpler Munitions potentially from Hezbollah or the houthis uh designed to overwhelm the same Target from the North and the South uh this is always an option uh unfortunately I think the regime does have a lot to play with and uh there is ample question as to how well could they militarily coordinate different iterations of a multi-directional attack um but what the regime has also said at least in its semiofficial media again no official has said this but the semiofficial media has hinted that Converse uh contrast to April 1314 where it was about a couple of hours long operation this would be a several days long operation kind of lulling you into a false sense of security and then escalating in and then lulling you such that you have what
18:02 general McKenzie called would take over the region which is a a series of precision fires Wars well thank you um we have a question now from Stephen Holstein who asks how can Iran continue to arm itself Hamas hisbah the hutis and the Iraqi Shia militias given that its currency has been in freef Fall for quite some time now its currency has been in free fall but it has unfortunately been able to generate significant revenues under the B administration's policy of unenforced oil sanctions I think the first major attempt to enforce these penalties came in May 2022 uh that's a year and a half into the administration uh and still now you still have some record setting highs of uh oil flows and even petrochemical flows which you can sell at higher than uh the oil barrel price uh going to East Asia particularly to China and that is even with the insurance issues and ship to- ship trans transfers and the whole uh undistributed midds of the cost of basically engaging in a smuggling
19:03 operation on the high seas nonetheless a couple things to point out if you remember way back in the day in the days of Saddam in the days of H al- Assad in the days of Gaddafi the trend line in the region was the bad guys have scuds the good guys have Jets uh this a lot of this has changed particularly with the Islamic Republic being the Region's preeminent missile Arsenal now because they are the bad guy now with with the projectiles uh but these are in essence weapons of the weak that we don't mean to devalue them or to Rob them of that Precision or that lethality the worst thing we can do is to rob an adversary of agency or to not take the threats that they make seriously but when I say weapons of the weak is that that which we have to spend we here in the west have to spend to credibly track and intercept and then uh destroy these projectiles is much much more expensive uh than the projectiles that then they have to five and that's what I mean by weapons of the week so costs are always relative that's one thing to keep in mind and when you look at what DOD
20:05 unfortunately is struggling with and I think that's what general Killa a few weeks ago when he sent that famous letter that I think the Wall Street Journal reported on about the shortcomings of the operation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of aen to to intercept uh a lot of these Hy Munitions it was evident to me that DOD was on the wrong side of the cost curve there that we're paying so much more uh to intercept these Munitions that do not C cost this much and we're unable to affect the Strategic calculus with this interception mission of the people firing these projectiles and that's what we have to remember right thank you now Carrie hillbrand asks is there any evidence of fracturing in the Iranian regime or irgc that may lead to regime instability if not regime change there is significant fracturing uh but this is much more of a of a video kind of issue issue or a you know recorder issue a story of change over time rather than a snapshot that I can present to you uh but nonetheless uh
21:08 you haven't had the kind of major elite fracturing in the traditional sense but you've had the elite slicing for example uh someone that the regime did not permit to run uh in the 2021 and current uh electoral contest that brought about massud pesan is someone like lar janni the lar Janis have been likened to the k ities of Iran for example I'm doing the political level first because it's more overt and easier to detect um so you've had a narrowing of the ultra Hardline Elite um you've likely had that with the irgc as well I remember during the time of the killing of Mosen fak mahabadi the country's Chief nuclear scientist in uh November 2020 uh at the tail end of that year there was a very good BBC report that actually at the end of its assessment of how the Israelis May been able to puncture the Iranian Security State mentioned that there actually were parts of Ean prison that famous notorious political prison in tan uh that were just devoted uh for having some of where they would throw you know
22:11 misbehaving irgc or what they would deem was unloyal irgc you've had the regime even very recently kind of engage in a mass arrest policy after the killing of hania we don't know if this is political theater or if they're randomly taking people but they understand how penetrated they are that penetration has not led to overt political fracture in the military establishment yet uh but it's something to keep your eyes on in the future but me a proponent of pressure would be content with us escalating pressure over time even though in the short term opponents of pressure would say this makes regime Elites more cohesive I would say yes in the short term hence my illusion to a video rather than a snapshot because in the short term the theory of pressure says that those Elites that they are cutting themselves plus created by the structural conditions would come together but once you have them together and you continue to squeeze now these more lik minded Elites have to compete with one another over that dwindling pool of resources and as they continue to face domestic pressure and exogenous
23:15 pressure be political economic and even military uh they will make mistakes and then when they make mistakes those are the opportunities for the west and for America and Israel and even the Iranian people to be able to capitalize on so there is no one snapshot I can provide to you to say that this would be a prospective ability for us to transition to a better regime change policy but I can make the case of how to move the theory of maximum pressure from Behavior change to a regime Change option if it is given the sufficient time to be able to be employed thank you now Paul Ross would like to ask since the Iranians almost certainly will attack what are are the chances the Israelis will attack preemptively and if so what could such an attack look like I think right now preemptively the Israelis would not attack it depends also if you mean by preemptively an attack against a facility that they believe the Iranians hold dear kind of in that shellian sense threaten that which they hold dear and
24:18 the hopes that the damage they incurred by I don't know a missile attack against some military facility for example would be sufficient to deter or dissuade a I don't think the Israelis are in that world yet but B the kind of thinking that would be able to say hey we're watching you consistently would be brought to you by an ISR capability that the Americans have at the 500,000 foot level versus the Israelis and in military terms uh no pun intended these are called law or left of launch operations kinetic and electronic warfare and even cyber options against the specific Munitions and command and control networks to launch those Munitions um I don't the Israelis or even the Americans uh by any public indication that I've seen be willing to embrace the risks that would come with either a strike in the schellingian sense to threaten that which they hold dear before the regime launches or to be able to connect those dots on command and control and engage in a left of launch operation against those specific nodes that would be firing those
25:20 missiles so I think that uh is where we today thank you now uh to follow up Stephen Miller would like to ask uh does Iran see the us as unwilling to retaliate for a major attack on Israel um unfortunately almost yes almost certainly I should say when we look at the April 13 April 14 attack one major force that redounded to the security dividend of the Islamic Republic was the uh politically unfortunately rightly placed gamble or risk or assessment by the regime that in the commencement of a scenario that could lead to a significant escalation the Americans would come down harder on the partner that was their Ally rather than the partner that was their adversary so as to stem that escalation spiral uh that continues to be borne out in the rhetoric of the Biden Administration today the second kind of force operating in the background is
26:22 again that threat of nuclear escalation and that's precisely why both before and after uh April you had a lot of Iranian officials kind of come out and talk about a a bomb in the basement option or in February 2024 you had Salah the former atomic energy Chief talk about a nuclear bomb being like a car and they just have to drop the engine in or even in this turbulent period between April 1st and April 13 and April 19 you've had an irgc official from a command that we don't even really know of the nuclear security command uh talk about essentially pushing Iran towards that military option and together this kind of nuclear escalation threat plus the political Prospect uh the the politics threat of of a wider Regional War together magnify as uh forces that the regime can use to handcuff Israel and uh it is a dubious political situation when an adversary like the Islamic Republic who calls America the great Satan can actually also count on said great Satan to restrain said little Satan which is
27:24 Israel in the parland of the Islamic thank you now um we're uh getting close to the end here I think we have time for maybe one or two more uh step Gilbert would like to ask will the US pressure Israel not to go on the offensive will the US will the US pressure Israel not to go on the offensive I think all indications point to that again election season oil process ECT price changes particularly given the status of the stock market today um as well as past is prologue given the April 13 April 14 and the successful interceptions uh coupled with obviously that conflicting mission for deescalation versus deterrant you add those four forces together and you get an equation for American restraint and pressure against Israel that ends up functioning in that deterrent dividend favoring the Islamic Republic at least politically like I answered in the
28:26 previous question so all lse equal those four forces will be at play all right well thank you very much uh I think we have unfortunately reached the end of our podcast for this week uh I want to thank you again benam for taking the time to join us this week and bless us with your encyclopedic knowledge of the region thank you it's a pleasure great to be with you all it's a pleasure as well uh and for our viewers and listeners and our audience is there somewhere where they can go where they can follow more of your work uh sure uh I have a page on the FDD website that's fd.org uh Frank delad delta.org I have a page there that has a lot of my writings and Analysis and commentary as well as media appearances and then while I don't have a social media presence the FDD Iran Twitter uh account uh amplifies the work of myself and many of the other Iran experts in the organization all right thank you and uh for those of you who uh will be watching this on the YouTube recording I will be sure to drop those links in the
29:29 description of the video here but once again uh we want to thank you all for joining us and for your participation please be sure to join us on Wednesday for our Israel Insider podcast with Ashley Perry and with that I hope you all have a wonderful day thanks